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Abstract
The moral philosophy of Dai Zhen can be summarised as “fulfil desires and 
express feelings”. Because he believed that life is the most cherished thing for all man 
and thing, he maintains that “whatever issues from desire is always for the sake of life 
and nurture.” He also claimed that “caring for oneself, and extending this care to those 
close to oneself, are both aspects of humanity" He set up a strong monastic moral 
philosophy based on individual human desire and feeling.
As the title ‘Dai Zhen’s philosophy of the ethical human being’ demonstrate, human 
physical body and activities of life is ethical base of philosophy of Dai Zhen. He regards 
the cause of activities for life is desire and feeling and he claimed that it is the prime 
concern of his moral philosophy. He set up a strong monastic moral philosophy base on 
the individual human desire and feeling to establish man as the moral subjectivity.
Dai Zhen applied a systematic research agenda and built on palaeography and 
phonology to reconstruct the meaning of the Canons to become a sage by using the 
"meanings" of words as a method of reconstructing the "intentions" of the words of 
Canons, rather than by using metaphysics and intuitive meditation.
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The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes
Quan-ji
Dai Z h e n ^ R  Dai Zhen quan-jiMMHkM(The Complete works of Dai Zhen). v.1-7. 
An-hui cong-shu Huang-shan-shu-sheW:ih^t±. 1997.
Yuan shan
Dai Z h e n U lt, Yuan-shan M l? , Commentary by An Zheng-hui ^JEW : Dai Zhen 
zhu-zuo-xuan-ji (Selected works of Dai Zhen, with commentaries).
Beijing: Zhong-hua shu-ju^^WM). 1978. Quan-ji. v.6.
Xu-yan
Dai Zhen I tR ,  Xu-yan Wim(The Prolegomena) Dai Zhen quan-ji V.6. An-hui
cong-shu Huang-shan-shu-she H i l l  H i t .  1997.
Shu-zheng
Dai ZhenUfcjH, Meng-zi zi-yi shu-zheng” Commentary by An Zheng-hui
Dai Zhen zhu-zuo-xuan-ji f F i l i l  Beijing: Zhong-hua shu-ju^p^WiM).
1978. Quan-ji. v.6.
Xing-zhuang
Hung P a n g P ^ , Dai Dong-yuan xian-sheng xing-zhuang 
(Biographical account o f Master Dai Zhen), Quan-ji, v.7.
Nian-pu
Duan Yu-cai^B1$, ‘Dai Dong-yuan xian-sheng nian-pu 
(Chronological biography of Dai Zhen),Quan-ji V.6.
Ewell Trans.
This dissertation will follow the Ewell’s translation (Ewell, John Woodruff. Reinvention 
the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the meanings o f Terms in Mencius 
(1777). Berkeley, CA, Unpublished PhD Dissertation in history, 1990.), not only 
because it is an excellent translation but also because it has nowadays become the 
standard translation of Dai Zhen in English-speaking academia: Philip Ivanhoe and the 
Internet Chinese Philosophy Text Archive, for instance, use Ewell’s translation.
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Introduction
Dai Zhen (1724-1777) was a philosopher and eminent evidential scholar of 
the mid-Qing era. As a direct result of Dai Zhen’s influence, important Confucian 
concepts and ideas have undergone philological study that has proved fruitful in 
text critics, and has proved equally productive in the context of Chinese moral 
philosophy.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was broadly held 
amongst scholars of Chinese philosophy that Dai Zhen, regarded as a social 
philosopher and as one of the foremost evidential scholars of the mid-Qing era, 
was the strongest contender to Zhu Xi, the founder of Neo Confucianism and the 
author of orthodox commentaries on the Canons, in particular the Four Books.
However, in the mid-eighteenth century, when Dai Zhen was in Beijing, 
although his philological works were held in high regard, few found in favour of 
his philosophical works. On reading his philosophical treatise Inquiry into 
Goodness (Yuanshan) one of his contemporaries Zhu Yun expressed the view 
that “he had wasted his energy on something useless,” and merely praised Dai 
Zhen’s skill at glossing words and terms, and his knowledge of the Six Canons 
and the nine branches of mathematics.1
1 Benjamin A. Elman. From Philosophy To Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change 
in Late Imperial China. Cambridge: Harvard Council of East Asian Studies, 1990.pp.106-107.
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The intellectual climate of the following century was completely different. 
Confucian literati became increasingly receptive to philosophical issues, and 
once again stressed the moral aspects of Confucian discourse. The distinguished 
scholar and patron Ruan Yuan (1764-1849) composed essays on Confucian 
philosophy modelled on Dai’s linguistic approach to philosophical terms.
Ruan’s treatise made use of etymological and phonological procedures to 
reconstruct the meanings of key Confucian concepts. The antithesis of Dai Zhen 
and Zhu Xi inspired the thinkers who strongly demanded reform of the Qing 
Dynasty. Dai Zhen’s philosophy found support among social reformers, 
essentially because it represented a possibility of social change. At the same 
time, Dai’s criticism also provoked responses from the defenders of the Zhu Xi 
orthodoxy, such as Fang Dongshu (1772-1851), who was a staunch advocate of 
the Neo Confucian orthodoxy.2
In the twentieth century, even previous radicals such as Zhang Binglin and 
Liu Shipei agreed on the impact of Dai Zhen’s philosophy, followed by Liang 
Qichao and Hu Shi. Also, Feng Yulan, Qian Mu and Yu Yingshih carried out 
research on Dai Zhen in the context of Chinese philosophy.3
However, whilst acknowledging the impact of Dai’s philosophy, a great 
disparity can be seen in the academics’ evaluations of his works. Zhang Binglin
2 ibid. p.21.
3 ibid. pp.21-22. Feng Yulan’s(1895-1990) wrote on Dai Zhen in the second volume of his 
History of Chinese Philosophy in 1934.
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was the first important writer to focus on Dai’s philosophy. His learning was 
inherited from the Wan School, and his interest in Qing intellectual history 
undoubtedly had an influence on the later scholars Liang Qichao and Qian Mu.4 
Zhang was the first to distinguish between the Song Confucians’ aims and Dai’s. 
Liang Qichao and Hu Shi were eager to espouse anti-Song Neo Confucian 
philosophy, since they felt it was Song Neo Confucianism that bore chief 
responsibility for social injustice and material backwardness in China, traditionally 
the country’s most glaring weaknesses. Feng Yulan, however, found Dai’s 
philosophy neither profound nor especially creative as compared with that of the 
Song Neo Confucians whom Dai criticised. Qian Mu, on the other hand, was a 
Confucian scholar, whose interpretation of the history of ideas followed the 
orthodox tradition. Later, Yu Yingshi compared Dai Zhen with Dai’s contemporary, 
the famous Qing historian Zhang Xuecheng.
Dai Zhen’s philosophy certainly seems politically radical on the surface, and 
does contain some elements of modern thinking. However, it is suggested that 
Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng and Inquiry into Goodness are not radical philosophical 
works but rather profound works on human nature and goodness, using 
Kaozheng methods to analyse key concepts in Confucian philosophy.
Time after time, Dai’s works have come to be regarded as so radical. 
However, it is not Dai Zhen’s work that has changed but the time and situations 
that have surrounded it. Trends of intellectual discourse have changed in
4 Elman 1990. p.22.
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accordance with the political climate, and there has been a switch from the old 
version of the Canon to the new.
Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scholars 
have argued over Dai Zhen’s philosophy and have examined the Canons and 
Classics following Dai Zhen’s instructions. His research method is still highly 
praised in many Chinese disciplines and his philosophy is utilised in some 
modern methods of analysis; furthermore, Dai Zhen’s work has always been 
central to discussions of the mid- and late Qing period in both philosophy and 
evidential research.5
The aim of this dissertation is draws a comprehensive understanding of the 
moral philosophy of Dai Zhen. Throughout the research, the central idea of Dai 
Zhen’s philosophy is taken to be the elucidation of the view of the goodness of 
human nature and of the way to become an ideal man. It is clear that the aim of 
Dai’s philosophy is to create a new conception of the human and the sage as 
compared to that of the Neo Confucians, and it is clear that the fundamental 
principle of Dai’s works is clearly declared that the Preface of Shuzheng, to cite 
the philosophical arguments in the Canons in order then to challenge the wrongs 
resulting from the flawed philosophy of Neo-Confucianism. To do so, it is 
necessary to elucidate the whole structure of Dai’s moral philosophy; this is the
5 Li Kai, Dai Zhen Pingzhuan, (Life and Thought of Dai Zhen), Nanjng University press. 1992. 
p.3.
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first attempt at schematising the structure and at reaching a comprehensive 
understanding of Dai’s moral philosophy by illuminating Dai’s concept of the 
human and the sage in the light of Dai’s moral philosophy. Therefore this 
dissertation titled ‘Dai Zhen’s philosophy of the ethical human being’ to represent 
his philosophical assertion on man’s body and activities for life itself is ethical and 
the sage is the man who fulfils the moral possibility of the ethical human.
As shown above, both positive and negative criticism to Dai Zhen’s work 
has persisted over the centuries. Advocators of Neo Confucianism have used Dai 
Zhen to refine their own theology;6 whilst radical activists have used the 
potentially revolutionary aspects of Dai Zhen’s philosophy to support their political 
activities.7 It is perhaps for this reason that Dai Zhen is still not a very well 
understood as a philosopher. To understand Dai Zhen more precisely, it is 
necessary to focus on the issues within Dai Zhen’s philosophy itself in isolation 
from these other, extraneous factors.
Phenomenological method and hermeneutics are the appropriate methods 
for elucidating Dai Zhen’s philosophical system. In phenomenological method, 
applying intuition and approaching Dai Zhen’s philosophy empathically makes for 
a solid base from which to view the philosophy from Dai Zhen’s own viewpoint. 
Placing oneself as far as possible within Dai Zhen’s viewpoint will help prevent
6 See Fan Dongshu and Qian Mu’s Lifie and philosophy of Dai Zhen. Quanji,, Voi.7.
7 See Zhang Binglin, Shi Dai (interpretation of Dai Zhen), Quanji,, Vol.7.
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misunderstandings and, ultimately, to draw an outline of the structure of the 
whole better than has been achieved previously. From the time of Confucius, 
hermeneutics has been used to interpret and understand culture and the 
Canons.8 Dai Zhen also tried to interpret the original Chinese Confucian tradition 
anew and to understand it properly. Therefore, to understand Dai Zhen, it must 
be necessary to apply hermeneutics as a methodology, but it is suggested that a 
strong phenomenological slant should be given to this particular application of 
hermeneutics.9
Before moving on, it would be helpful to say a brief word on translations. 
There is only one translation of Dai Zhen’s Inquiry into Goodness (M U),10 but 
several of his work on Mencius. One of these, Annping Chin and Mansfield 
Freeman’s translation, Dai Zhen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and 
Meanings ), is in general an unreliable work.11 Another version is
Torbjon Loden’s Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of the Words
8 Conficuis, Analects, 7:01
9 See David E. Cooper. World philosophies, Blackwell publishing, oxford, 2003. pp.170-2, 445- 
8. for phenomenology, see pp.437-444.
10 Chungying Cheng, Tai Chen's Inquiry into Goodness, East-West Center Press University of 
Hawaii. 1971.
11 Annping Chin, Freeman M. Tai Chen on Mencius: Exploration in words and meaning, Yale 
University Press. 1990.
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of Mencius?2 but the latest and best translation of the text is John Ewell’s Dai 
Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777).13
Sagehood was the predominant motive and goal of scholars before the 
beginning of the Qing; as such, the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasty Confucians 
stressed the cultivation of moral perfection as the ultimate concern. They 
developed complex metaphysics to support their philosophy of ethics. However, 
after the Qing dynasty everything changed. Those who inherited power became 
scholars, their legacy in turn being a scholarly community that encouraged and 
valued vivid, creative and accurate critical research on the Canons.14
Hamaguchi Fujio claimed that Qing evidential scholars such as Dai Zhen 
had in mind a systematic research agenda that built on palaeography and 
phonology to reconstruct the meaning of the Canons. Later Wang Niansun (EE 
Wd and his son Wang Yinzhi (E E 3 1 ^ )  extended Dai's approach and attempted to 
become sages by using the "meanings" of Chinese words as a method of 
reconstructing the "intentions" of the words of Canons, rather than by using 
metaphysics and intuitive meditation.15 However, in this dissertation it is claimed 
that Dai Zhen’s original concept of “intention” and of seeking the “meaning” of the
12Torbjon Loden. Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of the Words of Mencius, 
Bulletin of Museum of Far Eastern Antiquites, no. 60, Stockholm:1988.165-313.
13Ewell, John Woodruff. Reinvention the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the 
meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777). Berkeley, CA, Unpublished PhD Dissertation in history, 
1990. John Ewell kindly approved to use and quote of his translation in my thesis.
14 Elman. 1990. p3.
15Kuhn, Philip. Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1796-1864. Cambridge, Havard University Press, 1970. p157.
11
Canons was in fact the same as the truth of sages and the way to be a sage. Dai 
demonstrates a concept of human nature in the context of the moral philosophy 
of the Canons.16 He is not only a Confucian who subjected Confucian moral 
philosophy to philological study, but also a very profound Confucian who 
concentrated on the Canon and sought a systematic way of thinking about 
human nature and seeking the way to be a sage based on the ethical philosophy 
of the Canons.17
Dai Zhen devoted his philosophical passion to Zhu Xi, when he was young. 
Therefore, Dai Zhen was well acquainted with Zhu Xi’s philosophical writings and 
he passed local exam and tried to pass the metropolitan exam that exam 
question is Zhu Xi’s commentary of the Canons. Also Dai Zhen quoted some Zhu 
Xi’s commentaries in his commentaries.18 His knowledge on Zhu Xi and Neo 
Confucianism is well enough accuracy but his understanding on Buddhism is not 
well known.
Dai Zhen intended to discard the Song Confucian notions of human and 
sage that were based on the fallacies and mistakes of Zhu Xi’s theory, and to 
build a solid base from which to promote the correct understanding of human 
nature and sagehood. It is argued that Dai Zhen’s real aim and purpose was in
16 Chan, Wingtsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963. p.711.
17 Li Kai, 1992. p23.
18 See Dai Zhen’s early commentary on lunyu, Quanji,, v.1.
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fact to replace entirely the earlier Neo Confucian idea of the human with the 
Canon’s concept of human nature.19
Dai’s Shuzheng declared that Neo Confucian // (principle) is based upon 
fallacy and error and had over the course of history become mixed with 
heterodoxy such as Daoism and Buddhism. Dai Zhen criticises the Neo 
Confucian idea of principle, because he does not believe that there is such a 
thing as principle. Dai claims that Zhu Xi built up his concept of human nature 
and his idea of the sage alongside a version of principle that is borrowed from 
heterodoxy, and that this adopted concept of principle has distorted the concept 
of Dao. Dai Zhen rejects Zhu Xi’s principle - at the same time as he rejects the 
concept that ‘a man can possess principle'20 - because there is no mention of 
such principle in the Canon: he does not believe that man has “principle” and 
"human nature", as the Song Confucians claimed. Dai Zhen’s criticism of the 
Song Confucians therefore rejects the possibility of a philosophical anthropology 
on which the debate on human nature is necessarily based.
Criticism plays a very important role in Dai’s philosophical approach. As the 
German philosopher Emmanuel Kant has shown, criticism consists of analysing 
and reflecting upon limits. In this sense, philosophical criticism is a fully 
philosophical practice that is necessary in creating a philosophy. But if the 
Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has so as not to
19 Dai Zhen, Xu Yen, Article 2, Quanji, v. 6.
20 Dai Zhen, Shuzheng, article 15.
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transgress them.21 Dai Zhen’s criticism is a fully philosophical practice that is 
necessary in creating a philosophy, and even Dai Zhen transgresses the 
limitation of Zhu Xi’s theory. Dai Zhen knows what the limits of Song and Neo 
Confucian philosophy are and tries to transgress them intentionally. It seems that 
with Dai Zhen, critical questioning is turned into positive philosophical 
investigation. In Dai’s philosophical system, criticism is no longer to be practiced 
in the search for universal principle, but rather as an evidential investigation 
directed towards the constitution of a moral philosophy based on the Canons, 
and towards building a concept of human nature as the subject of what the sages 
referred to in the canon, but without the limitations of the Neo Confucian 
perspective.
These evidential research inquiries have their methodological coherence in 
the evidential study of practices envisaged simultaneously as a technological 
type of rationality and as strategies for the interpretation of the Canons22 His 
evidential works focus mainly on rebuilding the Canons free from the 
contamination of heterodox theories such as Buddhism, Daoism and Western 
science.23 His mathematics, astrology and calendar works in particular sought to
21 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, What is Enlightenment ? Paul Rabinow ed., Pantheon 
Books, 1984. p.42.
22 In here, I apply the Michel Foucault's philosophical method on Dai Zhen. See Michel Foucault, 
1984, p.43.
23 LiKai, 1992, p.3.
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restore and explain the ancient Chinese systems in order to repel the European 
science introduced later by the Jesuits.24
Dai Zhen was a strong ethical realist because he claimed moral base of 
human nature commence physical body and activities of life and concrete things 
in human life. Dai Zhen regards the cause of activities for life is desire and feeling 
and he claimed that it is the prime concern of his moral philosophy. He set up a 
strong monastic moral philosophy base on the individual human desire and 
feeling. Therefore he is called ethical realist.
However the concreteness of moral is positively not the result of his 
observation on natural phenomenon but the research through the words of 
ancient Canons. Dai Zhen’s ‘nature’ references the sense of characters of texts 
called Dao rather than actual nature.25
The moral philosophy of Dai Zhen can be summarised as “fulfil desires and 
express feelings” 26 Because he believed that life is the most cherished thing for 
all man and thing, he maintains “whatever issues from desire is always for the 
sake of life and nurture.”27 He also claimed that “caring for oneself, and 
extending this care to those close to oneself, are both aspects of humanity”28 He
24 Ibid.
25 Yu Yingshi noted that Dai Zhen wanted to prove that his reasonings were not just empty 
thoughts but were rooted in texts. Yu Yingshi, Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng, Quanji, vol.7. 
p.580
26 Shuzheng, Article 10.
27 Ibid.
28 Shuzheng, Article 21..
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set up a strong monastic moral philosophy based on individual human desire and 
feeling.
This dissertation consists of four chapters, which attempt to give a complete 
picture of the philosophy of Dai Zhen in accord to the Preface of Shuzheng.
Firstly, in order to introduce Dai Zhen I shall introduce his life and works in 
the setting of the formation and development of a distinguished academic 
community. Concerning his life and evidential works on various fields, Dai’s 
writings are deemed to be a form of translation of the labours of diverse 
philosophical inquiries. Dai Zhen’s three major philosophical writings - On 
Goodness, Prolegomena, and Commentary on the Words and Meanings of 
Mencius - are introduced in detail. The titles of his works demonstrate that what 
he tries to deal with to built the original sense of Confucius and Zhou Civilization: 
the ancient words and meaning: through the contexts and definitions of work of 
Mencius and the contents of words: the goodness.29
Under the heading of The Intellectual Milieu of Dai Zhen’ in the second 
chapter, I shall detail the philosophical genealogy and originality of Dai Zhen and 
show the effects of his influence. This chapter is displayed the opponents and 
friends of Dai Zhen who insisted that the champion of ancient and Confucius’ Dao. 
30 In this respect, his relations with his contemporaries, the research of later
29 Shuzheng, Preface: And once Confucius did speak them, actually articulation what the former 
Sages had left unsaid, without Confucius who would be able to follow and hear?
30 Ibid, Mencius disputed with Yang and Mo. When later men, accustomed to hearing the
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scholars and Dai Zhen’s own influences will be expounded. Although Dai Zhen 
had no opportunity to meet the Song Confucians he criticised so fiercely, he did 
come into contact with Neo Confucians everywhere he lived throughout his life. I 
shall suggest that Dai Zhen’s focus with regard to criticism was on contemporary 
concerns rather than on Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming. Historically Dai Zhen’s 
philosophy was so effective and successful precisely because he was a 
philosopher who was aware of the Zeitgeist and took a keen interest in 
contemporary concerns. Also in this chapter, I shall briefly draw a modern 
comparison between Dai Zhen and British empiricist D. Hume and elucidate my 
latest research on the comparison between Dai Zhen and the French philosopher 
M. Foucault.
Chapter Three describes the method Dai Zhen applied to his studies, which 
can be regarded as the basis of his originality. For Dai Zhen, the methodology is 
seriously important to his philosophy. His method is not a excavate tool or ladder 
for the Dao but it is the only way to ancient sages and that is come from the 
Confucius and Mencius.31 If He employed a linguistic approach in order to
language of Yang, Mo, Lao. Zhang, and Buddha, moreover use this language to make 
nonsense of the language to make nonsense of the language of Mencius;
31 This Chapter also follows the Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng, Preface: Thereupon Mencius could not 
refrain from engaging in disputation. ...In the writings of Mencius there is (a text) which says, “I 
know language.” And (another) which says "it is difficult for language to come up to the 
expectation of someone who has studied under a sage.” For the error of language does not end 
with language, but will alter the dispositions of men’s heart; and when the heart suffers this 
beclouding, necessarily it harms the conduct of affairs and of government leading them on
17
determine the precise meanings of terms in the text by evidential study. In the 
first section, the history and concept of evidential study is explicated, and later the 
two methods that Dai Zhen employed in the Shuzheng are described in detail.
Dai Zhen sets out two ways to build his philosophy on the bedrock of critical and 
constructive methods; these are not merely methodological but fundamentally 
philosophical. One is to display the limits of earlier metaphysics, and the other is 
to build a possible new concept of the human using the Canons and the Way as 
justification.32
The last chapter is devoted to the philosophy of Dai Zhen, that is to say the 
shape of Dai Zhen’s moral philosophy, it is here that we see what Dai Zhen really 
wants us to know and what he desires from the old Canons. The philosophical 
content of Dai’s moral philosophy can be divided into three areas. They are the 
metaphysics of the way, human nature, and ethics. Chapter four consists of four 
sections: the philosophy of the human being; metaphysics; the ethical human 
being; and learning, morality and the Canons.
with seductive language which enters deeply into men’s hearts and bring great calamity on the 
people without anyone even awakening, how can one refrain from disputation!
32 Ling Yicheng , Shibuchuan yu Dai Zhen de Jiejing fangfa (Commentary of Book of Odes and 
Methods of Dai Zhen), Taipei, Wenlu publisher. 1995. pp.67-93.
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I. The Life and Works of Dai Zhen
This chapter demonstrates that what Dai Zhen attempts to re-built the words 
of Confucius and Zhou Civilization.
Although Dai Zhen’s life seems to resemble that of an ordinary self­
established scholar of the mid-Qing period, his achievement was extraordinary.
He was the founder of the dominant evidential research school Wan, and the 
philosophical successor of Gu Yanwu (1613-82), the founder of the Qing 
philosophical trend. His efforts to attain the truth through the veil of an orthodoxy 
contaminated by heterodoxy initiated a new era of Qing scholarship.33
Dai Zhen’s life-long search for the truth of the Canons, all his works and all 
his activities are closely related to his own quest for the truth. Dai’s philosophical 
works and analysis are concerned chiefly with his linguistic approach and with 
scientific and mathematical and calendrical understanding. His aim is to restore 
and explain the Chinese Classical texts without the help of western mathematics 
and science. Dai Zhen devoted his life to mastering all aspects of ancient Zhou 
culture, because he believed that in this ancient culture could be found the 
original Confucian truth (Dao). Most of his philosophical works also have the clear
33 Bao Guoshun, Dai Zhen yanjiu (Research of Dai Zhen), Guoli bianyiguan, Taipei, 1998, p20.
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aim of restoring the original meaning of the Canons and the Classics so as to free 
them from heterodoxy and other outside influences.34
1. The Life of Dai Zhen
Dai Zhen was born on 19th January 1724, as the first son to a poor second-
hand cloth merchant. For generations, his family lived in Lungfu, a village in 
Xiuning County just a short distance from Zhejiang and Jiangxi. His hometown 
Xiuning was part of the mountainous region of the Huizhou prefecture.35
According to biographers of Dai Zhen, Hong Bang (1745-1779) and Duan 
Yucai (1735-1858), Dai Zhen did not speak at all until he was eight years old, at 
which point he suddenly started to talk. He could read fluently when he began to 
speak and memorised thousands of words a day. Even as a child, Dai Zhen was 
obsessed with knowing the truth, and relied more on common sense than on faith 
or authority.36 Dai attended the local school, because his family could not afford 
a private tutor. He made great efforts to understand each and every possible 
meaning of the words he encountered. His hunger for truth was satisfied after 
reading the Shuowen jiezi (an explanation of the sentence and an analysis of 
characters), which he loved so much that he studied every single item in it. He
34 Li Kai, 1992, p2,
35 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.1.
36 Xingzhuang p. 4.Quanji, v. 7. Nianpu p. Q50.Quanji. V. 6.
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also studied the Shisanjing zhushu (Commentaries and Sub-commentaries to the 
Thirteen Canons),37
When he was sixteen, Dai Zhen accompanied his father on a long trade trip, 
during which he found a job as a schoolteacher in the town of Shaowu near 
Fujian. He stayed there for two years.38
Jiang Yong (1681-1762) was a lecturer at the local Neo Confucian academy 
called Ziyang Shuyuan.39 In 1750, Dai was one of the young scholars visiting the 
academy in order to attend lectures and take part in discussions. Dai generally 
accepted Jiang’s instruction but did not follow his Neo Confucianism. Jiang 
encouraged him to continue detailed research not as a teacher but as a senior 
colleague and scholar.40 Dai Zhen stayed there for about two years, during which 
time he formed important ties with such talented Huizhou scholars such as Wang 
Wufeng, Fang Ji, Cheng Yaotian, Jin Bang, and Zheng Mu 41
In the mid-Qing era, there arose a massive scholastic movement against 
Zhu Xi and Neo Confucianism, which had hegemony over Imperial China. Critical 
scholars demanded that, in contrast to Song learning, they were looking for a 
clear understanding of their classical tradition with a solid base of study that no 
other opinion could challenge. For this, they required concrete evidence and firm
37 Nianpu p651. Quanji. V. 6.
38 Xingzhuang pp. 5,6. Quanji. V. 7.
39 Nianpu pp. 654-655.
40 Yu Yingshi (1966), Quanji, vol.7. p.582.
41 Prefaced by Xu Chengyao, Quanji v.7 pp. 171-172,
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ground, and therefore set up the research techniques advanced by the Han 
exegetes with their emphasis on etymoiogicai research as the most convincing, 
as it sought to gain direct access to the meanings of words, which were 
themselves beyond doubt.42
After returning from the Academy in 1748, Dai married and had a son and a 
daughter. However, his family was so poor that he had no income. To sustain his 
family, he had to work as a tutor in Xiuning. At that time, this area was suffering 
from a severe famine and this came to be one of the hardest times in Dai Zhen’s 
life. According to one of his letters, “Every day I would go to the noodle shop and 
take home whatever scraps they could give me. That would be our meal.”43 That 
year, Dai wrote A Treatise on Geometry, which became one of his major works 
on mathematics (Gaogu gehuanji), and the Commentary on Qu Yuan’s Rhyming- 
Prose {Qu Yuan fuzhu)44 At around the same time he also completed a 
Commentary on the Mao Recension of the Book of Odes {Maoshi buzhuan) and 
his Commentary to Some Unciear Parts in the Astronomy Section of the 
Arithmetic Classic (Zhoubei), in which he attempted to explain the path of the sun 
in relation to the celestial North Pole. In addition, he documented the results of 
his inquiry into Yang Xiong’s (53 BC-AD 18) Study of Dialects (Fangyan). Two 
years later (1755) his Records of Artisans (Kaogongji) and Mathematical Treatise 
(Cesuan) were published.
42 Elman (1984) pp. 3-6
43 Nianpu, Quanji, v.6 pp. 662-663.
44 Ibid. pp. 664. Quanji, v.6. Nianpu
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In the following year (1753), Dai Zhen had personal trouble with a rich and 
powerful kinsman of his clan, who levelled an accusation against him of unjust 
usage of the clan’s cemetery. The clansman had close relations with an officer, 
who sued Dai Zhen on a bogus charge. He was left with no option but to run 
away to Beijing without any clothing or money. Without any means of keeping 
warm or avoiding hunger, his refuge in Beijing might well have been the most 
miserable period of his life.45 From his place of refuge he sent a letter to his 
classmate Fang Xiyuan on three possible approaches to learning, and lamented 
his hardship:
“If the ancients were alive today, they would surely be distressed and 
feel pity for a person like me, who has no place to go. It’s the same with 
everything: you won’t know it until you’ve passed through it; you can’t 
feel the anguish until you’ve experienced it. I do not presume to 
compare myself with the ancients, but I would like to think that at least I 
have their sympathy. In any case, I shall under no circumstances seek 
sympathy from people who are unlike the ancients."46
Beijing then offered Dai Zhen another opportunity. Qian Daxin (1728-1804) and 
Wang Mingsheng (1722-1798) paid Dai Zhen a visit. They were the rising stars of 
Beijing scholastic society, having just passed the Metropolitan examination and 
been awarded the scholars degree (Jinshi) in 1754; they were of comparable age 
to Dai Zhen. Their special interest was in applying to historiography the exact 
methodology developed in classical study. They thought that the purpose of 
writing history was simply to ascertain the truth, and that historians should record
45 Ibid. pp. 665-668.
46 Reply to Fang Xiyuan. Quanji v.7 p.375.
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their findings only after examining all available sources. In their view, novels, 
poems and local papers should all be employed in the reconstruction of this type 
of concrete history.47
Qian Daxin introduced Dai Zhen to Qin Huitian. At that time Qin Huitian was 
compiling a comprehensive study of the Five Ritual Canons (Wuli tungkao). He 
was deeply impressed with the proficiency of Dai Zhen’s knowledge of the 
sciences and reflection. Qin asked Dai to help interpret the meaning of 
references to mathematics and astronomy in the ritual text. However, Qin thought 
that the concepts of principle (//') and nature {xing) were totally unnecessary for 
his research. This was the difference in approach between the two men, and it 
made Dai Zhen begin to consider both principle and nature 48 Nevertheless, Qin 
and Dai took heed of the Western methods that the Jesuits had brought to China 
during the Ming and early Qing, since they held them in high regard.49 Both 
recognised the importance of mathematics and the exact science of precise 
scholarship. In this project on the Five Ritual Canons, the assistance of Dai Zhen 
was crucial to Qin, including much of Dai’s analysis of ancient mathematics and 
astronomy, which were included in the final version: he added three chapters 
from Dai’s treatise on the relationship of right triangles to a circle (Gaogu 
gehuanji).50
47 Elman, Ibid. p. 71
48 Yu Yingshi (1976) p. 589.
49 Elman, Ibid. p.p. 80-83.
50 Nianpu, Quanji, v.6 pp. 667-668.
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In 1756,Dai Zhen became the tutor of Wang Niansun (1744-1832) who was 
the son of Wang Anguo (1694-1757), the minister of the Board of Rites in Beijing. 
Wang Niansun later became a very important figure in the field of etymology and 
phonology.51
At the end of 1757, Dai Zhen went to Yangzhou to become a guest of Lu 
Jianxuan, who was the chief commissioner of the Salt Administration and had 
built up a good reputation in the Lower Yangtze area. As a very rich and 
munificent man he had a special love for friends and scholars, and used to 
support talented men from the academic communities. Dai Zhen became one of 
these charges.52
Traditionally, a Chinese scholar’s dearest wish was to become a 
government officer in order to allow his ideas to come to fruition. A government 
post promised a fixed salary and good social standing. The competition to reach 
officialdom, the jinshi degree, was always keen and only about three hundred 
applicants every three years were able to attain this highest of degrees. 
Nevertheless, during the Song and Ming dynasties a number of prominent 
Confucians chose not to participate in the examinations. The implication was that 
these people could still afford to make a choice (though a difficult one) about their
51 Xingzhuang Quanji, v,7p.8.
52 Nianpu pp. 669-670.
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calling, and that perhaps a good scholar was still a rarity, so highly prized that he 
could consider other means of supporting himself.53
In Yangzhou, Dai Zhen became a friend of Hui Dong (1697-1758), one of 
the most important figures in the Kaozheng School at the time. He came from the 
Suzhou scholarly community, which were disposed toward the Han commentary 
tradition. Hui Dong created the Han Learning Movement and encouraged the 
Kaozhengxue, though his own method was not identical with it.54
In 1762, Dai Zhen passed the Anhui provincial examination for the Juren 
(elevated man) degree, which was a form of screening examination for the 
Metropolitan examination. The following year he sat the Metropolitan examination 
in Beijing but failed. This was his first failure of the Jinshi degree.55
In the same year, Dai Zhen met Duan Yucai in Beijing, who became Dai’s 
first disciple. Dai and Duan formed a strong relationship; after the death of Dai 
Zhen, Duan became the most important figure in the defence of Dai Zhen and his 
Kaozheng School.56
53 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.10.
54 Yu Yingshi (1975) pp.602.
55 Nianpu. Quanji\f.6 pp. 676-677.
56 ibid. pp. 535-536.
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In 1766, Dai Zhen met Zhang Xuecheng (1738-1801) in Beijing. Dai Zhen 
was there to take the Metropolitan examination and stayed in the Xiuning hostel. 
At that time Zhang Xuecheng was twenty-eight years old, a gifted, self-confident 
scholar and a student of the Imperial Academy.57
In 1769, Dai Zhen and Duan Yucai went to the shanxi province. Duan Yucai 
had a job there as lecturer in the Shouyang Academy. Zhu Gui (1731-1807), like 
his brother Zhu Yun (1728-1781), was a supporter of intellectuals and linked with 
the jiangnan academies.58 He introduced Dai Zhen to the prefect of fenzhou, 
who persuaded him to become the head of a project on the history of their 
Prefecture. Dai Zhen completed the compilation of documents of the fenzhou 
prefecture (in thirty-four juan) within a year. His work was good and was well 
received. Two years later, the magistrate of fenyang County in the shanxi 
province called Dai Zhen back to do similar work. Consequently, Dai Zhen 
became the principal contributor to the local historiography of fenzhou and 
fenyang.59
In 1770 Duan Yucai was appointed magistrate of Yuping County in the 
Guizhou province, when Dai Zhen was working as a local historian. Their last 
meeting was in 1772 at Hong Bang’s home in Beijing. They maintained their
57 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p19.
58 Elman, pp. 106-107.
59 Nianpu, Quanjiv.6 pp. 683-684.
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relationship through regular correspondence. Duan Yucai carefully dated each 
and every letter they exchanged.60
Dai Zhen’s reputation as a scholar was already so firmly secure that he 
occasionally received attractive offers. This notwithstanding, he still had to travel 
from place to place in order to make a living and send money to his family. He 
accepted a position in the zhejiang province as head of the Jinhua Academy.
That its duration was short was due to another irresistible offer: he was called by 
imperial command to serve in Beijing as a compiler of the Complete Library of the 
Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu). The directors of the Imperial Manuscript Library 
Yu Minzhong (1714-1780) and Qiu Yuexiu (1712-1773) and the chief editor of the 
project Ji Yun (1724-1805) strongly recommended Dai Zhen to the Qianlong 
emperor. Despite all positions having been filled by famous officials and scholars 
who were holders of the Jinshi degree at least, Dai Zhen had only passed the 
local examination. The fact that he was only a Juren made his appointment a 
very special occasion.61
To work in the Imperial Library, appointees had to work in full-time service 
without payment. This was the decree of the grand councillor on establishing the 
Siku quanshu commission. A month later the grand councillor changed his mind
60 In the Quanjiv.6, there are eleven of correspondence are listed between Dai Zhen and Duan 
Yucai.
61 Ibid, Quanji v.6 pp.688-692. Also see R. Kent Guy. The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars 
and the State in the Late QianLung Era. Harvard University, 1987. p.80.
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and compensated them with food and drink. Obviously, this job was designed for 
those who possessed wealth and fortune. The Imperial Library did not take into 
account men like Dai Zhen who had no other source of income. Financially, he 
was much worse off than when he had been employed privately. His appointment 
to the Imperial Library was a significant honour for Dai Zhen personally.62 
However, it made him suffer considerable economic hardship and drove him to 
physical exhaustion. According to a Letter to Duan Yucai in 1773, he confided to 
Duan:
"I can’t say that this work in the capital is due to an unfortunate 
invitation. In the past two years, I have had virtually no money to spare, 
but at least I was free in the mornings and evenings [to do something 
extra to supplement my income]. And even under those circumstances,
I could barely take care of the needs of my family. Being in the capital, 
we will have to increase our spending, and so I don’t know how we are 
going to sustain our life.’’63
It is said that the biggest problem Dai Zhen faced throughout his lifetime 
was financial shortage. He always managed to find work but he remained a poor 
scholar until his death. Occasionally he had to borrow money from Duan Yucai 
who made his living primarily as a civil servant; but even he attained only low 
status as a travelling magistrate, a temporary post which made his financial 
situation more stable. He also published a very important etymological study of 
the Shuowen jiezihu that had been deeply inspired by Dai Zhen. He had to earn
62 See Kent Guy, 1987. pp 79-87.
63 Nianpu. Quanji. v.6 p.538.
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money not only for his own survival but also to send to his family and parents in 
Longfu in Xiuning County.64
According to this response to a letter from Duan Yucai, he had received a 
draft of Duan Yucai’s work on the ancient phonological system extracted from the 
Six Canons, the Liushu yinyunbiao, and also asked for a loan of forty taels.
“Ever since the third month of last year, my feet have been suffering 
from an ailment, and up to now I have not been able to get out of house.
My eyesight is also failing me. It appears that this summer the editing 
will progress slowly. Therefore, I have decided to ask for a leave of 
absence in the seventh and eighth months so that I can travel south and 
get medical treatment and also visit an academy of some sort and 
perhaps eke out a living.”65
In 1775, Dai Zhen once again attempted the Metropolitan examination but 
failed, this being his sixth attempt. However, he had one more chance to take the 
examination: he was allowed by imperial decree to take the palace examination, 
which was usually taken by the recently successful candidates of the 
Metropolitan examination so as to quantify their relative capabilities. He passed it, 
and as a result he was both honoured with the jinshi degree and chosen as a 
bachelor of the Hanlin Academy.66
In 1776, Dai Zhen was gravely ill and nearing the end of his life; economic 
difficulties, a circulatory disease and maybe diabetes had confined him to his
64 Ibid. Quanji v.6. pp.533-535.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, p. 693.
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bed. He talked about his physical pain and worries, about his old father and 
family, and tried to pay back some debts but had to borrow more money from 
other friends. His aged father knew that he was anxious about his family. He 
suffered from sore feet so badly that he had to be carried to places where he 
might find employment.67 By the late spring of 1777, just months before he died, 
he was critically ill, but nevertheless replied to Duan. Even in this letter he was 
desperately worried about his financial situation:68
“My father is seventy-one, I must find an academy somewhere. 
Governor Bi Yuan wants me to go to shanxi, but to journey there is too 
far a distance, and I simply can’t make it.”09
He died on 1st July 1777, in a friend’s house. However, “the most important 
work” of his life, An Evidential Study of Meaning of Terms in Mencius had been 
completed and printed in the last months before his death. In his letter to Duan, 
he wrote:
“[People who] think that they will not be obsessed when they don’t have 
desire do not know that the act of desiring is the way to nurture life 
mutually, that it allows one to look upon others as one’s own self.”70
A year later Dai Zhen’s biographer Hong Bang wrote a lament for Dai Zhen:
67 Ibid.
68 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p17.
69 Nianpu. Quanji v.6. p.535.
70 Ibid. v.6. p. 543, Letter to Duan Yucai, Quanji. v.6.
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“Although at the time the master's teaching was not formally established 
and now he himself has succumbed to mortality, what he said will live 
on forever."71
2. The Philosophical Works of Dai Zhen
Dai Zhen produced a great number of works. In addition to many books on 
mathematics, astronomy, philology, phonetics, and geography, Dai wrote three 
books on philosophy. They are: On Goodness, Prolegomena, and Commentary 
on the Word and Meanings of Mencius, the latter being the most significant, for it 
embodies his final view on the subject. Although Dai entitled his most important 
work merely as a commentary on one of the Canons, it is nevertheless an original 
work containing his own philosophy.
The first attempts at collecting and publishing his writings came a year after 
his death. The first edition of the Literary Writings and Letters of Dai Zhen (Dai 
Zhen wenji) was printed in 1778. The second edition had twelve chapters and 
went to press in 1792. In 1936, the Complete Works of Dai Zhen (Dai Dongyuan 
xiansheng quanji) was published by the Anhui Congshu project and listed twenty- 
two separate works. Three years later in 1942, Sichuan Province Library released 
An Evidential Study of Private Aspirations of Mencius (Mengzi sishukao). 
However, it had many errors and paid no regard to the editing of the manuscripts.
71 Xingzhuang, Quanji v7  p.11.
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Later, in 1961, Beijing National Library compared three editions of manuscripts 
and printed the definitive version through the Zhonghua Shuju. Subsequently, 
twelve more unpublished works were discovered and the existence of three lost 
writings was confirmed. Now, thirty-eight separate works are listed in all and have 
been published in a new Complete Works of Dai Zhen.72
The definitive edition of the Complete Works of Dai Zhen (Dai Zhen quanji) 
was published in 1997 by the Anhui Congshu project (with Zhang Dainian as the 
chief editor). It consists of all the surviving documents that Dai Zhen wrote and 
articles on him by contemporary colleagues and modern scholars.
Dai Zhen’s Works on Philosophy
a. Inquiry into Goodness (Yuanshan)
The ontology of Dai Zhen differs from that of the Neo Confucians, who 
strongly asserted that the prime attribute of being can be nothing but principle (//). 
Dai’s Inquiry into Goodness argues against this view. Dai appraised g/', the vital 
force, and Dao, the Way, instead of //, as being analogous to what is necessary 
(biran) in human nature.
72 Quanji, v l .  The editor’s postscript, pp. 652-53.
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The first draft of his Three Essays of Inquiry into Goodness (Yuanshan) was 
written between 1757 and 1762; the definitive revised version of Inquiry into 
Goodness was completed in 1766.
The first version consisted of only three short essays, but Dai Zhen was 
delighted by what he had accomplished. The Nianpu states:
“The Master’s monumental works, such as his Inquiry into Goodness in 
three chapters, were all written in the ten years between 1753 or 1754 
and 1763. I, Yucai, had once copied these works in 1763. The Master 
once said, ‘having completed the first chapter of Inquiry into Goodness, I 
am so happy that even the rice seems to me to have a special 
flavour.”73
This asserts that Dai Zhen’s Inquiry into Goodness in three chapters was 
written before 1763, because Duan Yucai had already copied some of it that 
year. But, it is not easy to state the exact year that Dai Zhen wrote the book. 
Although Duan says it was finished in the ten years after 1753 and 1754, this 
remark is merely a supposition, and there is no concrete evidence to support it.
According to Qian Mu, Hui Dong had some influence on Inquiry into 
Goodness. Qian Mu claimed that the Inquiry into Goodness was probably written 
around 1757, when Dai Zhen had already visited yangzhou and had met Hui 
Dong, because it was only after this that Dai Zhen’s view on learning began to 
change. Hui Dong advocated a return to Han Confucians’ writings on the subject. 
But the Han people’s writings on the Book of Changes centred mainly on
73 Nianpu., Quanji v.6. p. 673.
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numerology and divination, and contained very little discussion of moral principle. 
However, in his study of the Book of Changes, Hui Dong did not follow the Han 
trend, but wrote V7 weiyan, which synthesised the common features found among 
the several schools of philosophy with the Yici in the pre-Qin and the two Han 
eras. He listed the various topics, adding his own opinions to them. At that time, 
Dai Zhen was deeply impressed by what Hui Dong had achieved.74
In 1766, Dai Zhen completed a full revision, in which he attempts to 
establish unique definitions of such Confucian terms as nature (xing), decree 
(ming), potential (cai), the internal texture of things (tiaoli), desire (yu), selfishness 
(si), obession (bi), and judgement (quan).
The Nianpu continues:
Inquiry into Goodness in three juan was included in Dai’s Literary 
Remains, gathered in one volume, and was printed by the President of 
the Board of Revenue, Kong. Originally, however, the Master’s Inquiry 
into Goodness in three chapters was included in the President of the 
Board of Revenue’s [Dai Zhen’s] printed Collected Literary Works which 
I, Yucai, copied and memorised well in 1763. In 1766 I saw the Master 
further elaborate on the thesis by extensively using statements in the 
Canons to support it. He still had three chapters with headings, to which 
he combined meaning; and the ancient sages’ discourse on moral 
principle would not have gone beyond him. The Shuzheng, moreover, 
was also intended to elucidate this thesis."75
In Dai Zhen’s own preface to his Inquiry into Goodness, he wrote:
74 Qian Mu, Dai Dongyuan, Quanji v.7. pp. 481-82.
75 Nianpu., Quanji v6. p. 673.
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I wrote the three chapters of Inquiry into Goodness because I feared 
that scholars might be misled by heterodox ideas. Later on, basing on 
the Canons, I elucidated on the [thesis]. I first wrote it in three chapters 
with appropriate headings, and then expanded it into three juan, with 
which I combined meanings; and therefore all the important points were 
presented. The Way of Heaven and man and the great teaching 
embodied in the Canons are included therein. Since the present period 
is distant from the ancient sages in time, and since students of the 
Canons might not be able to comprehend [the meanings in the Canons] 
and are too much accustomed to what they have been taught, I fear that 
a heap of errors might become a right; and, as I fear that my remarks 
are inadequate to uplift the decline of the sages’ teaching, I have stored 
the [Inquiry into Goodness] in village school, so as to await other 
competent men to preach it.76
The Inquiry into Goodness in the Collected Literary Works was Dai Zhen’s 
original version in three chapters, whereas the three versions of the same piece 
included in his Literary Remains represent a later revised edition. In the Literary 
Remains edition, chapter one has eleven topics, chapter two has five topics, and 
chapter three has sixteen topics. Moreover, the first chapter in each chapter 
comprises the three topics of Inquiry into Goodness in the Collected Literary 
Works, but there are differences in the phrasing of statements in the Collected 
Literary Works version.
In 1766 Duan went to the capital and saw Dai Zhen’s old manuscript of the 
Inquiry into Goodness in three chapters, which used the words of the Canons to 
support and elucidate his own thesis, and which supported what Dai Zhen had 
told Duan, namely that he had recently completed a book on moral principle.
76 Dai Zhen, YuanShan. Preface. Quanji v6.
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However, this book was in fact the enlarged version of the Inquiry into Goodness 
in three chapters, but Duan had mistakenly thought that the book Dai Zhen had 
mentioned was the Shuzheng.77
b. The Prolegomena (Xuyan)
The Prolegomena (Xuyan) was composed in 1766, and is the first draft of 
Dai Zhen’s greatest philosophical work, the Mengzi ziyi shuzheng. It is not 
mentioned in other biographies or bibliographies of Dai Zhen, but Duan Yucai 
wrote about the relationship between it and the Shuzheng and then printed it.78
The Nianpu states:
"Mengzi ziyi shuzheng in its original manuscript was entitled Xuyan, and 
there was a manuscript edition of Xuyan in the ninth month of 1772.
Cheng Yaotian made a copy of it in 1766.79
In Kong Guangsen’s printed Literary Remains, the Xuyan was not included. 
Moreover, in their discussions of Dai Zhen’s writings, Qian Daxin, Wang Chang, 
Hong Bang, and Kong Guangsen did not mention it, and it is in fact only included 
in the Yueyatang Congshu (Collection of Yueyatang). Cheng Yaotian deemed 
that the Shuzheng was not the final version, for the title of the final version was
77 Qian Mu, Dai Dongyuan, Quanji v.7. p.497
78 Ibid, p.497.
79 Nianpu., Quanji vQ. p. 676.
37
changed to Xuyan; he also wrote that he had made a copy of it in 1766. In the 
Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, there is the words “hand-copied edition, in the ninth month 
of 1772,” and its content cannot therefore have been altered from 1772 to 1776. 
Duan, however, considered the Shuzheng to be the final version and Xuyan as 
the first draft of the book.80
According to the Nianpu:
“In 1776, I, Yucai, went to the capital to take the Metropolitan 
examination. I saw the Master who remarked that recently he had 
completed a book on the study of principle, namely, the Mengzi ziyi 
shuzheng, but I could not get him to show it to me at the time. After the 
Master died, the president of the Board of Revenue, Kong [Guangsen], 
printed it, and I have only recently been able to see its subtle ideas.81
According to Zheng Izhou’s Letter to Duan Yucai, Duan was tutoring in Zhu 
Gui’s (1731-1807) home in the capital in 1772. Duan claimed that Dai Zhen had 
formerly lodged in the Governor’s [Zhu Gui’s] yamen in shanxi where he had 
pretended to be ill for around ten days. Then he “recovered” and told the 
Governor that he was not genuinely sick but was becoming frenzied and wanted 
to smash the Supreme Ultimate Chart of the Song Neo Confucians. Duan said 
that Dai Zhen was pretending to be ill, and that this was exactly the time he wrote 
the Xuyan.82
80 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. pp. 502-505.
81 Nianpu., Quanji v6. p. 682.
82 Dai Zhen, Letter to Venerable Cheng Yaotian. Quanji v.7. p. 545.
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This book was first begun in 1765 and 1766 and was completed in 
Governor Zhu’s yamen in 1769. In 1768, when he was forty-six years old, Dai 
Zhen accepted the invitation of Fang Guancheng (1698-1768), the viceroy of Zhili 
(Hupei), to compile Zhili hequshu (Waterways and Canais in Zhili) in one hundred 
and two volumes comprising twenty-four chapters. For the next five years, Dai 
Zhen was journeyed between the Beijing and shanxi and he devoted all his 
energy to the compilation of local gazetteers. According to Cheng Yaotian’s 
reiteration of his pretended illness, the rough draft of the Xuyan must have been 
written before the autumn of 1769 when he was a guest at Zhu’s yamen in 
Shanxi. Cheng Yizhou made a hand-written copy of it, which can be taken to be 
the rough draft rather than the edition completed in the ninth month of 1772.83
Dai Zhen revised his old manuscript of 1769. According to the above, the Xuyan 
was first begun before the fall of 1769 and was completed in the ninth month of 
1772.84
c. Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of the Words of 
Mencius (Mengzi ziyi shuzheng).
83 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. pp. 111-113.
84 Ibid.
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Shuzheng, the most important work of Dai Zhen, demonstrates the impact 
philology had on theoretical issues. Kaozheng methods were now used to 
analyse key concepts in Confucian philosophy. Both the title of his work and the 
approach used in it were clear signs of the impact of Kaozheng research on 
philosophical issues.85 Also, the methodology Dai Zhen applied to his study of 
Mencius was essentially a linguistic approach used to determine the precise 
meanings of terms in the text. He began with careful glosses of 7/' (principle, 
reason, inherent pattern, and so forth), and of 'qf (material force, vital energy, 
and so forth). This appeal to etymology, Dai Zhen thought, would enable him to 
refute the later meanings that Zhu Xi and other Neo Confucians had attached to 
these concepts.86
Dai Zhen stated:
“What the ancients called comprehension is but to seek something’s 
principle and to analyse it. The so-called Heavenly Principle, for 
example, according to Zhuang Zhou, is that Heavenly rules implicitly.
The ancient worthies and sages deemed that to give consideration to 
people’s feelings and to fulfil people’s desires is the //'. Nowadays, 
however, men regard an opinion not emanating with a selfish purpose 
as the //. Thus, when one uses an opinion to murder people, he still 
deems that it is in accordance with the //'. This is just like someone 
wishing to learn about the sages’ Dao (truth) in the Canons without
85 Elman.1984, p.19.
The technical term Shuzheng (evidential analysis, “verifications on the form of sub­
commentary”) in the title indicated that Dai Zhen saw his efforts as part of the evidential 
research movement. The same term had been used earlier in Yan RuoJu’s title to his definitive 
critique of the Old text chapter Book of Document.
86 Ibid.
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bothering to study the meanings of words, institutions, semantics of 
technical terms, language, and philology.”87
Having completed On Goodness in three chapters, Dai Zhen deemed that 
the Song Confucians’ discussions on human nature, principle, the Way, ability, 
sincerity, enlightenment, authority, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, 
wisdom, and courage were not the true words of Confucius, or Mencius, or within 
in the Six Canons, as these had become mixed with heterodox teachings. 
Therefore Dai Zhen started to cite words in Mencius so as to point out the Song 
Confucians' semantic errors.88
In the preface to the Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of the Words 
of Mencius, he quoted from the second book of Mencius: “I understand words.”89 
Furthermore, he wrote that “Erroneous words do not just end with words; they 
change and influence the minds of men. A mind that is beclouded must do 
damage to the conduct of affairs and to government.”90
The ‘correction of erroneous words’ is the key concept of this book. The 
Shuzheng aims to correct Confucian words abused by the Neo Confucians, 
Daoists and Buddhists, as demonstrated through questions and answers.
87 Shuzheng, Article 1. .
88 Ibid, Preface.
89 Mencius, 2A:2.
90 Shuzheng, Preface.
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Therefore, it is a philosophical thesis with a linguistic approach, rather than a 
commentary on Mencius as such.91
By the time he was thirty, the doctrines that Dai considered “erroneous” 
included those of Lu Xiangshan, Chen Baisha, and Wang Yangming. These three 
Confucians, in his opinion, had abandoned “the Way of learning and inquiry”. He 
observed only slight differences in doctrine between their teachings and those of 
the Buddhists and the Daoists.92 Eventually the list grew to include Cheng Yi and 
Zhu Xi, and by the time Dai began writing the Shuzheng in 1772. He had long 
objected to their research techniques, which he thought sloppy, but now he felt 
uneasy about their ideas, especially with regard to the power these ideas 
assumed as words.93
The Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of the Words of Mencius was 
completed in 1776. The writing of The Prolegomena (Xuyan) and Shuzheng 
spanned over ten years. Between these two works, there is one more draft that 
was not published until 1943. After major revision, An Evidential Study of the 
Private Aspirations of Mencius (Mengzi sishikao) was released by the Zhonghua 
Shuju in 1961. The Shuzheng consists of three chapters and considers eleven 
important Confucian definitions and forty-two questions and answers.94
91 Ibid.
92 Annping Chun, Freeman M. (1990), p.36.
93 Yu Yingshi, A new interpretation of the history of thought in the Qing period, Zhonghua 
wenhua buxing 9 (1976), pp 1-13.
94 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7, p. 505.
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Duan said that the revised version of Xuyan was made between the winter 
of 1776 and spring 1777, and was re-titled Mengzi ziyi shuzheng.95 On the 
twenty-fourth day of the fourth month of 1777, Dai Zhen wrote his Letter to Duan 
Yucai, in which he said:
“I have had this foot ailment for over a year already and am unable to go 
outside. I have decided to ask for a leave of absence in early autumn 
and to return to the South. Actually, I will not leave home again. The 
most noteworthy writing in my life is the Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, and it is
a substantial work aimed at rectifying man’s m in d  Nowadays a
person, regardless of whether he is a righteous or wicked man, always 
mistakenly takes personal opinion as the li and has thus brought 
calamity to the populace. Therefore, I had to write the Shuzheng"96
There is also his Letter to Peng the Metropolitan Graduate, written in the 
fourth month of 1777. Dai Zhen had earlier showed Peng his On Goodness and 
Shuzheng, and Mr. Peng had sent Dai Zhen a letter. Dai in turn answered Mr. 
Peng. With regard to his Letter to Peng Yunchu, this was written after Peng 
Yunchu, while in the capital, had shown Dai Zhen his Erlinju zhiyi and had asked 
to see the On Goodness of Dai. It follows, therefore, that Peng also did not know 
that Dai Zhen had completed the Shuzheng. When Dai Zhen showed Peng the 
new book, Shuzheng, Peng wrote a letter to Dai Zhen asking to discuss it, and 
Dai Zhen answered him mentioning the date on which he would return to the 
South; also, we can see that Peng was in the capital at the time.97
95 Ibid. p.512.
96 Dai Zhen, Letter to Duan Yucai, Quanji. v. 6. p.544.
97 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7, p. 516.
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Also, in Letter in Reply to Dai Zhen Discussing li and desire, it reads:
I received your letter in early spring but have procrastinated in 
answering i t . . .. Your studious study of Canonical works far surpasses 
other scholars, since you have taken on yourself the mission to edit and 
to expound the [the sages’ message]. Wherefore is the sudden remark 
that you plan to take a leave of absence in the autumn to return home?
... In your letter, you pointed out the recent Confucians’ teaching on li 
and desire. You stated that they expressed their thought out of a biased 
mind and deemed that [their opinion] was the li and, moreover, that this 
so-called li [of theirs] was fallacious. You certainly have pinpointed the 
errors of these vulgar scholars.98
On examining this letter, we can see that it was written in the summer of 
1777 just before Dai Zhen’s death. Dai Zhen had written a letter to Lu Zaogong n 
early spring of the same year and had said he would take a leave of absence to 
return home in the autumn, which was similar to the idea stated in his Letter to 
Duan Yucai saying that he had a foot ailment (above). At the time, Zhaogong was 
in Xinan (Shangdong). As Dai Zhen had just completed his Shuzheng and could 
not send it to Zhaogong by mail, he wrote him a summary of his newly-acquired 
thesis on the distinction between // and desire."
Dai Zhen’s distinction between li and desire, devised in order refute the 
views of the Song Confucians; can only be seen in the Shuzheng but not in either 
On Goodness or the Xuyan. The fact that Dai Zhen mentions this distinction most 
emphatically in his two letters to Duan in 1777 indicates that he had just finished
98 Dai Zhen, Letter to Peng Yunchu. Quanji. v. 6 p.358.
99 Dai Zhen, Letter to Duan Yucai. Quanji. v. 6.543.
44
this book. This therefore indicates that the Shuzheng was first started in 1776 
after Cheng Yaotien had copied the Xuyan, and was completed in the same year. 
The reason that Dai Zhen wrote a letter to Duan in the first month of the following 
year, 1777, is precisely that the interpretation of the word li in the Shuzheng was 
his latest discovery. Thus, having barely finished the book, Dai Zhen immediately 
told him about it in a letter. We can see Dai Zhen’s satisfaction upon the 
completion of the new book in the letter written in the fourth month of 1777, in 
which he states that the Shuzheng is the most significant book he had ever 
written.100
Among his three books on moral principle, Dai Zhen acquired his thesis on 
the distinction between //and desire last of all, between 1776 and 1777. Along 
with his Letter to Lu Zhoagong there are altogether five letters we can account for 
on the subject of li and desire, which were probably all written in 1777: in his 
Collected Literary Works there is a Letter to Someone, though it is not known 
who that someone was; there is the Letter in Reply to Peng Yunchu; there are 
two Letters to Duan Yucai. Dai Zhen mentioned the subject repeatedly in his 
letters simply because he so was exuberant about his doctrine. All this proves 
conclusively that the Shuzheng was completed in 1776.101 His Letter to 
Someone," contains the following remarks:
In this study of the Canons, a person must first study the meaning of the 
words and then proceed to grasp the ideas in the text. If he intends to 
learn about the Way himself, he must be free from reliance on other
100 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. p. 524.
101 Ibid. p.525.
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[people's interpretation]. The Han Confucians’ annotations of the 
Canons followed their master’s school of interpretation, but they 
sometimes also added their own guesses. As for the Jin people, they 
appended even more unfounded ideas to the Canons. The Song 
people, however, formed judgments based on wild speculation, and 
therefore what they adopted to be true was preposterous in most cases; 
whereas what was not preposterous, they chose to abandon. ... In our 
study, one should have an impartial mentality in order to grasp the 
meaning of a Canon’s text. If there is one written character whose exact 
meaning we misunderstand, then our comprehension of the Canon itself 
must necessarily be incorrect, and the Way eludes us... Scholars from 
the Song onward arbitrarily assigned their own opinion to be the theme 
of the writings of the ancient worthies and ages, but they really had no 
comprehension of either language or etymology. As for the [political and 
social] affairs of the empire, they arbitrarily imposed what they 
considered to be the li and wanted it to be carried out, but they actually 
know nothing about the real causes and subtle details of them. 
Therefore, the great Dao has been lost and man’s action is perverted.102
Thus, Dai Zhen’s theory of learning moral principle through philological 
study remained unchanged even at this time. In Hong Bang’s Letter to Chu Yun, 
it reads:
As for Mr. Dai’s view on human nature and the Way, there is no more 
complete work on the subject aside from his exposition on the Mencius, 
and that was the reason for his entitling his book, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng. 
Therefore this book was not aimed at expounding human nature and 
decree but on philology, numbers, and measurements.103
It would be difficult to claim that this description is an inappropriate account 
of Dai Zhen’s aims in his discourse on learning. Nonetheless, what people at the
102 Dai Zhen, Letter to Someone. Quanji. v. 6. p.495.
103 Xingzhuang. Quanji. v. 7
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time exalted Dai Zhen forwent beyond his philosophical achievements. In 1773, 
when he was invited to the capital to work as a compiler of the Four Treasury 
Collection of Books of the Imperial Library, the official versions of the books he 
collated included subjects such as astronomy, mathematics, geography, the 
Waterway Classics, traditional linguistics and dialectology -  subjects for which he 
was renowned among his contemporaries when he first went to the capital. Even 
towards the end of his life, his contemporaries still exalted his ability in these 
subjects, and praised him for his competence in the study of numbers and 
measurements, but not in philosophy.104
Hence, when Hong Bang wrote his Biography of Dai Zhen and included in it 
the Letter to Peng Yunchu, Zhu Yun remarked after reading it that:
It is not necessary to record this, since human nature and the Heavenly 
Way cannot be known. There other doctrine besides Cheng Yi and Zhu 
Xi’s teaching! Mr. Dai’s portion of learning which can be transmitted to 
posterity does not [lie on human nature and decree].”105
On this point Dai Zhen wrote:
Matters like Liushu [six ways in which the written characters are 
classified] and Zhishu [mathematics] may be likened to the duty of a 
sedan-chair carrier -  to lift the passenger sitting in the sedan chair. If I 
am acclaimed to be excellent in matters such as liushu and Zhishu, it is
104 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. p. 523.
105 Xingzhuang. Quanji. v. 7.
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similar to making the mistake of taking the sedan chair carrier as the 
sedan chair passenger.106
Dai Zhen did not want to confine himself to the study of liushu and Zhishu, 
and he held such a view even before he had gone to the capital. But his public 
attack on Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi only started in earnest in old age. Zhang 
Xuecheng sneered at him:
What the ancients wrote on bamboo slips and cloths were the same as 
what they uttered ... But nowadays cunning persons d iffe r... They use 
writing to win the trust of those who know the subjects but use their 
mouth to deceive those who do not know too much about [the subjects]
... Such a person’s relation to Master Zhu may be likened to someone 
who having drunk the water treacherously forgets its source -  the 
fountain; and [when this someone] writes about Master Zhu, the reader 
can detect only slight insinuations, for he dares not blatantly attack 
[Master Zhu]. And this is the reason why this someone would not make 
himself abominable in the eyes of those who really understand [Master 
Zhu’s teaching]107.
Those who have no deep understanding of Master Zhu, however, openly 
vilify him without compunction, because they have become accustomed to 
hearing Dai Zhen’s fulminations: they hold that this man’s statements must be 
correct, and therefore that Zhu Xi deserves to be denounced.
In 1773, when Zhang Xuecheng and Dai met in Dai’s yamen at nanfeng, 
Dai Zhen’s opinion had already changed somewhat and he therefore attacked
100 Duan Yucai. Preface in Dai Dongyuan’s Collected Literary Works (Dai Dongyuan Ji), 
Shanghai, Hanfenlou ed. Quanji. v. 7.
107 Zhang Xuecheng 'Zhu Lu Chapter1, Wenshi Tongyi, Beijing, 1956. pp. 56-57.
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Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi orally, but in his Xuyan this attitude cannot be detected.
This was the reason that Zhang gibed at him that his writing-brush and tongue 
differed and that he was devious.108
Among the people at the time only Zhang Xuecheng truly perceived that Dai 
Zhen was indeed the philosopher who created philosophical arguments and not 
the one who merely compiled them.
The Shuzheng enjoyed great success after the death of Dai Zhen, 
becoming the philosophical foundation of the anti-Neo Confucian movements of 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. Social reform movements 
were based mainly on Dai Zhen’s works and methods. His advocates and 
opponents raced to develop better theories with which to surpass each other.
108 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. p. 522.
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II. The Intellectual Milieu of Dai Zhen
After the declaration of Gu Yanwu’s that "to study the Canons is to study 
principle”,109 for both public motives and political reasons, scholars of the Qing 
dynasty tried to reconstruct the authentic Mozi, or the historical Confucius, the 
Book of Odes, Book of Documents, and Rites Canons so that they would be free 
from the defects of Buddhist and Daoist interpretations.110 Dai Zhen also tried to 
reconstruct the Canons and the lost classics, and to find the truth and original 
meaning of the Canons by breaking through the influence of Buddhism and 
Daoism. Finally, he applied the Kaozheng method to Mencius to correct the Zhu 
Xi orthodoxy that was infected by Buddhism and Daoism and had important 
political and philosophical implications. Dai Zhen’s philological philosophy acted 
as a foil for the articulation of an antithetical philosophy.111
Like other evidential scholars, Dai Zhen seems to have truly believed and 
followed Gu Yanwu’s statement. However, it seems that whilst most scholars 
concentrated more on the details of the reconstruction of the lost Classics, they 
departed from the principle of their original intention of study, to the point where
109 Bao Guoshun, 1998, p20
110 Elman, From Philosophy To Philology: 1990. pp. 17-18
111 Elman. 1990. p.20. i.e. Fang Dongshu (1772-1851), a staunch advocate of the Neo 
Confucian orthodoxy from Dongcheng, Anhui. Fang Dongshu, Hanxue Shangdui, Taipei, 1963. 
2A:19A. Quanji. v. 7.
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they seem to have forgotten entirely what the purposes of research and meaning 
were. However, Dai Zhen’s philosophy did not lose sight of his aims: he simply 
looked back to the roots of his knowledge and built from there, a process which 
went on to generate both radical and progressive elements of anti Neo Confucian 
philosophy. The great achievement of Dai Zhen’s research was to unify the two 
categories of ‘Canon’ and ‘principle’ on the one hand and ‘positive science' and 
‘metaphysics’ on the other in one unique philosophy that draws a complete 
picture of the philosophy of the Canon. In this sense, Dai Zhen was proper heir of 
transmission of the Dao as he insisted. In this chapter I will displayed the 
opponents and friends of Dai Zhen who insisted that the champion and heir of 
ancient and Confucius’ Dao. At the same time, Dai Zhen was at once the 
successor of Gu Yanwu and the creator of the Qing philosophical tradition.
For Dai Zhen, philosophy is also a form of evidential work similar to the 
various fields of philology. His philosophical works can be seen as applications of 
the evidential research method employed to restore the Chinese classics. The 
impact of Kaozheng research on philosophical issues is clear both from the title 
of his works and the approach used in it.
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1. The Origins of the Philosophy of Dai Zhen
Dai Wang (1837-1873) intimated that when Dai Zhen wrote the Mencius 
commentary and the Xuyan in the middle period of Emperor Qianlong’s reign, he 
developed Yan Yuan’s thesis on human nature.112 Some Chinese contemporary 
scholars have suggested that Dai Zhen’s thought was derived from Yan Yuan 
and Li Gong’s system.113
Central to Dai Zhen’s thought are the distinctions between what is natural 
(ziran) and what is morally necessary (biran), and the distinction between 
principle (//) and desire. Although these two ideas may be similar to the teachings 
Yan and Li’s, they might not necessarily have been copied from them. More 
important, however, is the fact that Dai Zhen’s advocacy of obtaining an 
understanding of moral principle by means of philology is patently at variance 
with the essence of Yan Yuan’s work. Also, the fact that both Yan and Li 
repudiated Cheng and Zhu makes it highly improbable that Dai Zhen’s ideas 
originated from their teachings.114
Moreover, the Ming Confucians had already discussed original state (benti), 
li and qi and the differences and similarities between human nature and capacity,
112 Liu Zhaoren, Ruan Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan commercial press. 1979. pp.37.
113 Liang Qichao, 1939, pp22-24.
114 Liu Jinxian, Dai Dongyuan Sixiang silun (Inquiry into the thought of Dai Dongyuan), National 
University of Education, Taiwan 1977. pp.268-269.
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and it was therefore not necessary for Dai Zhen to derive his ideas from Yan and 
Li; also, Dai Zhen could conceivably have learned them from his own philological 
study, in which he interpreted moral principle (yili) and Heavenly Principle (tianli) 
as orderly principle (f/ao//).115 Also, Chen Que (1604-1677) postulates that 
Heavenly principle is seen from human desires, and that only in the full 
development of man’s capacities can his goodness be seen.
Since scholars could have received inspiration from their social interaction 
and reading, one should not conclude the origin of a particular scholar’s thought 
by holding fast to one or two points.116 In the realm of thought, each individual 
could conceivably think about the same thing and arrive at the same conclusion 
independently; byway of example, one need only consider Wang Fuzhi’s (1619- 
1692) discourses on Dao and qi, naturalness and human nature’s formation, and 
on the suppression of anger and the elimination of desire.
On the other hand, it is probably closer to the truth to say that Dai Zhen’s 
view on learning underwent slight change after he journeyed to yangzhou and 
met Hui Dong, and that Hui Dong perhaps influenced his philosophical works to a 
certain extent.117
Since Hui and Dai’s views were very similar, why should it be necessary to 
seek to locate the origin of Dai Zhen’s thought as far back as Yan and Li?
115 See Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng, Quanji, vol.6.
116 Liu Jinxian.1977. p.243.
117 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 480.
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Moreover, Hui’s discourse on learning exalted antiquity, and he often cited the 
writings of philosophers of the Zhou and Qin periods, saying that these were 
complementary to the Confucian Canons. Studying Dai Zhen’s thought, it can be 
seen that a large part of his system may be traced to the thinkers of the late Zhou 
period. This, combined with the fact that he followed Mencius’ thesis of human 
nature being good, would seem at this point to make the origin of Dai Zhen’s 
philosophy clear.118
On the other hand, Qian Mu insisted that the origins of Dai Zhen’s 
philosophy could be found in Xunzi. According to Quian Mu, although Dai Zhen 
followed Mencius’ thesis of human nature being good, his statements often 
resembled those of Xunzi, who maintained that human nature is evil and greatly 
emphasised man’s actions.119
Thus Xunzi wrote, “He who knows the distinction between Heaven and 
man may be regarded a sage.”120 ... The sage purifies his natural 
ruler, rectifies his natural sense, makes the natural nourishment 
sufficient, obeys the natural government, nourishes his natural 
emotions, in order to develop to perfection his natural usefulness.121
This looks very similar to Dai Zhen’s thesis of studying meticulously what is 
natural in order to gain an understanding of what is morally necessary.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Xunzi, Xunzi, 17, 1A.
121 Ibid, 17. 4A.
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According to Qian Mu, Dai Zhen said that //can be sought in man’s feelings 
and desires, and their complete fulfilment without deviation is known as li. This 
corresponds well to Xunzi’s idea of following what is deemed possible and 
rejecting what is deemed impossible. But Xunzi concluded that the essential 
element lay in the rules of proper conduct (li). He said:
Man at birth has desires. When these desires are not satisfied, he 
cannot remain without seeking their satisfaction. When this seeking for 
satisfaction is without measure or limit, there can only be contention.
When there is contention everything will be disorder; when there [was] 
disorder, [people] hated this disorder, and so they established the rules 
of proper conduct (li) and [a] standard of justice to satisfy men’s desires.
This is how the //originated.122
Qian Mu noted that Dai’s learning arose later, but that it also based its 
doctrine on the rules of proper conduct (li). This is another point that the two 
thinkers have in common. Moreover, even Dai Zhen’s statement “the best way to 
disperse delusion is to study" owes much to Xunzi, since the key term “to 
disperse delusion” came from Xunzi’s book. As such, we can see that many of 
Dai Zhen’s ideas are similar to those of Xunzi. Also, in his Xuyan, he put Xunzi in 
the same category as the Song period’s Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi.
Dai Zhen said,
122 Dai Zhen, Letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, v.6.p.352.
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“Xunzi exalted rules of proper conduct, whereas the Song Confucians 
exalted //. Although he did no harm to the sages’ teaching, nonetheless 
he did not know about human nature."123
According to Qian Mu, Dai Zhen found the doctrine to restore beginning and 
to return to the origin of human nature’s goodness124 most repugnant. This was 
also true of Xunzi’s statements that propriety (li) and righteousness (yi) result 
from the teachings of the sages, but not that they also derive from the nature. He 
said that they consist of the manifestation of what is morally necessary, but not 
that this moral necessity represents the highest ultimate pattern of the natural, to 
which it gives final perfection.
Xunzi’s views place great emphasis on learning, but he does not know 
the whole substance of the nature. His articulations come from 
honouring the sages, from emphasising learning, and from exalting 
propriety and righteousness... But Mencius, when he emphasises 
learning, [says that a foundation for it already] does exist within, and that 
this is then to be further supported by what lies without.125
Qian Mu continues that from Dai Zhen’s point of view, therefore, both Xunzi 
and Mencius have need of further understanding of human nature. Amongst all 
the philosophers of the late Zhou period, there was no one who could better 
repudiate the natural than Xunzi. Dai Zhen borrowed his idea to refute Laozi and 
Buddha, and he also appended Mencius’ “human nature is good” thesis to that of 
Xunzi. One nineteenth and twentieth century scholar, Zhang Binglin, said:
123 Shuzheng, Article 27.
124 ibid, Chapter 32.
125 Shuzheng, Article. 25.
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Examining what Dai Zhen stated, it seems his ideas are the same as 
those of Xunzi. However, since Xunzi held that human nature was evil, 
which was at variance with Dai Zhen’s own viewpoint, therefore he 
interpreted it differently and expounded it in his Inquiry into 
Goodness'26
Qian Mu finally concluded, “His is indeed an appropriate observation of Dai 
Zhen’s learning. As to Dai Zhen’s vilifying of the Song Confucians in his 
discourse on //'and desire in the Shuzheng,127”
Many scholars have linked Dai Zhen to Xunzi, and the comparison is neither 
unwarranted nor unhelpful. Because Dai Zhen’s first interest was meaning of 
ancient words, as long as Xunzi used the proper words and meaning there is no 
reason to dispel the Xunzi. Secondly, Dai Zhen thought that the Way had 
transmitted from the Confucius to Mencius: the human nature is good. However, 
Xunzi had faith that a calm and careful analysis of traditional rituals and norms 
would eventually convince anyone that they are the unique solution to life. But he 
insisted that one could only come to such an understanding by diligently 
practicing these traditional forms for many years under the strict discipline and 
guidance of a proper teacher. Those who are just beginning to learn the Way are 
largely unaware of the reasons that justify the things they practice.128
126 Zhang Binglin, Shidai (An interpretation of Dai Zhen), Quanji, p.338.
127 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 482.
128 Philip J. Ivanhoe. Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, Hackett, Indianapolis/ Cambridge, 2000. 
p. 95.
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As Zhang Binglin shows, Dai Zhen was born at the end of Emperor 
Yongzheng’s reign. Having seen imperial decrees that punished people without 
the process of law, he therefore admonished the ruler by adopting the statements 
of Canons. The authorities would supervise every detail of society, and would 
even prosecute people for conducting private conversations. Thus ordinary 
scholars and people would be breaking the law even by merely moving their 
hands. In creating such an atmosphere, the Emperor inflicted a deep wound on 
the society of the time.129
When he was young, Dai Zhen was a merchant and regularly travelled a 
distance of a thousand miles, through which he gained an intimate knowledge of 
the conditions people were living in. Dai was indignant at the fact that the 
government had not said a single lenient word about the people’s living 
conditions, and consequently wrote his Inquiry into Goodness and Shuzheng, in 
which he emphasised impartiality and reflective love. Dai Zhen’s statements were 
based on the position that the governed should admonish their ruler, as he 
wanted the Emperor to practice moral restraint so that the people would not 
suffer.130 In Dai’s own words:
In good government, if the government officials are not excessively 
oppressive, the governed will not mutter complaints; if there is an 
abundance of clothing and food, they could very well substitute 
punishment.131
129 Zhang Binglin, Quanji, p.339.
130 Ibid. p.340.
131 Shuzheng, Article 15..
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It is an understanding that motivated by his enlightenment social activism; 
therefore he tried to interpretation Dai Zhen as a revolutionary thinker.
According to Philip J. Ivanhoe. “Dai Zhen was a strongly ethical realist, and 
he believed that one approached moral truth by making the facts of a matter clear 
to oneself. The knowledge one gains through study leads to moral understanding. 
For him, philosophy and self-cultivation consist of a systematic, critical, 
comprehensive, careful and thorough study of the Canons. In his own terms, 
study nourishes one’s mind just as food nourishes one’s body.”132 He continues 
that “Dai expressed no interest in developing some nascent moral capacity, nor 
did he emphasise the need for shaping the self through ritual practice. He did not 
advocate cultivating and maintaining a state of constant inner vigilance, nor did 
he engage in practices such as quiet sitting. He believed that proper intellectual 
understanding of the Canon without any premise was the only way to grasp the 
Dao ” fully.133
2. Dai Zhen and His Contemporaries
a. The Neo Confucians and Dai Zhen
132 Shuzheng, Article, 9.
133 Philip J. Ivanhoe. 2000. pp 92-97.
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Dai Zhen never had the opportunity to meet the Song Confucians criticised. 
It is said that Dai Zhen’s criticism and philosophy are based in contemporary 
concerns over the wrong usage of the words of the Canons, and he is heavily 
critical of the source of the fallacy, namely Zhu Xi. Because he lived in a country 
ruled by Neo Confucians and their law, Dai Zhen himself also had a strong 
background of Neo Confucianism, and it could indeed be said that Neo 
Confucianism is a part of the genealogy of his philosophy and is a strong 
influence on it.
Ironically, when Dai Zhen was a young scholar, he devoted his 
philosophical passion to Neo Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi. He studied Neo 
Confucian philosophy in a local academy under the supervision of a strong 
supporter of the Cheng and Zhu orthodoxy. Because his county of Anhui was 
Master Zhu Xi’s native county,134 this influence continued, and scholars often 
adhered to the model he had set down for posterity. Therefore, Dai Zhen was 
well acquainted with Zhu Xi’s philosophical writings and he passed local exam 
and tried to pass the metropolitan exam that exam questions is Zhu Xi’s 
commentaries of the Canons. Also Dai Zhen quoted some Zhu Xi’s 
commentaries in his commentaries. His knowledge on Zhu Xi and Neo 
Confucianism is well enough accuracy but his understanding on Buddhism is not 
certain.
134 Zhu Xi was the son of a local official in Fujian. His first official position (1151-58) was as a 
registrar in Dungan, Fujian. But his family came from Anhui, so the people of Anhui believed that 
Anhui was Master Zhu Xi’s native county.
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Dai Zhen passed the local exam and attempted to pass the Metropolitan 
examination.135 The intellectual and political hegemony of Zhu Xi’s brand of Neo 
Confucianism in the Yuan, Ming, and the Qing eras turned the attention of 
scholars and the educated elite as a whole to the Four Books. Mastery of these 
texts with the authorised commentaries by Zhu Xi and his associates was almost 
essential for passing the imperial civil service examinations in late traditional 
China.136
In Dai Zhen’s time, the most famous scholar in Huizhou was Jiang Yong 
(Shenxiu, 1681-1762). Jiang Yong was a self-made man, and a strong supporter 
of the Cheng-Zhu schools. His most famous writing is a commentary on the three 
Confucian Canons of Rituals of Zhou (Zhouyi), Decorum Ritual (lyi), and Book of 
Rites (Liji) and a treatise on Zhuzi and Lu Zu Qian’s compilation of the early Song 
philosophers, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsilu). He had studied under the 
supervision of the great astronomer and mathematician Mei Wenting (Wuan,
1633-1721 ).137 His learning emphasised the study of names of things, meaning
135 Yu Yingshi, Discourse of Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng, (Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang 
Xuecheng), Hong Kong, 1976. pp.146-78. Dai Zhen eagerly passed the imperial civil service 
examinations. To apply for the examination six times, he mastered Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi texts, 
and Dai Zhen himself was one of the strong supporters of the Cheng-Zhu school. In this sense, 
some critics’ insistence that Dai Zhen misunderstood Zhu Xi’s philosophy is nonsense or almost 
misunderstanding of Dai Zhen.
136 Henderson, John, The Construction of Orthodox and Heresy, State University of New York 
Press, 1998. pp72-75.
137 Yu Yingshi (1976) pp. 164-78.
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of words, phonology and arithmetic, which were, after all, the essence of the 
Anhui people’s practical learning.
Dai Zhen sent letters and manuscripts of his essays to introduce himself to 
Jiang Yong. In his letters, Dai Zhen assured Jiang of his loyalty to the Neo 
Confucianism and the philosophy of Zhu Xi. The early part of Dai Zhen’s learning 
was similar to Jiang Yong’s.
As a young scholar, Dai visited Jiang Yong in 1750. Jiang wanted to discuss 
the calendar system with Dai Zhen, which Jiang was unable to understand. Dai 
Zhen’s analysis and explanation were clear and distinct. Dai and Jiang built up a 
relationship that resembled the traditional master-disciple relationship.138 
However, Dai Zhen was certainly not supposed to be a disciple of Jiang, as he 
was by this time already a self-made scholar and took pride in his independence. 
As such, he accepted Jiang’s instruction, but did not follow Neo Confucianism 
completely. Dai Zhen used to refer Jiang as “the old scholar from my district”, but 
other scholars strongly disliked this expression. They thought there were no 
scholars without a teacher apart for Confucius himself and treated Dai Zhen’s 
words as immoral. Neo Confucian scholars considered Dai Zhen to be one of 
Jiang’s disciples.
At the age of twenty-six, when he met Jiang, Dai Zhen was treated as a 
scholar who determined his own path. There is some similarity between Jiang 
and Dai’s learning. According to Dai Zhen’s friend from Beijing, Qian Daxin, Dai
138 Xingzhuang Quanji v.7 p. 6.
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praised Jiang's learning on astronomical calculation highly, saying it was an 
achievement not inferior to that of Mei Wenting.139 When Dai Zhen first went to 
the capital, his learning was certainly in a similar vein to Jiang's.140 However, it 
could well be that the resemblance was due to the fact that they came from the 
same region, and so it is not necessarily true that Jiang enlightened Dai Zhen. 
Jiang Yong only encouraged him to pursue precise research further as an elder 
colleague.141
Jiang Yong agreed with Dai Zhen on the subject of evidential study, but at 
the same time did not realise that Zhu Xi’s teaching was antithetical to canonical 
learning (Jingxue). Zhu Xi applied philological research in his works, and said that 
the ‘investigation of things'was the beginning of moral cultivation. However, 
many scholars of the Qing, enthusiastic about Han scholarship, no longer 
concerned themselves with Zhu Xi; they preferred to criticise Neo Confucianism 
and Zhu Xi from a distance. Yu Yingshi also said:
When Qing philologists talked about Song learning unanalytically, they 
meant almost without exception Daoxue or lixue. Because Zhu Xi’s 
moral philosophy and metaphysical constructs were so overwhelming 
one simply could not look at his ideas beyond those boundaries. Some 
scholars in Qing regarded Zhu Xi as one possessed by the wildest 
dream.142
139 Annping Chin, Freeman M.1990. p.4.
140 See. Annping Chin, Freeman M.1990. pp.5-9.
141 Yu Yingshi (1966) pp. 164-165.
142 Ibid. pp116-20.
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Zhu and Dai’s methods were similar, but their objectives and interests in 
learning were entirely different. Master Zhu’s investigation of things was to 
investigate things in nature. For Dai, however, investigation meant to investigate 
the semantics of technical terms and philology in the Six Canons. Jiang Yong 
was closer to Master Zhu’s approach of the investigation of things in scholarship. 
Dai Zhen’s investigation of things, however, focused on the semantics of 
technical terms in the Six Canons, meaning that he remained essentially within 
the spirit of Kaozheng learning rather than Neo Confucianism.
With regard to the most important concern in Dai’s philosophy, the sage,
Dai Zhen is convinced that the Neo Confucians’ philosophy of principle cannot 
make one a sage because their theory is based not on the Confucian Canons but 
on heterodoxy.143 As mentioned, Dai devoted his whole life to excavating the true 
meanings and intentions of the words of sages from the original Confucian 
Canons so as to show the proper language of the Confucian sage. Thus Dai 
Zhen said:
Before the Song, Confucius and Mencius were distinctly Confucius and 
Mencius, and Laozi and Buddha came from the Laozi and Buddha.
Those who discussed Laozi and Buddha used exalted and abstruse 
language without depending on Confucius and Mencius, but since the 
Song, Confucius and Mencius have completely lost their interpretation.
For scholars have indiscriminately plagiarized the words of Laozi and 
Buddha to interpret them. From that time, readers of Confucian books 
flowed and entered into Laozi and Buddha. They loved Laozi and 
Buddha too much so they drowned in it; in the end they eclipsed [the] 
Confucian Canons and enjoyed borrowing help from the Confucian Dao.
143 in Dai Zhen’s context, sage is exactly the Confucianism term.
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For that reason, they lean on the Confucian Canons for discussion of 
Laozi and Buddha. When they meet [the] same people, they share the 
evidence of the tenet of mind, but when they meet others from 
themselves, [they] entrust their theory to [the] Six Canons, Confucius 
and Mencius. They said, "What my acquirement is profound language 
and the great meaning of the sages." And then they make it interlocking 
and confusing, repeatedly changing and more complicated. They mix 
everything to make a crack in the earthware to prevent a leak.144
With regard to the Neo Confucian philosophy of principle, Dai Zhen’s logic is 
simple and clear. According to Dai Zhen, Neo Confucianism from the Song 
Confucians cannot create Confucian sages because the Neo Confucians’ notion 
of principle is adopted from the Buddhist concept. As such, he claims, the Neo 
Confucian concept of the sage can make someone a Buddha, but the Neo 
Confucian notion of principle cannot make someone a Confucian sage. Buddha 
and the Confucian sage have different ‘references’ and ‘senses’.145 In other word, 
they are wholly different species, and, of course, it is impossible to make Buddha 
a Confucian sage. Dai Zhen’s view can be seen a Chinese version of logical 
positivism, by which the Neo Confucian notion of principle is nothing but a 
categorical fallacy. His research, covering etymology, mathematics, science and 
phonetics is all directed towards the one aim: to understand the words of the 
sages and thereby clearly and finally to become a sage through the Canon, 
despite all the obstacles of false interpretation.
It is like a grandson who has never seen his grandfather's face and 
mistakenly draws another man's face as his grandfather's, in order to
144 Dai Zhen, Letter to Dr. Peng, Quanji, v. 6.
145 For ‘reference’ and ‘sense’, see the Frege’s Reference and Sense.
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make obeisance. Indeed, the obeisance is made to his grandfather, but 
the face is not his. Actually the grandson cannot draw his grandfather's 
face. What a hurt that is! However, others try to encroach upon our 
ancestors with their grandfather's face. Others entice our clan to 
become theirs, indeed. That is why I cannot help writing Elucidation of 
the meaning o f word in Mencius. The aim of this book is to destroy the 
wrong picture and to draw the correct picture of our ancestors so as to 
perpetuate our clan and to foil [the] long-standing corruption of our 
ancestry. For a long time, our clan has been shattered and has become 
other races. How little toleration can be allowed! 146
b. Hui Dong and Han Learning
Hui Dong was the most influential figure in Dai Zhen’s philological and 
philosophical research. After encountering Hui, Dai Zhen was set firmly on his 
path and method, which was later to become the backbone of Qing evidential 
study. It was chiefly the difference and similarities between Dai Zhen and Hui that 
influenced Dai’s philology and philosophy. The differences between the two 
induced Dai to try seeking the truth of philosophy through philological research, 
whilst their similarities induced him to study so as to find ways to defeat the Neo 
Confucians effectively.
Dai Zhen befriended Hui Dong in Yangzhou. Hui Dong (1697-1758) and Dai 
Zhen were great masters of Han Learning at the time, and men of later
146 Dai Zhen, Letter to Dr. Peng, Quanji, v. 6.
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generations talked about the Wu [Jiangxi] and Wan [Anhui] schools, which were 
derived from Hui and Dai respectively. Hui was from the Wu county of Jiangxi, 
where his family had taught the Canons for three generations. His grandfather 
was Hui Zhouti (1679-1691) and his father was Shiqi (1671-1741), both of whom 
are famous for their Han learning.147
Hui and his followers wanted to change the study of the Canon. Their 
doctrine was Han Learning; their examples were Zheng Xuan (A.D. 127-200) and 
Fu Sheng (A.D.200-7). Their method involved glossing the meaning of words to 
let the words light the way of the sages in the Canon. They studied especially the 
Han people’s studies of the Book of Changes. The version of the Book of 
Changes that is extant came from Fei Shi, and Fei was a member of the Old Text 
School. Since Wang Bi (226-249) completely altered the Book of Changes into a 
vulgar book and created abstruse ideas in it, he had shorn the substance of the 
scholarship of the Han period, and therefore ancient learning was lost. This, then, 
was Shiqi’s view. Hui Dong maintained Shiqi’s view, and his faith in the latter’s 
doctrine was ever more firm.148
Hui Dong wrote Yishou in six volumes. In it he commented on the Han 
Confucians’ discussion on the Book of Changes. Scholars praised his work as 
the recrudescence of Han Learning after fifteen hundred years.
147 See Annping Chin, Freeman M.1990. p.10-11.
148 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 480.
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Scholars of the Jiangxi and Zhejiang regions, from Huang Zongxi (1601- 
1714), and the brothers (i.e., Zongyen and Zonghui), Mao Qiling (1623-1716) and 
Hu Wei (1633-1714) onward, when talking about the Book of Changes, bent 
every effort towards refuting the Taiji tushuo of Zhou Dunyi. As the theories of 
these authors appeared, the numerous discussions on the diagrams of the Book 
of Changes that appeared from the Song Period onward were pushed aside.
As the Hui father and son followed Huang and Mao, they disregarded the 
Song scholars’ research on the Book of Changes and studied the Han scholar’s 
writing. Their action was in accordance with the trend of the time. The Huis’ study 
of other Canons was just like their study of the Book of Changes, in which they 
generally praised Han Confucianism, exalting the method of various Han schools, 
and believed in the ancient interpretations. As the elucidation of a Canon’s 
meaning lay in the philological study of ancient written characters, an 
acquaintance with and understanding of the ancient written characters’ usage 
and their pronunciation enabled a person to know the Canon’s meaning, and 
therefore philological study of the ancient written characters could not be 
changed.149
Hui Dong claimed that there was a considerable lapse of time between Han 
Zhou, and an even greater one between Han and Tang. How, therefore, could 
one expect men from the Song onward to understand the meaning of the ancient 
written characters? Although the writings of philosophers in the Zhou and Qin
149 Ibid. p. 481
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period’s texts were not all researched, the Han documents were written at a time 
closer to antiquity. Hui Dong therefore decided to take the text of the Canons as 
his theme, the commentaries as headings, the Zhou and Qin periods’ 
philosophical writings as supplementary proof, and the Han Confucians’ works as 
complements.150
This, then, was Hui Dong’s position on the study of the Canons -  to follow 
the ancient interpretation of the Canons, in doing so, he relied on the Han 
Confucians, sought supplementary assistance from philosophers of the Zhou and 
Qin periods, and was unwilling to adopt the expositions of Tang and Song 
scholars.
Examining the differences between Hui’s school of learning and Dai’s 
school of learning and their historical origins shows that the latter began by 
exalting Song learning and reviving Zhu Xi, whereas the former started with anti- 
Song learning and a revival of antiquity. Gu Yanwu said that the precondition for 
learning the principle (lixue) in antiquity was the learning of the Canons (jingxue). 
In order to understand the Canons, it was necessary to know the written 
characters; and in order to know the written characters, it was necessary to study 
their sounds.151
Gu Yanwu wrote Yixue wushu, which used Tang scholars’ writings to 
correct those of Song scholars, and then in turn used the ancient Canons to
150 Ibid. p.478.
151 Ibid.
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correct the Tang scholars’ writings. His intention was to rebel against Song by 
reviving antiquity, and to repudiate the Song and Ming scholars’ recorded sayings 
(Yulu) using the philological study of the Canons. Gu’s influence permeated the 
Three Wu region, and this work became the historical origin of the Wu School of 
Han Learning.152
Moreover, in Yaojiang County in eastern Zhejiang, Wang Yangming’s 
influence was still very much alive. All Yangming scholars’ arguments against 
Zhu Xi arrived at the same conclusion as Gu Yanwu, which made scholars 
realise that the ancient Canons and Song learning were not one and the same. 
Also, athough Yan Ruoju’s research on the Guwen Shangshu had had the 
intention of exalting Zhu Xi, the result was in fact to make people realise that the 
understanding of the Canons lay in studying antiquity. Writings from the Jin (265- 
420) and Tang (618-907) periods onward have doubtful veracity, not to mention 
those in the Song and Ming eras, since these latter eras lay so much further in 
time from antiquity.153
As a result, the main target for Hui Dong and his followers was Neo 
Confucianism, e.g., Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. They claimed the Song Confucians 
were illiterates, and that the disasters caused by the Song Confucians had 
become ever more serious. Hui Dong said, “I, Dong, consider the debacle 
brought on by the Song Confucians as worse than the Qin dynasty’s burning of
152 Ibid. p.483.
153 ibid.
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the books to ashes.”154 Hui Dong created the Han Learning movement and 
encouraged the Kaozhengxue (but was not identical with it).155
The relationship between Dai Zhen and Hui Dong was warm and 
harmonious. Dai Zhen was twenty-seven years younger and was greatly 
influenced by Hui Dong. The encounter with him marked a crossroads in Dai 
Zhen’s progress; it is possible that Hui Dong’s Yi weiyan influenced Dai Zhen’s 
philosophical works to a certain extent.156
Yi weiyan has a note on li, saying:
The meaning of the word li is dualistic. The Record of Music states 
[that] Heavenly Principle consists of like and dislike. Like is nearer to 
benevolence and dislike is nearer to righteousness; the proper 
expression of like and dislike is Heavenly Principle, whereas [the] casual 
expression of like and dislike is [the] destruction of Heavenly Principle 
which is what the Great Learning refers to as [going] against human 
nature. That which Heaven decrees is known as nature (xing). Nature 
contains yin and yang, firmness and softness, benevolence and 
righteousness: all of which are known as Heavenly and man, and li and 
desire; and they said, moreover, ‘Heaven is If, which is particularly 
ridiculous.157
The above statement is similar in general to Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng.
154 Ibid. p. 498.
155 Yu Yingshi (1975), Quanji. v. 7. p. 584.
166 See Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. pp.12-13.
157 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 480. p. 421.
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The following year, in 1758, Hui Dong passed away. Seven years later, 
when Dai Zhen was passing through Suzhou, Hui Dong’s hometown, he wrote a 
preface to Hui shoujingtu (Diagram of Receiving Instructions) to remember the 
time and to give meaning to what they had shared.158
However, Dai Zhen could not accept Hui Dong’s idea that there were two 
paths in the study of the Canons. Hui encouraged Dai Zhen to look at the two 
categories, ancient glosses and rational meaning, as inseparable; one being the 
method and the other its philosophical justification. In Dai Zhen’s terms, “If the 
ancient glosses are not employed for the purpose of understanding the reason 
and meaning of things at the same time, then what is the point of pursuing that 
type of research?” The differences between them are obvious and very important 
in the Kaozheng movement. Later the Dai Zhen School distinguished itself from 
Hui Dong School.
c. Duan Yucai and the Kaozheng School
Dai Zhen had established his school, regardless of his lack of desire to create 
one. At first, he strongly refused to form any kind of teacher-disciple relationship, 
as he preferred to have a “brother” or “companion” rather than a disciple. Dai
158 Nianpu, Quanji v6. p. 687. also see Dai Zhen, Shoujingtu {Diagram of receiving instructions), 
Quanji, v.6. p.396.
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Zhen thought the only the teacher to be Confucius, and that each man has to 
face the words of Confucius and words of the sages independently. Dai Zhen’s 
Kaozheng School emphasised the importance of independence from the later 
authorities or exegetes. With regard to truth, the Dai Zhen School encouraged the 
correction of errors and the criticism of the fallacy of the work even of one's 
master, something not allowed within the traditional Chinese master-disciple 
relationship. Dai Zhen’s denial of the traditional limits of such a relationship can 
perhaps be seen as a prognostication of the negative effects of this kind of 
relationship in his eyes.
In Beijing, Dai Zhen met Duan Yucai, who became Dai’s first disciple. At 
that time, Duan was a teacher of the Manchu children in the Palace. Dai Zhen 
and Duan Yucai formed a strong relationship; after the death of Dai Zhen, Duan 
Yucai wrote a biography about Dai and became the most important scholar in the 
Kaozheng School and Dai’s strongest defender.
At the time Dai Zhen met Duan, Dai had to return south with haste and so 
he and Duan did not have time to establish a formal master-disciple relationship. 
But some time later, in a letter to Dai Zhen, Duan referred to himself as a 
“disciple”. Three years later, Dai Zhen was again in Beijing for the Metropolitan 
examination that both had failed. The two men met again, and Dai refused to be 
Duan Yucai’s teacher. 159 Dai Zhen said:
159 Annping Chun, Freeman M. (1990), p.14.
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I kept the letter which you kindly wrote me a year ago with the intent of 
returning it to you. At the time of my hurried departure from home, I 
searched but could not find it. It was out of your enormous love for 
[learning that you honoured me], but I must decline the honour, not 
because I am modest. By the ancient means friendship is understood 
that people learn from each other. We must be friends in the ancient 
manner. I am, therefore, returning your letter.160
Dai Zhen regarded learning to be such that each person ought to be his 
own teacher and that this was an intensely personal experience. However, Dai 
Zhen gave weight to the view that mutual teaching prevented obstinacy. Just as 
he had not allowed Jiang Yong to be his teacher, Dai Zhen regarded the 
traditional teacher-disciple relationship as somewhat limited and as being likely to 
hamper him in the way he thought and worked. But Duan was determined, and 
so three years later when he saw Dai again in Beijing when taking the . 
Metropolitan examination, Dai gave in and agreed grudgingly to the more formal 
relationship.161
Duan Yucai was very close to Dai Zhen, and what they shared was more a 
brotherly than a formal master-apprentice relationship. When Dai Zhen sent him 
copies of his works, Duan would read and comment on them with loyalty. When 
money was tight, Dai Zhen would ask for help and Duan did what he could. Dai 
gave Duan comfort and encouragement when he was deeply depressed over his
160 Dai Zhen, A Letter to Duan Yucai, Quanji, v.6. p.535.
161 Yu Yingshi (1975), Quanji. v. 7. p. 588.
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job security.162 Dai Zhen sent him three letters while gravely ill in the last year of 
his life; he was anxious not only to hear from Duan but also to speak to him about 
what he had finally grasped after a lifetime of studying the Canons and 
deciphering the meaning of words from his most important work, the Mengziziyi 
shuzheng (An evidential study of the meaning of terms in the Mencius). However, 
Duan’s interest was not philosophy but etymology and phonology. Even though 
Duan became Dai Zhen’s most faithful defender after his death, he had almost no 
concern for philosophical matters. It is said that except for scholarly methods, no 
philosophical vision was transmitted from the older to the younger. In this sense, 
Duan Yucai was in fact not Dai Zhen’s disciple.163
Even as the strongest defender of Dai Zhen, Duan Yucai tried but failed to 
understand Dai Zhen completely, and so Duan tried to place Dai Zhen’s name 
among those of the Zhu Xi line of Neo Confucians. However, Dai Zhen’s other 
scholastic descendents Wang Niansun and his son Wang Yinzhi understood Dai 
Zhen better, and so they extended Dai’s approach and attempted to become 
sages by using the "meanings" of Chinese words as a method of reconstructing 
the "intentions" of the sages.164 In the second generation of Dai Zhen’s School, 
Jiao Xun and Huang Sanshi attempted to extend Dai Zhen’s philosophy. The 
distinguished scholar and patron Ruan Yuan composed essays on Confucian 
philosophy modelled on Dai’s linguistic approach to philosophical terms. Ruan’s
162 Ibid, pp. 535-536.
163 Annping Chun, Freeman M. (1990), p.16.
164Kuhn, Philip. Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1796-1864. Cambridge, Havard University Press, 1970. p157.
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treatise made use of etymological and phonological procedures to reconstruct the 
meanings of key Confucian concepts. The most famous scholar of the Later Qing 
period, Gong Zizhen (Wang Yinzhi’s grandson) referred to himself as a genuine 
inheritor of Dai Zhen’s philosophy.
d. Zhang Xuecheng and Historiography
Zhang Xuecheng, an eminent Kaozheng historian of the mid-Qing period, 
was influenced by Dai Zhen despite their very different stances. The differences 
between Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng give a clear and distinctive view of 
character and limitations of the philosophy of Dai Zhen. As Zhang indicated, while 
Dai’s lack of historical perspective could be seen as a limitation, it is precisely this 
anti-historical character that is such a strongpoint in Dai’s philosophy.
Dai Zhen met Zhang Xuecheng (1738-1801) in Beijing in 1766. Dai Zhen 
was there to take the Metropolitan examination and stayed in the Xiuning hostel. 
At that time, Zhang Xuecheng was twenty-eight years old, a gifted, self-confident 
scholar and a student of the Imperial Academy.165
To gain insight into philological research, he paid a visit to Dai Zhen and 
questioned him about his learning. Dai Zhen presented a general outline for him.
165 Annping Chun, Freeman M. (1990),. p.18.
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At that time, many scholars admired Dai Zhen because of his skill at glossing 
words and terms and because of his knowledge of the Six Canons and the nine 
branches of mathematics. But what Zhang Xuecheng found was not what Dai 
Zhen had promised. He was a totally different kind of scholar.166
After reading Dai Zhen’s philosophical treatise Inquiry into Goodness 
(Yuanshan) many scholars commented that “he had wasted his energy on 
something useless.”167 However, in Zhang’s view, the scholars who criticised Dai 
Zhen’s discussion of principle and qi as “empty words” did not truly discern him. 
Zhang Xuecheng labelled himself as “the one who understood Dai Zhen most 
profoundly.” He wrote, “I gather that Dai’s secret feelings were most subtle. There 
are mistakes as well as brightness in his scholarship.”168
After the first meeting, Zhang felt “ashamed and alarmed,” stating, “my heart 
felt a chill." But six years later, the two scholars saw each other twice. Their talks 
on these occasions did not go well, turning into a dispute over Zheng Jiao’s 
(1104-1160) work on a comprehensive history (Tongshi). Neither was prepared to 
accept the other’s position; nonetheless, their discourses conveyed a genuine 
concern, both understanding the other intuitively. Each had the self-confidence to 
attempt to make sense of a universe that was not always clear and distinct, and
166 Yu Yingshi (1975) p. Quanji. v. 7. p. 593.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
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each wanted to release his learning and himself from a dependency on 
accumulated evidence.169
In 1772, when Zhang Xuecheng and Dai met in Dai’s at Nanfeng, Dai 
Zhen’s view had already shifted somewhat and he attacked Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi 
orally, although this attitude cannot be detected in his Xuyan. This was the 
reason that Zhang gibed at him that his writing-brush and tongue differed and 
that he was devious.170 Thus Zhang said:
Mr. Dai was a great scholar of his time. However, as he had a devious 
mind, scholars nowadays are revolted by his behaviour, and therefore I 
wrote a “Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Jiuyuan] Chapter” to correct him. Mr. Dai had 
passed away more than ten years before. Although he blatantly 
inveighed against [the Song thinkers], this does not pillory Mr. Dai’s 
[reputation] ... Mr. Dai’s learning was steeped in philology and excelled 
in semantics of technical terms and institutions. He may be said to have 
discovered the truth of these matters, with the assistance of which he 
was to expound the Way. Since people in his own days valued erudition 
and empirical research, and since they knew of his competence in 
philology and the semantics of technical terms which fitted in with the 
current fad, they considered that these subjects were what Dai excelled 
in. However, when Dai wrote On Human Nature (Lun xing), On 
Goodness, and other treatises, he expounded new ideas on Heaven, 
man, //' and qi that men of by-gone ages had never expressed. His 
contemporaries commented that he talked emptily about moral principle 
and that he could have dispensed with the trouble of writing these 
treatises. They certainly did not know about Dai’s learning.171
169 See, Annping Chun, Freeman M. (1990), p.19.
170 Qian Mu, Quanji. v. 7. p. 522.
171 Zhang Xuecheng, Zhangshi yishu, Beijing University, 1934. p.34.
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According to Zhang’s own account of their meeting, “Dai Zhen was 
comprehensively practised in the skill of glossing the Canons ... but he did not 
realise what historiography was, and when he heard me discussing it, he 
suddenly become dictatorial and started to belittle me.”172
Zhang, however, had given considerable thought to historiography, focusing 
mainly on the problem of methodology. He was convinced that evidential 
research was important for the study of the past. It was not evidential research 
that gave learning meaning and purpose but historiography that delivered 
pictures of change. By Zhang truth was not something contained in any single 
body of data, not even the Canons; it was to be seen as changes or the flow of 
events over time, and Zhang himself intended to become the most conscientious 
observer of change in the history of China. Zhang Xuecheng wanted to go one 
step further in historiography, “to liberate evidential research from the monopoly 
of those who study the Canons,” whereas Dai Zhen felt this was not necessary 
because the vastness of the universe was totally encompassed in the Canons.173
However, Dai Zhen did not want to confine himself to the study of phonetics 
(liushu) and mathematics (zhishu), and he held such a view even before he had 
gone to the capital. But his public attack on Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi only started in 
earnest in old age. Zhang Xuecheng sneered at him:
172 Zhang Xuecheng, Wenshi tungyi (General principle of literature and history), in Zhang 
Xuecheng, 14:37a.
173 Yu Yingshi (1976) p.140.
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What the ancients wrote on bamboo slips and cloths were the same as 
what they uttered . . .  But nowadays cunning persons differ . . . They 
use writing to win the trust of those who know the subjects but use their 
mouth to deceive those who do not know too much about [the subjects]
... Such a person’s relation to Master Zhu may be likened to someone 
who having drunk the water treacherously forgets its source -  the 
fountain; and [when this someone] writes about Master Zhu, the reader 
can detect only slight insinuations, for he dares not blatantly attack 
[Master Zhu]. And this is the reason why this someone would not make 
himself abominable in the eyes of those who really understand [Master 
Zhu’s teaching]174.
Those who have no deep understanding of Master Zhu, however, openly 
vilify him without compunction, because they have become accustomed to 
hearing Dai Zhen’s fulminations: they hold that this man’s statements must be 
correct, and therefore that Master Zhu deserves to be denounced.
In comparing Dai Zhen and his contemporaries, Zhang Xuechang, Yu 
Yingshi points out that Dai does not throw commentary out of the window. 
Whereas Zhang Dai" attempts to escape from the tyranny of the commentarial 
tradition by advocating a direct relationship with the text of the canon itself."175 
Dai Zhen wishes to maintain the integrity of both text and tradition. His return to 
the genuine meaning of Mencius is evidenced by his use of that the Canons, but 
his keeping to tradition is also shown by his acceptance that reading Mencius can 
be done in the light of the metaphysics that developed from the Great Appendix. 
Where he castigates Song metaphysics is in it’s reading of the text of the Great
174 Chang Xuecheng 'Zhu Lu Chapter, Wenshi Tongyi, Beijing, 1956. pp. 56-57.
175 Campbell.D., The Body of the Way is without edges: Zhang Dai and his Four Books 
Epiphanies, Conference Paper CSAA: Adelaide 1997
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Appendix resulting in a dualism of Principle and Matter. In other words Song 
Confucian metaphysicians are not guilty of constructing a metaphysical system, 
but for poor exegesis made critical error to interpret the Canon.176
As mentioned, Zhang Xuecheng labelled himself as “the one who 
understood Dai Zhen most profoundly.” Yet Zhang himself gravely misunderstood 
Dai and rebuked him for being a “man who forgot where he came from”. However, 
Dai Zhen did not in fact come from the Zhu Xi School or indeed any other 
established school of philosophy. As shown above, Dai Zhen was a self­
established philological scholar and was not subject to any master-disciple 
relationship with the Neo Confucians. In this sense, Zhang Xuecheng’s criticism 
is therefore misdirected and misguided.
Despite Zhang’s criticisms, in Dai Zhen’s philosophical framework 
historiography is an unreliable tool with which to grasp the truth of the Canons.
Dai Zhen was a philologist of the Chinese Classics and his philosophy is a form 
of extension of his philological works. For him, there is no truth outside the text of 
the Canons written in the Zhou period by Confucius, Mencius and the sages. 
Unlike Zhu Xi, Dai’s main concern is with words. The truth dwells in the Six 
Canons and it’s commentaries and semantics research is the only tool with which 
to discover the truth.
Dai Zhen claimed that the Canon is not formed by the passage of history, 
but that the words of the sages are a rigid designation. Without doubt, Dai Zhen
176 Yu Yingshi, (1975) p. 142.
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believed that the Canons can be received directly from the sages and that they 
contain the truth that must be salvaged from the contamination of history. So, 
there is no truth outside the text of the Canons, and history does not bring out the 
meaning of the Canons, but is rather something has to be cleared away so that 
the truth of the Canons can be revealed.
2. Modern Understanding of Dai Zhen
As a result of Dai Zhen’s anti-Neo Confucian philosophy, modern Chinese 
philosophers view him as representing the opposite of Zhu Xi’s metaphysics, 
almost as a counterpart, rather than placing him in a separate category. By way 
of analogy, to place Dai Zhen in the same category as Zhu Xi is like placing 
Thomas Aquinas in the same category as Wittgenstein. Although Dai Zhen does 
attack the metaphysics of Zhu Xi, Dai Zhen’s philosophy has a different discourse 
and paradigm and therefore a different Episteme from Zhu Xi’s. In other word, 
their respective philosophies have different objectives: Zhu Xi meditates on things 
themselves and verifies his insight through the Canons; whereas Dai Zhen 
inquires only into the semantic structure of the words of the sages rather than into 
the things themselves. It must be noted that, despite the fact that he continually 
praised Zhu Xi in many respects, Dai did attack Zhu Xi’s usage of words and the 
origin of his concept of principle.
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The first important writer to elaborate on Dai’s philosophy was Zhang 
Binglin. Zhang had studied with Yu Yue of the Wan School in his youth, and was 
therefore well acquainted with Dai’s philosophical writings. In addition to treatises 
on philology and phonetics, a tradition he inherited from the Wan School, Zhang 
made a brief survey of the intellectual trends of the Qing period in general and a 
review of Dai’s thought in particular. Zhang’s interest in Qing intellectual history 
undoubtedly had an influence on later scholars, notably Liang Qichao and Qian 
Mu.177
Zhang honoured Dai by quoting him and by giving praise to many of his 
philosophical views. Zhang begins by first making a distinction between Song 
Confucians’ aims and Dai’s. Thus Zhang says:
The Song Confucians’ teaching was intended for personal cultivation 
and not to be applied in government. Hence, Dai did not grasp the main 
purpose of the Neo Confucians’ exposition.”178
Zhang observes that since Dai’s having been a merchant when he was a 
young man made him intimately familiar with the common people’s hardship. 
Although Dai served in an official capacity in his later years, the emperor gave 
him little encouragement for his toils. Zhang notes that this could be the reason 
for the writing of On Goodness and Commentary on the Words and Meaning of
177 Liu Jinxian, 1977, p.373.
178 Zhang Binglin, Shidai (An interpretation of Dai Zhen), Quanji, p.336.
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the Mencius, in which he expressed the concepts of impartiality {ping) and 
reciprocal love (sftu).179
According to Dai, Zhang continues, the ancient sages assisted the people in 
improving their livelihood, but rulers in subsequent ages have neglected this. All 
of Dai’s views are expressed in a similar vein. Zhang adds that Dai’s postulate 
was based on the common people’s position, and that he admonished the ruler 
that he should abide by his duty to care for his people. When Dai elucidated the 
origin of human nature, decree (ming), feeling, and desire, Zhang asserts, he 
always had in mind the improvement of the common people’s material 
conditions.180
Binglin made an eloquent supplication to Heaven, Zhang declares. He also 
showed that if one breaches the law there is hope of mercy; but if he commits a 
violation against principle, there is no hope of consolation for him from society, 
since Neo Confucian social mores do not tolerate a breach of the all-important //'. 
However, Zhang holds that it was Xunzi who first enunciated the dictum that 
“appropriate desire is the principle’’. Zhang criticises Dai for seemingiy being in 
agreement with Xunzi, but, since the latter’s thesis was that “human nature is evil” 
and therefore at variance with his own view, for interpreting this originally as 
stating that human nature is good. In addition, Zhang chides Dai for utilising the 
name of Confucius but really embracing the Daoist view of obeying naturalness 
(.ziran) and regarding Mencius as a convenient mouthpiece through which to
179 Ibid.
180 Liu Jinxian, 1977, p.376.
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express his own ideas. Furthermore, Zhang observes that Dai made merely 
superficial criticism of the Daoists, and that this is his main failing.181
It seems that Zhang did, however, truly admire Dai, and showed this 
admiration by lashing out at Dai’s so-called followers who, from Zhu Yun (1724- 
1850) on, professed to practice his admonitions but behaved contrary to the spirit 
of them. The implication was that they did not have any true understanding of 
their master’s teaching.182
Zhang was a famed essayist. Aside from the fact that he had a deep-seated 
interest in Qing intellectual history, his exposition on Dai Zhen seemed to be 
politically motivated. As an inveterate opponent of the Manchu and an implacable 
enemy of the alien Qing dynasty, he always keen to preach the overthrow of this 
hateful foreign dynasty. In his incisive comments, he wished to point out the evil 
of the autocratic Manchu government and its abuse of the Song Neo Confucian 
school’s words (such as //') in oppressing the people. In any event, Zhang 
aroused the intelligentsia’s interest in Dai and showed that he was a philosopher 
as well as a master of Han learning.183
As a result of Zhang Binglin’s expounding on Dai Zhen’s ideas, his work as 
a philosopher belatedly received the scholarly attention due to it. The political 
revolution of 1911 was followed by an intellectual revolution in the late teens of
181 Ibid.
182 Zhang Binglin, Ibid, Quanji, p.337.
183 Liu Jinxian, 1977, p.374.
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the new century. The “May Fourth Movement” of 1919, which started as a 
patriotic protest against the Paris Peace Conference and the Beijing regime, 
inaugurated a new era in which China’s traditional civilisation underwent critical 
evaluation by Chinese intellectuals.184
Two years later in 1921, there came what has since been called the “New 
Culture Movement,” in which many radicals adopted the slogan “Down with 
Confucius and his sons.” They blamed Confucianism, particularly the Cheng and 
Zhu Rationalistic school of Neo Confucianism, ignoring its solid contribution to 
Chinese civilisation. Although Chinese traditional culture was not without its 
apologists, the trend of the time was to disparage anything that was remotely 
related to tradition and to nurture an increasing infatuation with Western ideas 
and ways of living. Indeed, for a time the very words ‘Zhu Xi’ or ‘Confucianism’ 
seemed to be synonymous with obscurantism, autocracy, and debilitation. In an 
intellectual atmosphere such as this, it is no wonder that anti-Rationalistic school 
writers such as Dai Zhen received attention, and that his philosophy was widely 
publicised by well-known intellectuals of the time.185
Liang Qi-chao was an intellectual who, in his own words, had no fixed ideas, 
and whose intellectual outlook underwent several changes throughout his life. As 
a leading student of Kang Youwei, he had been a member of the Modern Text 
School movement in his youth. After a sojourn in Japan as a result of his 
participation with Kang in the abortive reform movement of 1898, Liang had
184 Ibid.
485 Ibid. p.380-381
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acquired some familiarity with Western philosophical and political ideas through 
Japanese translations, and intellectually began to diverge from Kang. Although 
he had a period of disillusionment with Western civilisation, it seems that certain 
Western concepts such as liberty, human rights, and material satisfaction, 
persisted in his mind.186
Hence, in 1923, when he was teaching at Qinghua University, Liang, along 
with a returned student from America, Hu Shi, started a series of lectures to 
propagate Dai’s philosophy. Although Liang and Hu differed in background and in 
age, they both shared the conviction that the Neo Confucians, particularly the 
Song Confucians, had misled the people with their false teaching of the denial of 
desire. Since Dai Zhen had made pointed criticism of the Song Confucians on 
this point, it is not surprising that these two intellectuals were enthusiastic 
promoters of his philosophical system.187
Aside from doctrinal belief, however, Hu Shi had another reason for 
eulogising Dai’s scholarship. Whereas Liang was Cantonese, Hu was from Anhui, 
a fellow provincial of the Han learning master. As Hu proclaimed in his speeches 
and lecture, “Anhui people ought to study Anhui learning”. Sentimental reasons, 
therefore, were a contributory factor in his promotion of Dai’s learning.188
186 Ibid, p.356.
187 Ibid, p.358.
188 Ibid, p.361.
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According to Liang, the Confucian school affirms life, and therefore 
considers that all political and social mores should be sympathetic to human 
emotions and needs. The Daoists and Buddhists, on the other hand, advocate 
having no desire. Although the Song Confucians did not negate life, Liang 
asserts, they made the fundamental error of adopting the nonsensical idea of 
having no desire. This, then, is where they are wrong and is the main reason why 
Dai wished to refute them.189
Agreeing with Dai, Liang points out the Song Confucian’s three main errors. 
As desire is inherent in man, and as even a junzi (gentleman) has need of food, 
drink, and sex, how could anyone do without them, Liang asks. And, since 
according to the Neo Confucians, only a person with no desire is a junzi, many 
so-called junzi were unsympathetic to human emotions and needs.190 Moreover, 
they insist that the //' (principle) is their own biased opinion. According to the Neo 
Confucians, Liang continues, even someone’s arbitrary action would not stir his 
conscience at all if he considered that it did not originate from desire. Even 
worse, if other people’s views are contrary to his own biased opinion, the self- 
styled junzi would accuse them of being “at variance with the //”.191 Finally, the 
Song Confucians forced the population to become hypocritical, Liang adds. The 
Neo Confucians followed this precept that // and desire are incompatible as a 
criterion even in government. They deemed the material needs of man to be
189 Liang Qichao, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue (Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan), Quanji.vl pp. 355.
190 Ibid, pp. 354-357.
191 Ibid, pp. 367-380.
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connected to human desire and therefore to be something that ought to be 
eliminated altogether.192
Hence, according to Liang, the main reason for Dai’s holding human 
emotion and desire in such high regard is that he wished to establish a normal- 
life philosophy as opposed to the Song Confucians’ non-life philosophy. However, 
it is obvious to us that there seems to be a misrepresentation of the Song 
Confucians on Liang’s part, for, as Feng Yulan points out, what the Song 
Confucians condemned was not desire itself but excessive desire.193
Hu Shi, on the other hand, praises Dai as knowing that philological study is 
merely the means to an end and not an end in itself. Dai did not, Hu argues, want 
merely to be a philologist as a philosopher. Dai’s cosmological theory is a form of 
naturalism that is also contains material elements. Differing from the Song 
Confucians’ dualistic view of li on the other hand, Hu maintains, Dai regarded that 
there is only the qi. In Dai’s cosmological system, the things in the universe are 
all active, in which point his philosophy differed from the Song Confucians’ dual 
interpretation of activity and passivity in the universe; and, as a matter of fact, he 
explains that they emphasised the passive aspect of their philosophical 
system.194
192 Ibid, p.378.
193 Liu Jinxian, 1977, p.380.
194 Hu Shi, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue (The Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan), Quanji,v7. pp. 384- 
386.
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Dai’s view on human nature derived from his cosmological theory. Dai 
regarded man's nature, says Hu, as really his blood, breath, and consciousness. 
The Song Confucians held that man has a moral nature within him on the one 
hand and a material nature on the other. As the Song Confucians insisted that 
only moral nature is the true nature, Hu comments, this put Dai directly at 
variance with them. Moreover, Dai refuted the Song Confucians’ denial of the 
worth of materia! nature. According to Dai, Hu adds, if man expands the intellect 
contained in his mind so that whatever he does he would not be deluded, he 
would be able to return to what is natural and to what is morally necessary in his 
activity, and he would have the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, 
and wisdom.195
Although Dai also considered that human nature is good, Hu remarks, his 
view was not based on the dualism of // and qi in the same way as the Song 
Confucians’. Moreover, according to Dai, the Song Confucians’ fundamental error 
lay in disparaging the material aspect of human nature as evil while asserting the 
goodness of the moral aspect. Dai insisted that man’s blood, breath, and 
consciousness, i.e. the material aspect, was the nature. Herein, says Hu, lies the 
main difference between Dai’s philosophy and the Cheng and Zhu schools of 
Neo Confucianism.196
Moreover, Dai held that feeling, desire, and knowledge are all equally 
worthy, this assertion acting as a protest against the Song Confucians who
195 Ibid, p.393.
196 Ibid, p.381.
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repudiated them and advocated quiescence as the ideal. Dai, according to Hu, 
particularly praised knowledge, for only by means of knowledge could one’s 
feelings and desires be fulfilled, and only because man has knowledge is he 
capable of surmising other people’s feelings, on which morality is based.
The ideal morality is the complete fulfilment of every man’s desires and 
feelings. Hu comments that Dai berated the concept of li because he felt that 
many of the self-styled followers of the Song Confucians had abused the word.
As for the li, Dai deemed that it could only be found within matters and affairs. He 
also refuted the Idealistic school (Song Confucianism), Hu Shi goes on, and held 
that the mind could not be the li as the Idealists (Song Confucians) insisted but 
was merely an organ of the human body that is capable of thinking and absorbing 
knowledge.
According to Hu, Dai advocated that man must use his mind’s 
enlightenment to scrutinise human affairs, and Dai’s methodology in learning was 
to analyse things minutely and to emphasise verification. According to Dai, Hu 
adds, another evil emanating from the Song Confucians’ teaching was that a man 
could now insist that his biased opinion is the //, and could use this hallowed word 
to reprimand other people for their feelings. Hu summarised Dai’s philosophy as 
adopting a scientific attitude towards seeking knowledge and towards seeking the 
principle of the solution to the problem of life. In addition, Hu concludes, Dai
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elevated the idea of desire, which represents a significant contribution to the 
history of Chinese thought.197
Liang and Hu’s promotion of Dai Zhen’s philosophy epitomised the restless 
intellectuals of the early republican era, whose faith in the orthodox doctrine and 
the Neo Confucians had been shattered, and who were searching for a new 
guiding philosophy. As the orthodoxy had been discredited, intellectual 
atmosphere arose in which all sorts of novel and extreme ideas found their 
eloquent champions. As criticism against tradition became a fad, the way was 
paved for the eventual ascendancy of Marxist thought in China from the late 
1920s on.198 Liang and Hu’s espousal of what they held to be anti-Song Learning 
reflected the chaotic political and intellectual climate of the time.
Liang’s fulmination against the Neo Confucians was not due to any 
fundamental lack of understanding of their philosophy; rather, his denunciation of 
the Neo Confucians was partly due to his want of fixed ideas, and partly due to 
his earlier infatuation with certain Western concepts such as idividual freedom, 
the fulfilment of man's material needs, national wealth and strength, etc. These 
ideas had made an indelible mark on him, and it seems that they were not 
obliterated from his subconscious even after his disillusionment with Western 
civilisation. It is therefore no surprise that he praised Dai’s anti-Neo Confucian
197 Ibid. pp. 396-412.
198 Liu Jinxian, 1977. pp.367-369.
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philosophy, holding that the Neo Confucians had imposed unreasonable 
restraints on man’s emotions and needs.199
Liang’s attack on the Song Confucians was not due to any deep-seated 
antipathy toward them; rather, he was a patriot with the praiseworthy aim of the 
rejuvenation of China, for which goal he was willing to clear away any obstacle he 
perceived. Earlier in his career, many of his numerous articles in newspapers had 
as their theme the strengthening China against foreign aggression and the 
improvement of the Chinese people’s spiritual and material well-being.200
On the other hand, his friend and collaborator, Hu Shi, was educated in the 
United States, and was an unequivocal follower of pragmatism. He prescribed 
“science and democracy” as the panacea for China’s ills. One thing that is 
apparent, however, is that Hu found in Dai’s philosophy a convenient weapon 
with which to strike a fatal blow to the Neo Confucianism that had, according to 
him, done incalculable harm to the minds and bodies of the people for the 
previous seven hundred years. For him, the prerequisite condition for the revival 
of China was the casting aside of Confucianism, especially Song Neo 
Confucianism. It is for this reason that he heaped praise on Dai’s predecessors, 
Yen Yuan (1635-1704) and Li Gong (1659-1733), seeing in them Chinese 
pragmatists and stout anti-Song Confuciansm crusaders.201
199 Ibid, p.365.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid. p.392.
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After 1923, the enthusiasm for the study of Dai’s philosophy died down, and 
Hu, its chief promoter, soon left his teaching position at Beijing University and in 
1926 embarked on an extended trip abroad. Dai’s philosophy again received 
attention when Feng Yulan(1895-1990) published the second volume of his 
History of Chinese Philosophy \n 1934. Feng, like Hu, had also studied in the 
United States on a government scholarship in 1919, and after the completion of 
his studies in philosophy in 1923, he returned to China and held teaching 
positions at various universities.202
In his interpretation of Dai Zhen’s philosophy, Feng saw an essential 
difference between this Qing thinkers’ view on desire and that of his Song 
precursors, for, according to Feng, the Song Neo Confucians condemned only 
excessive desire and not desire as such. Where Dai really differed from the 
Cheng and Zhu school, however, is that he deemed the li to be immanent in the 
qi, whereas the latter considered it to be transcendental. This view, Feng 
suggests, was held by most of the early Qing scholars such as Huang Zongxi, 
Wang Fuzhi, Van Yuan and Li Gong. Moreover, Dai flatly denied the Song Neo 
Confucians’ contention that every man has a Supreme Ultimate (taiji) in his mind, 
which is the sum total of all the li and which is man’s own nature. Thus men's 
own nature also has all the li in the world. Dai, Feng comments, categorically 
rejected this view.203
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid. p.397.
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Like Hu Shi, Feng considers that Dai Zhen, Yan Yuan and Li Gong were all 
anti-Neo Confucian, and that the reason for these early Qing thinkers’ diatribe 
toward the Song philosophers was the fact that the latter “had the appearance of 
truth; yet in reality they were confusing if. This, then, is the reason for Dai’s 
vituperation of Song Confucianism. Nevertheless, although Dai differed from the 
Song philosophers’ system, adds Feng, his thought was not very profound, and 
he could not therefore set up a full-blown philosophical system to vie with either 
Song Confucianism or the Idealistic school of Neo Confucianism.204
Qian Mu wrote a biography of Dai Zhen, in which he pointed out the 
influence of other scholars on the evolution of Dai’s thought. Because both the 
Yen and Li school and Dai fulminate against the Song Confucians, Liang Qichao 
and Hu Shi hold that the early Qing “pragmatists”, Yen Yuan and his disciple Li 
Gong, inspired Dai’s philosophy. Qian contends, however, that it was not 
necessarily so, for thinkers could conceivably arrive at the same view 
independently, and one scholar did not necessarily have to derive his ideas from 
another. Qian suggests, moreover, that Ming scholars had already taken up Dai’s 
discourse on ontology, principle, qi, human nature, and ability. Hence Dai did not 
necessarily derive his ideas from these early Qing critics of the Song 
Confucians.205
204 ibid. p.401.
205 See Qian Mu’s Zhongguo jin sanbainian xueshu shi.
Qian Mu made an exhaustive research on the evolution of Dai’s philosophical system, tracing 
the date of completion of his three philosophical books.
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The central focus of Dai’s philosophical system, Qian asserts, is his 
distinction between naturalness (ziran) and moral necessity (biran) on the one 
hand and li (principle) and yu (desire) on the other. Although these distinctions 
are in line with the Yen and Li School’s precepts, and although both the Yen and 
Li schools and Dai impugned Zheng Yi (1033-1108) and Zhu Xi (1130-1200), 
Qian notes, Dai’s philosophical ideas were not necessarily inherited from his 
early Qing predecessors. On the contrary, Qian comments, Dai’s insistence on 
the understanding of the ancient sages’ philosophy by means of philology was in 
opposition to Yan’s teaching, which frowned on book-learning and the study of 
sentences.206
According to Dai, Qian maintains, the li is man’s feelings and originates in 
desire. In Dai’s philosophical system, if one ignores human desire when 
discussing the li, he misses the perception of it, and this so-called //would really 
be nothing more than his opinion. Moreover, Qian Mu comments, if one 
compelled others to follow his own biased opinion by claiming it to be the li, he 
would only bring calamity and suffering to the world. Dai reproached the evil 
derived from the Song Confucians’ distinction between li and Yu, for which 
reason he railed against the Song, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, treating them as he did 
the Buddhists and the Daoists. For this reason, Dai regarded the Song 
Confucians teaching as baneful to political and social morals. Nonetheless, Dai
206 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 499-502.
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emphasised the intellect, Qian adds, in order to understand things and affairs. 
Since he stressed the intellect, he also valued knowledge and its accretion.207
Beside Dai Zhen, Qian Mu wrote a lengthy exposition on the followers of the 
Dai school, as their views were in many instances similar to Dai’s. Qian notes 
that there were significant differences between Dai Zhen and Zhu Xi’s ideas. 
Moreover, Qian adds, Dai vilified the Song Confucians, whereas Dai Zhen’s 
friend Zheng Yaotian did not. Quite on the contrary, Yaotian in fact praised Zhu Xi 
highly.208
On the other hand Yu Yingshi makes the point that Dai's addition of the 
quotations was motivated by a desire to justify his exegetical technique in the 
face of an intellectual climate that valued exegesis. He wanted to prove that his 
reasoning were not just empty thoughts but were rooted in texts. Yu makes clear 
that Dai Zhen's main protagonists were his fellow exegetes whose interest failed 
to extend to the philosophical meaning of the texts they were reading. Using 
Isaiah Berlin's distinction of the fox and the hedgehog, Yu says that while Dai was 
engaged in the scavenging task of the fox, he was really a hedgehog, bent on 
discovering the underlying philosophical enterprise.
207 Ibid.
208 ibid. Cheng Yaotian (1725-1814) was one of student of Jiang Yong and close friend of Dai 
Zhen. Cheng’s philosophy of human is similar to Dai’s but it is based on the philosophy of Zhu 
Xi.
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As has been mentioned above, Liang Qichao and Hu Shi were eager to 
espouse anti-Song Neo Confucian philosophy, the reason being that they felt it 
bore chief responsibility for social injustice and material backwardness, 
traditionally China's glaring weaknesses. Feng Yulan, however, found Dai’s 
philosophy neither profound nor really creative as compared with that of the Song 
Neo Confucians whom Dai criticised. Qian Mu, on the other hand, was a 
thorough Confucian scholar, whose interpretation of the history of ideas followed 
the orthodox tradition.
3. Comparison of Dai Zhen with Western Philosophers.
Dai Zhen’s philosophy has been compared with that of a number of 
Western philosophers, such as Plato, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Feuerbach, J. 
Rousseau and the encyclopaedist F. Voltaire, the British utilitarian J. Bentham 
and J.S. Mill. While some of the comparisons that have been made have some 
validity and can be helpful in reaching an understanding of Dai’s philosophy, 
some of the essays written are less helpful. 209
209 Xu Ximin, Dai Zhen yu zhougnguo wenhua (Dai Zhen and the Chinese Culture), Quizhou
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a. Dai Zhen and David Hume
Dai Zhen and David Hume differ in most respects even they are the 
naturalists in every aspects. Unlike Hume, Dai Zhen does not see any reason to 
be a sceptic, because he strongly believes in the guarantee and wealth of the 
truth to be found in the ancient Canons.210 in other words, the two thinkers have 
different theories of truth. Dai Zhen is a sort of naturalist, who believes that the 
human is a product of the process of nature. However, Dai views the human as 
the components of the physical body, desire, emotion, and intellect, that all grow 
into the right proportions, and for him it is this attained perfection that becomes 
the human moral basis, rather than a series of sense data and experience that 
fashion morality in terms of habits. Dai Zhen’s concept of human nature and its 
morality derive from an interpretation of the Canons, according to which man is 
good because of nature, and the source of morality is nature and the learning of 
the Canons. Dai does not give precedence to experience, but rather applies the 
ancient usage of words, with the result that his theory is coherent according to the 
text of the Canons. However, Hume uses as a starting point that which he
renmin chubanshe 2000, pp.347-348.
210 Dai Zhen, Yuan Shan chapter 3, “One may appeal to the ancient teachings to testify to these 
truths."
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experiences through his senses, and composes his theory in terms of cause and 
effect.211
Recently Edmund Ryden212 published research on the comparison
between Dai Zhen and Hume, though unfortunately his work focused on the 
possibilities to be gained for modern philosophy from pre-modern works, rather 
than being a direct comparison between the two thinkers.
According to Ryden, the chief idea that Hume wished to express in his 
Enquiry on Human Understanding is that our use of the term 'cause' does not 
mean that there is a metaphysical entity that ensures necessity, but rather that 
experience leads us to form habits, whereby we universalise using known 
experience so as to affirm rules that are valid regardless of our past experience. 
Where such a habit is engrained, we may say that x causes y.
According to Ryden, Hume stresses with regard to moral actions the socia! 
context in which human behaviour is found. Habit teaches us which actions 
benefit society as a whole and thus enables us to form moral norms. It is thus 
habit that leads us to infer causality, the basis for all scientific reasoning in 
Hume’s view, just as it is habit that impels us to draw up moral norms. In both
211 For D. Hume see Green, T.H. & Grose, T.H., David Hume: The Philosophical Works, 
Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen 1964 [reprint of New Edition, London 1882] Vol. IV pp 167-288 
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
212 Fifth Biennial Conference of the Chinese Studies Association of Australia held at Adelaide 
University, 16-18 July, 1997.
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cases experience is paramount, for without it we should not know what human 
social life is like and thus could not form habits based on observation.213
Thus Ryden maintains that both Hume and Dai Zhen each have a 
consistent approach to metaphysics and morals. Habit based on experience is 
the determining feature of Hume's reasoning, whilst Dai Zhen seeks to maintain a 
unitary approach to reality in the face of dualism. Yet they come closer than this 
mere parallelism. Dai Zhen's concern for universal human society, for the search 
for truth in daily reality and in things is reflected in Hume's concern for the voice 
of nature and experience.214
Ryden’s main comparison is between the quotations of the two thinkers and 
their usage of words, which he uses to determine their modernity and pre­
modernity. Ryden states in conclusion that:
Post-Cartesian thought has conditioned us to seeking truth on grounds 
established by reason on its own rights. Even when contemporary 
thought challenges the limits of the rational enterprise it still remains 
sure of its own ability to affirm its authority by itself. Hume is no 
exception to this goal. Yet even Hume admits a fondness for Cicero and 
thus demonstrates that the modern philosopher can never be wholly 
free of his/her pre-modern setting. Dai Zhen speaks from a pre-modern 
setting and claims only to be presenting the real meaning of an ancient 
text. Yet in so doing he has constructed a cognitive theory of morality 
that is systematic to a degree Mencius himself would doubtless never 
have imagined. The pre-modern philosopher is thus able to create a
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
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new system of thought even though it comes with the label of an ancient 
classic.215
b. Dai Zhen and Michel Foucault
According to my research, among post-modern philosophers it is Michel 
Foucault’s philosophy that are most easily comparable with Dai Zhen’s in terms 
of tactics and strategy, method, doctrine, and the aims of their philosophies, but it 
must be noted that there strongly divided in terms of time, space, culture and 
language. While it is not possible in the framework of this dissertation to compare 
the contents of their philosophies in detail, since this would require a lengthy and 
complex cross-cultural comparison of context, it is however possible to make an 
introductory comparison between the two.
Foucault schematises his philosophy along three axes: the axis of 
knowledge (the relations of control over things), the axis of power (the relations of 
action upon others) and the axis of ethics (the relations with oneself).216 Dai 
Zhen philosophy is also set out in three parts: the metaphysics of the Way, the 
human nature as an individual, and ethics.217 Although these two schemes do 
not correspond exactly, there is some similarity in the way they are schematised.
215 Ibid.
216 Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinowed., Pantheon 
Books, 1984. pp.48-49.
217 Structure of Dai Zhen’s Yuanshan and Shuzheng divided into three parts as metaphysics, 
human nature and ethics.
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Among the axes (or in Dai’s case parts) precedence is given to ethics over the 
others, and in both cases the intention of the ethics section is to create a new 
concept of human nature. Foucault calls it an objectivization of the subject, or a 
subjectivization that consists of the placement of oneself in the game of truth.218 
The semantic research of the Canons in Dai Zhen’s philosophy and criticism lead 
him to a new dimension of subjectivism as an individual, the ethical goal of which 
is to become a sage.219
Foucault suggests two methodologies220 - archaeology and genealogy -  
while Dai Zhen demonstrates the two methodologies that lead to the truth of the 
Canons, namely evidential study and interpretation of the Canons. These 
methodologies seem superficially to be entirely different, yet have enough in 
common to make a comparison possible. The aim of Foucault’s archaeology - 
that is to say his detailed research of the history of ideas - is to discover the 
discourse and its Episteme, while Dai Zhen’s research seeks the similar goal via 
an examination of semantic structure and the usage of words of the Canons. 
Thus both works reject history and the metaphysics that is formative of human 
nature through history; furthermore, in this sense, both works reject history, 
metaphysics and science as well. Their later methodologies have strong ties with 
their ethics and with their philosophies of human nature. Foucault emphasises
218 Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Leslie Sawyer trs. The University of Chicago Press, 
1982. p.209.
219 See Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng, Articles 30-45.
220 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, What is Enlightenment Paul Rabinowed., 
Pantheon Books, 1984. 45-46
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the freedom to be oneself; Dai Zhen places great importance on the possibility of 
becoming a sage so as to be free from metaphysical restrictions and universal 
agreement.
Foucault claimed that the main concern of philosophy is to criticize the limits 
that make up a philosophy and the possibilities of transgressing those limits.221 
Criticism plays an important role in Dai’s philosophical approach. His 
philosophical criticism is a fully philosophical practice and his philosophical 
problomatization.222 Thus Foucault says:
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as 
a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us 
and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.223
With regard to moral philosophy, Foucault and Dai Zhen both stress the 
importance of concrete ethics and philosophical activities rather than 
metaphysical abstract ethics. From the time of Confucius, Confucian ethics were 
based on one’s feelings (J&) and the extension of one’s feelings from oneself to
221 Ibid. P42. “This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not 
talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we 
have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. ... 
The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a 
practical critique that lakes the form of a possible transgression."
222 Problomatization is Foucault’s term The Concern for Truth, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 
Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Routledge, 1988. p. 257.
223 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, What is Enlightenment? P.40.
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the others ($5).224 According to Dai Zhen, the fulfilment of these feelings is the 
starting point of ethics. Thus Dai Zhen said that: “If a man who has desires 
understands everyone else’s desires, he is a man of benevolence; if a man who 
has consciousness also comprehends everyone else’s consciousness, he is a 
man of wisdom.”225 According to Foucault, ethics is the freedom to transgress 
limitations and is the "ontology of ourselves” which must exist “as an attitude, an 
ethos, a philosophical life”.226
Caring for oneself is also an important concept in Dai’s ethics:
Care for oneself, and extending [this care] to those close to oneself, are 
both aspects of humanity: to care for oneself is to be humane towards 
oneself; to extend [this care] to those close to oneself is to be humane 
towards those who are close to one. Spontaneous manifestations of 
conscious knowing are something like this. And man’s difference from 
the birds and beasts also does not reside here.227
Foucault’s ethical theory also stresses the idea of caring for oneself, (he 
even wrote a book entitled The Care for Oneself, the third volume of the series 
The History of Sexuality).
224 Analects, 4:15.
225 Shuzheng, Article 40.
226 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, What is Enlightenment? Paul Rabinow ed., 
Pantheon Books, 1984. 45-46
227 Shuzheng, Article 21.
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One must not have the care for others precede the care for the self. The 
care for the self takes moral precedence in the measure that the 
relationship to self takes ontological precedence.228
There is also an interesting coincidence between two philosophers in that 
Foucault a wrote book entitled the Order of Things,229 which is also the English 
translation of Dai’s Zhen’s definition of principle,230 (by which the knowing of the 
“order of things” from the words of the sages enables a man to become a sage). 
For Foucault, the Order of Things is a reference to the ‘Episteme’ that he 
suggested as being attainable through his main concept of the ‘archaeology of 
knowledge’.231
There are of course many more possible comparisons between the two 
philosophers, as, despite the fact that they are so far apart in so many respects, 
the tendencies within their philosophies are remarkably similar. To build on this 
brief comparison, it would be necessary to conduct more precise research in 
order to widen the horizons of both philosophies.
228 Michel Foucault, The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, p.7, James 
Bernauer & David Rasmussen ed., The Final Foucault, J.D. Gauthier, S.J. trs., The MIT Press, 
1988.
229 M. Foucault, The Order of Things, London, Tavistock, 1980. Original French title is Les mots et 
les choses (the words and the things) but Foucault preferred the English title.
230 Chan, Wingtsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963. p.711. Wingtsit titled Chapter of Dai Zhen as ‘the Order of Things’.
231 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of knowledge, A. Sheridan trans. New York, Random 
House, 1979.
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III. Method of Dai Zhen
The titles and the approach of Dai Zhen’s philosophical writings make use 
of Kaozheng research on philosophical issues. The technical term Shuzheng 
(verifications on the form of sub-commentary) in the titles indicates that Dai Zhen 
saw his efforts as works of evidential research. The same term had been used 
earlier in Yan Ruoju’s title to his definitive critique of the old text chapter of the 
Book of Documents. In addition, the methodology Dai Zhen applied to his study 
of Mencius was essentially a linguistic approach used to determine the precise 
meaning of terms in the text. Dai Zhen thought this appeal to etymology would 
enable him to refute the later meanings Zhu Xi and other Neo Confucians had 
attached to these concepts.232
Dai Zhen differs from his Neo Confucian contemporaries in a number of 
ways. His view of the nature of philosophy was at variance with that of the Neo 
Confucians, and the originality of his relation to philosophical terms and usage led 
to his often being misunderstood and excluded from the more conventional 
approaches to philosophy. As mentioned above, Dai Zhen’s writing has a number 
of strong and distinctive features that are extraordinary for his time: he believes 
the truth to be attainable from the semantic relationships within the text of the 
Canons, rejects historical discourse, Neo Confucian metaphysics, Western
232 Elman,1984, p.19.
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science and so on. It is as though he was living intellectually in another time and 
place, namely in the Zhou Dynasty, and it is in this sense that Qian Mu asserted 
that “his intellect reached back to the ancient Zhou directly”.233 In this sense, the 
methodology is seriously important to his philosophy. His method is not a 
excavate tool or ladder for the Dao but it is the only way to ancient sages and that 
is transmitted from the Confucius and Mencius directly.
It is suggested that much of the originality of Dai Zhen’s philosophy was a 
result of his particular way of attempting to attain the truth; this chapter will 
explore the methodologies that contributed to that originality.
Qian Mu suggested that there are two stages to Dai Zhen’s philosophy 
whilst Yu Yingshi claimed there were three. Yu Yingshi’s three stages are better 
applied to the Dai’s philology and philosophy, but Qian Mu’s two-stage theory 
focused only on his philosophy. Qian Mu’s theory on Dai’s approach to 
philosophy is that it consists of the critical method and the constructive approach 
to the Canons. The critical method is used by critics of the distortions made by 
the Song Confucians and of the stubbornness of the Han Confucians. The 
constructive approach claims to excavate the true meaning of the sages from the 
Canons. However, all these philosophical methods are based on the philological 
evidential study that Dai spent his whole life developing. While the end and 
meaning of Dai’s philosophy, to hear the Dao of the sages, was clearly a single,
233 Qian Mu, Quanji. v.l. p. 480.
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unified goal, his tactics, method and approach to the Canons are contained in two 
distinct stages.234
1. Dai Zhen’s Evidential Study
Dai Zhen and most of the scholars of his school of "evidential study" 
(Kaozhengxue) stressed the importance of exacting research, rigorous analysis, 
and of the collection of impartial evidence drawn from ancient artefacts and 
historical documents and texts. Evidential scholars made verification a central 
concern for the emerging empirical theory of knowledge they advocated, namely 
"to search for the truth from the facts" (shishi qiushi). This scheme involved the 
placing of proof and verification at the centre of the organisation and analysis of 
the classical tradition in its complete, multi-dimensional proportions, including 
aspects of natural studies and mathematics.
Liang Qichao shows that the intellectual tendency of the Orthodox school 
may summarise as follows:
1. Generally speaking, if one attempts to confirm the meaning of a word, 
then one has to base this on the evidence; if something is without 
verification it must be discarded. 2. If one chooses evidence, old data 
has priority. Someone can use Han or Tang materials to drive the Song 
and Ming into the corner, but he cannot use Song and Ming to make an 
attack on the Han and Tang. 3. It is said that validation of the Canon
234 Ibid.
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has to come from the Canon and confirm all the Canon and historical 
material and vice versa. 4. Concentrate on the evidence; do not depend 
on a general opinion. If there is no obvious counter-evidence, hold on 
for a while; if it has supporting evidence, it gains ground inch by inch. 
However, if it encounters strong counter-evidence, it must be discarded.
5. It is disgraceful behaviour to conceal or distort the evidence. 6. There 
is keen interest in categorizing similar items as a basis for comparative 
study in order to find a law. 7. If someone applies an old theory, it must 
be noted where it comes from. Plagiarism is the most disgraceful 
behaviour. 8. The cross-reference of evidence is needed when one 
comes across confliction between opinions. Even the disciple drives the 
master into the corner; it cannot be evaded, because sometimes an 
initiator defies his teacher. 9. Sentence style has to be sincere and 
courteous. Even if the theories of others are conflicting with yours, 
respect their opinions. 10. Bend all your energies to one task and be 
absorbed in your research.235
The research contributions made in the seventeenth-century by Gu Yanwu 
(1613-82) and Yan Ruoju (1636-1704) in the formation of the method of 
evidential study were continued in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
philological research of Dai Zhen, Qian Daxin, Duan Yucai, Wang Niansun (1744- 
1832), Wang Yinzhi (1766-1834), Jiao Xun (1763-1820), and Juan Yuan (1764- 
1849). Philological studies developed and evolved during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries because their published works were parts of a dynamic 
classical research enterprise whose goals were not "scientific" or "objective" per 
se, but were instead tied to a new commitment from the literati to use the
235 Liang Qichao, Zhongguo jinsanbainian xueshushi (Intellectual history of China during the 
300 years), Taipei, Zhonghua shuju, 1955. p.77-79.
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language of the ancient Classics as an impartial means to recapture the ideas 
and intentions of the sages of antiquity.236
By the eighteenth century, reflecting the scholarly trends of the Qianlong era 
(1736-95), the policy questions for the civil examinations began to exhibit a 
common five-way division of topics, usually in the following order: 1) Canons; 2) 
history; 3) literature; 4) statecraft; and 5) local geography. The primacy of Canon 
learning in policy questions was due to the impact of Han learning and evidential 
research among literati scholars. What was fuelling the popularity of the revival of 
first a poetry question on session one and then philology in the policy questions 
(in session three of the civil examinations) was the close tie between the rules of 
rhyming in regulated verse and the field of phonology, which became the 
predominant aspect of philology during the reign of Qianlong. The role of 
phonology in evidential research studies was paying dividends by improving the 
literati’s knowledge of classical sounds and rhymes.237
One by-product of these philological trends was the full realization of how 
important poetry - particularly regulated verse - was for the reconstruction of 
antiquity via phonology, palaeography, and etymology. For example, Liang 
Zhangkhu (1775-1849), who assembled one of the first cultural studies of the
236 Elman, 1984, p,123 and p.176.
237 Benjamin A. Elman,11Chinese Sciences" and the "Triumph" of "Modern Science" in China. 
For presentation at the Conference on "Rethinking Science and Civilization: The Ideologies, 
Disciplines, and Rhetorics of World History," organized by Roger Hart and Haun Saussy. 
Sponsored by the Stanford University Department of Asian Languages and the Program in 
History and Philosophy of Science. May 21-23,1999.
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examination regime entitled Collected Comments on the Crafting of Eight-Legged 
Civil Examination Essays (Zhiyi conghua) in the early nineteenth century, also 
compiled a collection on poetry studies in which he outlined the study of poetry 
and the rules of regulated verse. In the conclusion, Liang traced how Qing 
classical scholars had finally unravelled the rhyme system of the poetry Classics. 
They had thereby illuminated the technical rules in regulated verse and made 
major advances in the study of phonology.238
As shown above, Liang Qichao summarized the basic approach of the 
evidential school. According to him, there were two distinct trends during the 
middle of the Qing era; one focused on Han study, the other on Kaozheng study.
Hui Dong emphasised the importance of the Classics and the exegetical 
tradition of the Han. The tactic of Hui Dong and his followers was to let the words 
shed light on the way of the sages, and all were skilled in glossing the meanings 
of words. Their credo was Han learning, their role models were Zheng Xuan (A.D. 
127-200) and Fu Sheng (fl. Second century B.C.), and Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi were 
their targets.239
Hui Dong, therefore, had an agenda, and his learning created the Han 
Learning movement that fell under the rubric of evidential research but was 
nevertheless not identical with it. His followers, true to the revolutionary spirit, 
instigated a number of incidents within the Qing intellectual community because
238 ibid.
239 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.11.
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they sought to fix the meaning of evidential study, and to define it in their 
terms.240
Kong Zizhen (1735-1815), grandson and student of Dai Zhen’s disciple 
Duan Yucai, having read Jiang's manuscript prior to publication, urged his friend 
and colleague to revise his categorical approach toward learning. In a much- 
publicised letter written to Jiang in 1817, Kong said, “Those who read Canons 
search for the truth in actual facts (shishi qiushi). For a thousand years it has 
been the Way. Although to search for the truth in actual facts is a Han Dynasty 
expression, it is not the monopoly of (Han learning).” Kong Zizhen241 criticised 
the artificial distinctions Jiang made between Han learning and Song learning.
For Kung this simple delineation distorted how things really were. “Didn’t the 
people of Han discuss issues such as nature (xing) and the Dao?” he asked. And 
“how can one deny that people of the Song discussed names and their referents 
(mingwu) and textual glosses?” Finally, what about those “superlative gentlemen” 
of the “present dynasty”? “They patiently master their texts and make new 
discoveries concerning the Classics. They are neither Han nor Song, but search 
only for the truth.” 242
For Kong Zizhen, the controversy over Han learning and Song learning was 
a petty dispute when the real issue was learning itself. In his view, a good scholar
240 Yu Yingshi, Yu Yingshi Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng I r a l i M I W ( D / c o
urse of Dai Zhen and Zang Xuecheng), Hong Kong longmen ShudianflF llU^. 1976. p112.
241 Kong Zizhen, Letter to Zhuang Zibing, Kong Zizhen Quanji (Complete Works of Kong 
Zizhen), Hong Kong, zhonghua shuju,'\974. 2:347-48.(tras. Elman, 1990, p.239.)
242 Ibid.
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was one who searched “for the truth in actual facts”, irrespective of whatever 
group identity he might have had. But for someone like Jiang Fan, the school a 
person belonged to determined the kind of scholar that he was; therefore, in his 
Record of Han Learning Masters of the Qing Dynasty, many scholars were either 
misplaced or omitted.243
When Dai Zhen first met Hui Dong in Yangzhou, these scholarly divisions 
had not developed far. After the encounter with Hui, Dai began to create his own 
method, which later became the Wan school that dominated evidential study. 
Although their admiration was mutual, the encounter had a greater impact on Dai 
Zhen, who was twenty-seven years younger than it did on Hui Dong. Qian Mu 
believes it marks a turning point in Dai’s intellectual and philosophical 
development.244
243 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.11
244 Ibid. p.12.
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2. Dai Zhen’s Method of Philosophy
Dai Zhen is famous for his critiques, especially of Neo Confucian philosophy 
and the Han exegetes. However, it must be noted that philosophical criticism is 
itself a philosophical practice, and Dai went beyond the subject of the limitations 
of Zhu Xi’s philosophy in ways not acknowledged by Chinese scholars.245 in 
terms of methods of philosophising, Dai Zhen suggested that criticism of fallacy 
and method of truth are closely related. In Shuzheng, a critical method was used 
to correct errors and demonstrate the limits of Neo Confucian philosophy and, at 
the base of his criticism he reveals his philosophical perspective of the Canons.
Dai’s critical method approach to the Canons is in keeping with his time and 
the issues confronting him. As mentioned, he believed Neo Confucian philosophy 
to be a hybrid between Confucianism and heresies such as Daoism and 
Buddhism. Because of this hybrid, Neo Confucians made errors and distorted the 
words and meaning of the Canons.
The Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi joined with heresies at first, all tried to 
invert their theory to ours, and invert ours to theirs. Together they made 
Heaven and mind a unity, as they did with the principle and awakening 
of the mind. With all of our terminology, they let the heretic help and 
borrowed from them to establish themselves. According to the Cheng 
brothers’ and Zhu Xi’s interpretation, heretics interpreted the Cannons,
Six Cannons, The Analects of Confucius and Mencius. All of these
245 In this point, Dai Zhen can be compared with the German philosopher E.Kant.
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manners came with the Cheng brothers’ and Zhu Xi’s heip and with 
ours. Consequently, they became dependent on ours.246
Dai Zhen claimed that the Confucians after the Han were deceptive with 
their false theories. These Confucians committed three main iniquities. The first is 
that they created definitions of the words of the Canon according to their own 
context. The next is that they transmitted invalid obstinacy247 and fallacy by 
making the definitions of the words from their own context so that the interpreted 
meaning is not the real sense of Canon but merely inherited glosses of words. 
And the third is that they reach forced and far-fetched interpretations without 
grounding them in the Canons. Because of these misleading notions, the words 
of the sages are damaged and defective.248 Their invalid obstinacy and 
transmission of fallacy makes the ‘Canon’ no longer the words of the sages that 
originally came from Confucius and Mencius.
Thus Dai says:
The philological (method) of the Han scholars was based on an 
orthodox line of transmission. At that time, the old Canon suffered from 
forced interpretations. The Jin men had even more far-fetched 
interpretations and groundless speculations.249
246 Dai Zhen, Reply letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, v.6. p.352.
247 Dai Zhen critique Han exegetes as stubborn because they exclusively transmit an 
interpretation of Canon in their family. Han Confucians never correct even the errors are obvious 
and exclusive to others because it is directly transmitted from his ancesters. Dai Zhen criticise 
their inherited errors.
248 See Dai Zhen’s Reply letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, v.6. p.352.
249 Dai Zhen, Letter to someone(Yumoushu). Quanji, v.6.494.
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Fallacies and mistakes are the first enemy of the Qing evidential scholars, 
who placed emphasis on exact research. The Han Confucians employ the xungu 
method to work on the exegesis of the Canons. Dai criticises the Han Confucians 
for providing the “definition of the word according to their own context”. Because 
the Han Confucians separated the words from the context of the Canons and 
only produced glosses and etymologies of words, according to Dai, Han 
Confucians could not understand the reason and the meaning of the Canons, 
since they were merely absorbed in the words and characters.
The Han people’s study of the Canons was based on the individual 
method, and therefore they were taught orally by a master of a Canon, 
and, later, it was recorded on bamboo and silk. Thus in the Han, a 
master of a Canon’s interpretation was officially established, and it was 
preserved along with the Canon itself. Only a master of a Canon could 
understand [the meaning of] the ancient written characters and ancient 
statements; therefore the philological study of written characters [in 
ancient documents] could not be abandoned, nor could [the expositions 
of the Han] master of a Canon be done away with. My family transmitted 
the Canons for four generations, and we all understood their old 
meaning. I therefore expound my familial teaching by writing.250
The foregoing account is a justification for preserving the practice of 
interpreting ancient written characters, respecting the tradition of the ancient 
teachers, and preserving the methods of the various Han schools. Henceforth 
Han learning attained an unassailable position, and it was firmly established as a 
scholarly trend in the Qing period. Hui Dong’s disciples, Yu Xiaoke (1729-1777) 
and Jiang Sheng (1721-1799), who also came from his Hui’s native country,
250 Ibid.
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defended his view successfully. From the influence emanating from these men, 
scholars within China came to emphasise an understanding of the Canons that in 
turn depended on believing in antiquity. Hui started this trend, which has since 
been given the name of the Suzhou [or Wu] School.
If a person wishes to go to the altar of a house, he must go via the steps 
and cannot skip them; a wild guess has two faults: first, "deriving by wild 
guess at a statement” (yuanzi shengshun); and second, “preserving 
falsehoods and transmitting ridiculousness" (shouwei chanmiu). Yuanzi 
shengshun means that the interpretation is not the original meaning; 
and shouwei chanmiu means that the Canons used are not the original 
texts. Now Zhonglin (i.e.,Yu Xiaoke) learned antiquarian research from 
Hui Dingyu of his home county. Mr. Hui and I were good friends, and he 
was disgusted with a wild guess being equal to knowing the Canons.251
In this sense, there is also the same limitation of Han learning in the Qing 
period that is led by the Hui Dong School. In 1758, Hui Dong died, and seven 
years after that, whilst Dai Zhen was passing through Suzhou, Hui Dong’s 
hometown, Dai wrote a preface to Hui’s Shoujingtu (Diagram of Receiving 
Instructions) to commemorate the occasion and to make sense of what they had 
shared. The piece reads:
It has been said that there is Han classical learning and there is Song 
classical learning: the former emphasises the ancient glosses (guxun) 
and the latter is concerned with [understanding] the reason and 
meaning of things (HI). It is said that this statement is not easy to 
understand. If one can understand the reason and meaning [of things] 
by sheer speculation, then anyone can grab them out of emptiness. If 
that is so, what can we hope to gain from classical learning? It is
251 Qian Mu, Quanji, v.7. p.487.
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precisely because sheer speculation cannot lead us to the reason and 
meaning [of things] as intended by the sages and worthies that one has 
to seek it from the ancient Canons. Only when the ancient glosses are 
clear can the Classics be understood and only when the Classics are 
understood can the reason and meaning [of things] as intended by the 
sages and worthies be grasped.252
Zhu Xi believed that his insight into the notion of principle was inspired by a 
passage that did not exist in the original Canon, Book of Documents, so where 
does that leave him or his insight? This was Hui Dong’s strategy -  to weaken the 
credibility of the Song thinkers. Thus, while pursuing their scholarship, 
proponents of Han learning were constantly mindful of their opponents. What 
they wanted to establish beyond any doubt was that they were right and others 
were wrong. Dai Zhen did not follow the same agenda, although at times he was 
caught up in the same rationale and revolutionary rhetoric.253
In Dai Zhen’s view there is only one path in classical scholarship. “If the 
ancient glosses are not employed for the purpose of understanding the reason 
and meaning of things,” he asked, “then what is the point of pursuing that type of 
research?” The reverse is also true: “If one’s effort is not grounded in the study of 
the Canons, then “it is easy to for one to be swept away by heterodox teachings 
and perverted doctrines.” In the above preface, Dai Zhen seems to suggest that it 
was Hui Dong who influenced him to look at the two categories -  ancient glosses
252 Dai Zhen, Hui Dong Shoujingtu (Diagram of receiving instructions), Quanji, v.6. p.396.
253 Qian Mu, Quanji, v.6. p.485.
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and reason and meaning -  as inseparable, one being the method and the other 
its philosophical justification. This could have been simply Dai Zhen’s perception 
of things. Since he was edging toward this conclusion, his discussions with Hui 
Dong may have only confirmed his predilections.254
The historiographer Wang Mingsheng framed his comparison of the two 
scholars as follows: “Master Hui studied the Classics in order to understand them 
anciently. Master Dai studied the Classics in order to understand the truth in 
them, but ultimately he believed that without a knowledge of the ancient text, one 
would have no basis for establishing the truth.”255 Both took the Classics as their 
source, expending their energy on exacting a correct understanding of every 
word and phrase, yet their aims were different. Dai Zhen was absorbed with the 
study of the Three Ritual Canons; he delved into every subject -  astronomy, 
mathematics, geography, ancient pronunciation, and rhymes -  because he 
wanted to know everything about the early Zhou. Hui Dong, on the other hand, 
undertook a scrupulous reading of the Book of Documents, but he was 
concerned more with the question of authenticity. He followed the example of 
Yan Ruoju, who had offered powerful evidence for the Old Text version of the 
Documents by sorting out the true from the false. Of course, his purpose was not 
merely to refine his research skills.256
Dai Zhen commented:
254 Dai Zhen, Hui Dong Shoujingtu, Quanji, v.6.p.396.
255 Xing zhuang, Quanji, v.7. p8.
256 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.13.
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Though the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi all engaged with Mr. Buddha at 
first, eventually they realised that this was wrong. Chengzi said, "We 
Confucians are based on the Heaven, the heresies are based on the 
mind." Zhuzi said, "We Confucians regard the principle as neither born 
nor destroyed. Mr. Buddha regards the awakening of mind as neither 
born nor destroyed." As regards awakening of the mind, although one 
tenet is different from another, it barely tries to invert their saying. ... Zhu 
Xi said that their tenet of mind "became similar to Buddhism", but he did 
not specifically mention that it is different from ours. It can never be said 
to be ‘similar’ too. The Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi studied them, so they 
knew Buddhist teaching very well. When they inquired into 
Confucianism, they realised that the tenet of ours was different from 
theirs. Therefore, they could not have it as a basis, but they said with 
conjecture that they had made Heaven as basis. Of all men and things, 
which is not based on Heaven? How can one say that mind and heaven 
have to be separated! They are one who could rise to fight. If one 
foliows their way, even a fool must be clever and even a weakling must 
be strong. If one develops their theory, it says that if a person completes 
his mind, he can fulfil the Dao! Thinking like that, he cannot truly join in 
the Dao of Yao and Shun, even if he says principle, knowledge, 
learning, ail are fake and suitable to bring disorder to virtue.
Dai said that “over several hundreds years, the harmful influence of the 
false theory is nothing but error and mistake.” Thus he also said that:
Those of the Song Confucians judged by introspection; they often made 
many errors, renouncing preciseness that cannot be laid aside... 
Scholars since the Song have wrenched their own ideas back to what 
the words of ancient sages and wise men intended to say.257
257 Dai Zhen, Letter to someone (Yumoushu), Quanji, v. p.495.
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Criticism of “the forced and more far-fetched interpretation without grounds 
in the Canons” refers to Song Confucianism. According to Dai Zhen, the Song 
Confucians were not only in error but also distorted and placed arbitrary 
definitions on the words and meanings of the Canons.
Dai Zhen commented:
The Song Confucians discussed the principle without any reflection on 
philology. Are they trying then to discover the meaning of the old 
Canons? Or do they want to dwell in the old Canons? If they want to 
stay, why are they twisting the old Canons? The essence of the Canon 
is the Way and the thing that brings the right meaning to the Way is only 
the language [of the Canons]. ... The Song Confucians mocked the 
study of etymology in the Han period and slighted philology. What they 
did was the same as trying to cross the river without a boat and wanting 
to climb to a high place without ladders. Having done this work for thirty 
years, now I know with perfect clarity that, from past to present, the key 
to bringing order to the world lies in these texts.258
It is clear from this that the errors of the Song Confucians were greater than 
those of Han scholars; however, the more serious problem is that the Song 
Confucians’ fallacy is far beyond the reach of correction by xungu. This is 
because Han learning does not have any means of treating the philosophical 
problems that arise from the mixing of heresy with Confucian tradition or 
orthodoxy as represented by Mencius. As a result, the orthodoxy insisted on by
258 Ibid.
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Zhu Xi and the Neo Confucians no longer has any validity.259 This quotation 
shows why Dai Zhen felt he had to write against the fallacy he faced:
Mencius disputed with Yang and Mo. When later men, accustomed to 
hearing the language of Yang, Mo, Lao, Zhuang, and Buddha, moreover 
use this language to make nonsense of the language of Mencius, it is on 
this account that one who comes after Mencius should also be able to 
refrain. If I were unable to know this, that would be an end of it; but if, 
knowing it, I were not to speak, this would be to devalue their learning, 
and with regard to humane persons of the empire and of later 
generations it would be to make myself a stranger to benevolence. 
Therefore I am apprehensive, and have set forth [these] Verified 
Explanations of the Meanings of Terms in Mencius in three juan.260
Dai Zhen was critical of those who were absorbed in a search for reason 
and meaning (///) and had no time to refine their methods of research. In his view, 
the Song Confucians were preoccupied with the reason and meaning of things. 
Dai Zhen also criticised both the Han and Song Confucians for their forced 
interpretations based on false theories. Contrary to Han Learning, Dai Zhen 
claimed that the meaning of the Canons could not be kept within the boundary of 
etymology, since it reached far beyond the restricted usage and glosses of 
words:
In Han, one finds the Confucian study of the Canon; in Song, one also 
finds the Confucian study of the Canon, but the Han Confucians mainly 
researched glosses and etymology, while the other mainly investigated 
meaning and principle. The Song Confucians seek meaning and
259 Ling Yicheng, Shibuchuan yu Dai Zhen de Jiejingfangfa (Commentary of Book of Odes and 
Methods of Dai Zhen), Taipei, Wenlu publishes. 1995. p.33.
260 Shuzheng, Preface.
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principle without the Canon and so make people receive a fictitious 
version ... If the Han Confucians’ commentary of the Canon is good, 
then the wise man and the sages’ meaning and principle will be 
illuminated naturally when people read their commentaries. However, 
the ancient sages’ meaning and principle is not like theirs. It is said that 
the meaning and principle of the ancient sages is kept in the rituals, 
documents, vessels and in civilisation.261
So, Dai Zhen claims that the Canons hold the meaning and principle of the 
sages. The ancient sages’ meaning and principle are not only written in the old 
Canons but also kept in the rituals, documents and civilisation. As mentioned, Dai 
tried to reconstruct the Canons and lost Classics and attempted to discover the 
truth of the Canons by breaking through the veil of Zhu Xi’s orthodoxy, that had 
become infected and damaged by Buddhism and Daoism262.
Through his critiques, Dai Zhen clearly displays the aim and meaning of 
learning: to hear the Dao. However, he rejects the inspirational or intuitive 
approach, which certainly offered a more direct route. Dai Zhen wanted to attain 
a higher form of knowledge and to have a greater understanding of things, but 
not at the risk of self-deception and fallacy; since, for him, such goals had to be 
genuine when reached, he was sceptical of shortcuts and the types of experience 
described as “sudden enlightenment.”263 To perform this task reliably required
261 Dai Zhen, Yumoushu, Quanji, v.6.p.494.
262 Nowadays the fact that the Song Confucian philosophy influenced by the Buddhism and 
Daoism turned into a common sense. Song Confucians defeat of Buddhism has political and 
economical reason rather than philosophical. But the time of Dai Zhen, it was very dangerous to 
attack the Neo Confucian systematically. It is the one of Dai Zhen’s major achievement in the 
history of Confucianism.
263 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.32.
124
new methods that would neither bear falseness and transmit fallacy nor define 
words from within their own context.
Thus Dai Zhen says:
Scholarship in ancient and present times can be categorised into three 
branches: (1) dealing with principle; (2) dealing with institutions; and (3) 
dealing with literature. Dealing with literature is the least important ...
The sages’ Dao (Way) is in the Six Canons. The Han Confucians 
obtained its institutional aspect but missed its principle. [On the other 
hand], the Song Confucians obtained its principle but missed its 
institutions.264
As new methods, he suggested two synthetic methods to approach to the 
words of the sages. It is said that the first approach to the Canons is to hear the 
Dao, which clearly reveals the aim of research. The next approach assumes that 
the Dao is laid within the ancient culture and the Canons. In this sense, the 
meaning has to be excavated from the language of the old Canons.265
Thus Dai Zhen said:
When I was young, my family was poor, and I did not have a tutor. I had 
heard that amongst learned men there was a man called Confucius who 
had decided that the Six Canons should be the basis of instruction for 
later people, and so I got hold of one [of those books] and began to read 
it. I was at a loss. After much contemplation, I realised that what the
For Dai Zhen what the Classics transmit is not an implicit sphere of inner value but a record of 
the institutionalized practices of a society in which the Way of the sages had been fully realised.
264 Dai Zhen, Jiangshenxiu xiansheng shiluezhuang, (A Brief Note on Master Jiang’s Life), 
Quanji, v. 6. p.409.
265 Ling Yicheng, p.85.
125
Canons attain is the Dao, what unravels the Dao is the phrases 
[contained in them], and what make up these phrases is words, if 
through words I were to understand phrases and through phrases the 
Dao, then I would make progress.286
To hear the Dao, one must know where the truth resides, and according to 
Dai Zhen, the source of truth lies within the Canons, and to attain the truth from 
this place without error or fallacy one must understand the rules of the warehouse 
of truth. According to Dai, the first step towards reaching an understanding of the 
Canons is the use of precise philology.
The acme of the Canons is the Dao (Way), and by means of 
statements, the Dao is known. That which forms a statement cannot be 
anything other than words. Therefore, knowing words, a person 
understands language; and knowing language, a person understands 
the mind of the ancient sages and worthies267.
It is not just the skills of ancient philology that are needed to grasp the truth 
of the Canons, but also a knowledge of the structure and system of the Canons, 
that one must have in order to understand their uniqueness and coherence. It is 
only through such labour that we can know the meaning of the ancient sages 
words. Thus Dai Zhen says:
To inquire into a Canon, first of all one has to study philology and then 
understand the uniqueness and coherence of the Canons. The aim is
266 Dai Zhen, Letter to Shi Chungming, Quanji, v.6. p.369.
267 Dai Zhen, Gujing jieguochen (Research and Interpretation of the Old Canon), Quanji, v.6. 
p.377.
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clear: hearing the Dao and aspiring to reach the truth; a man must purge 
himself completely of all of his dependence.268
It is to be noted that Dai Zhen does not in this quotation that omit to stress 
the importance of completely independent research. When speaking of evidential 
study, Dai Zhen advised that one should concentrate on the evidence; do not 
depend on a general opinion. If there is no obvious counter-evidence, hold on for 
a while. Independence from a general opinion or later theories is also a very 
important notion in Dai’s concept of evidential study. The distinction drawn 
between opinions and truth is one of his most valuable contributions.269
Dai Zhen claims that the Canons hold the meaning and principle of the 
sage. However, the ancient sages’ meaning and principle are not only written in 
the old Canons but are also to be found in the unspoken truth contained within 
rituals, documents and civilisation. Equally, the ancient materials contain plenty of 
evidence that verifies and confirms the meaning of the words of the sages. 
According to Dai Zhen, anyone who talks of principle without having mastered the 
Canons, the meaning of words, rituals, documents and civilisation, must be 
deceiving his listeners.
Since Confucius, not attaining the proper position, could not manifest 
[his virtue] in institutions, ritual, and music, he corrected their basis and 
traced out their origins so that with regard to the appropriateness of 
preserving changing institutions, ritual, and music, men would have, as 
it were, a steelyard to assess the heavy and the light, or a compass and 
square or marking line to determine the square, the circular, or the level
268 Dai Zhen, Yumoushu (A Letter to Someone), Quanji, v.6.p.495.
269 Liang Qichao, Zhongguo jinsanbainian xueshushi p.77
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and abstruse. This could not have been left unspoken. And once 
Confucius did speak them, actually articulating what the former sages 
had left unsaid, without Confucius who would be able to follow and 
hear? This is what [Zi Gong] meant by “cannot manage to hear.”270
Civilisation and ritual were the unspoken inner meanings of the sages, and 
are the reason way Dai Zhen tried to master all aspects of Zhou civilisation. As 
mentioned, Dai Zhen attempts not only to build a comprehensive encyclopaedic 
knowledge of Zhou civilization, ritual and science, but also suggests that such 
mastery is a very important method for his philosophy. He recommends that 
anyone who researches a particular field must aim for an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of a specific area, touching every corner on the way, and doing so he 
will gain ground inch by inch by bending all his energies to this one task. Even so, 
if one encounters strong counter-evidence, Dai Zhen suggests that such efforts 
should be abandoned.271
When l read the ancient Book of Rites, I first encountered the chapter 
on the “Capping Ceremony for the Young" (shiguanli). Since I did not 
know anything about ancient dwellings, clothing, and other social 
conventions, I was lost; I could not decide what the functions were.
Since I did not know the changes made from past to present regarding 
place-names, when I read the "Tributes o f Yu (Yu Gong)" [in the Book of 
Documents], I could not figure out the places under the charge of the 
Office of Tribute and Maps. Since I did not know anything about the 
extraction of mathematical roots and trigonometry, I could not 
understand from the texts the engineering techniques described in the 
“Record o f Artisans" (Kaogongf\) [in the Ritual of Zhou]. Since I did not 
know the names and classifications of birds and beasts, insects and
270 Shuzheng, Preface.
271 Liang Qichao, p.78
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fish, flowers and trees, I made incorrect interpretations of poems [from 
the Book of Odes] that were composed allegorically [to reflect people’s 
feelings toward their ruler] and of poems meant to inspire moral 
sentiments.272
There is one more important method that Dai Zhen implies in his philosophy 
and study of the Canons. In order to confirm the meaning of a word, a cross- 
reference of evidence is always needed between one text and another. He states 
that the validation of an ancient Canon must come from a Canon composed in a 
similar period and place so as to confirm the meaning through all the Canons and 
historical material.
The following provides a good example of Dai Zhen’s encyclopaedic 
knowledge and skill at cross-referencing; in Shuzheng Dai Zhen wrote on 
principle:
“Principle” (//') designates the subtle incipiencies that must be 
distinguished according to type when [something] is examined; thus it is 
called "pattern” (fenli). With regard to the physical substance of things 
one speaks of “skin texture" (jili), of “capillary passages" (couli), 
“structural pattern” (wenli). [When something is] in its proper place, well 
ordered and not confused, it is called “orderly” (t/aoli). ... What the 
ancients meant by “principle" was never anything like what latter day 
Confucians have called “principle”.273
272 Dai Zhen, Letter to Shi Chungming, Quanji, v.6. p.370.
273 Shuzheng, Article 2.
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Dai Zhen had in mind a systematic research agenda that built on 
palaeography and phonology to reconstruct the "meanings" of words of the 
Canons as a method of reconstructing the "intentions" of the sages. Moreover, 
when he applied technical phonology to the study of the language of the Canons, 
he reached unprecedented levels of precision. To achieve this end, evidential 
scholars chose to use philological means to study the Canons.274
Dai Zhen’s methods not only provide a way to examine the ancient Canons, 
but also pave the way towards his Confucian moral philosophy. He emphasises 
the understanding of the minds of the ancient sages and worthies and claims that 
this can only be achieved through knowledge of words and language.
After this the privately wise and the narrowly dogmatic also became 
alarmed at the world’s disorder, and either relied on their Way to 
preserve themselves and avoid disaster, or else relied on its ability to 
entice men’s hearts, [promising] order without disorder yet confused 
about the great root. Singling out one thing to the neglect of a hundred 
others, their intentions were not bad, but their language was sufficient 
only to injure the Way ... Mencius disputed with Yang and Mo. Later 
men, accustomed to hearing the language of Yang, Mo, Lao, Zhuang, 
and Buddha, moreover use this language to make a nonsense of the 
language of Mencius; it is on this account that one who comes after 
Mencius should also be able to refrain. If I were unable to know this, that 
would be an end of it; but if, knowing it, I were not to speak, this would 
be to devalue their learning, and with regard to humane persons of the 
empire and of later generations it would be to make myself a stranger to 
benevolence. Therefore I am apprehensive, and have set forth [these]
274 Kuhn, Philip.1970. p157.
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Verified Explanations of the Meanings of Terms in Mencius in three
According to Ewell, Dai Zhen’s philosophy was a re-inventing of the Dao of 
the sages in much the same manner as that of Confucius and Mencius. As in the 
famous phrase “interpreting but not composing”276 Confucius directed his efforts 
towards defining the Way that he insisted was communicated by the ancient 
sages. Moreover, the Way Confucius found was the meaning of the culture, 
institutions and norms of the Zhou. Confucius sometimes identified his philosophy 
with Zhou culture and bemoaned the culture’s decline. However, in every age, 
characteristic misunderstandings would arise; and thus in every age it would be 
necessary to address these misunderstandings, to diagnose their origins, and re­
find and refashion the Way anew.277 In Dai Zhen’s view, says Ewell, it was 
Mencius who understood the imperative nature of this task the best. Mencius 
rebelled against the contamination of Confucianism popular scholarship of the 
time such as that of Mozi Yangzi. Dai Zhen believed his work Shuzheng to have 
the same purpose as Mencius' rebellion against the heresies, as it was a tool with 
which to fight to re-fresh the Dao from the pollution and misunderstandings of 
Neo Confucianism.
Ewell’s theory certainly provides a good explanation of the historical 
background to Dai Zhen’s work. However, an obvious limitation of his theory is 
that it does not give a comprehensive picture of Dai’s moral philosophy; in other
275 Shuzheng, preface.
276 Analets, 7.1,
277 J. Ewell, 1990, p50.
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words, Ewell failed to show the raison d'etre of Dai Zhen’s re-invention of the 
Way, namely the goal of becoming a sage through the moral philosophy of the 
Canons, Ewell denoted that as a Confucian philosopher, Dai Zhen sets out to 
define who the “Yang and Mo” of his own age were, to diagnose their errors, and 
to show the solutions to their dilemmas. In response to this challenge, Dai’s 
treatise speaks well for itself.
Although he criticises the Song and Ming Confucians relentlessly, Dai is in 
fact closer to these philosophers as Zhang Xuecheng denoted. Duan Yucai 
recalls Dai Zhen saying that:
[Investigating] the six Canons and the nine branches of mathematics is 
the work of those who shoulder the sedan chair. The person they serve 
is the one sitting in the sedan chair.278
As Zhang Xuecheng noted clearly this remark was intended for the 
evidential scholars who were the footmen. Their accomplishment was all legwork. 
They bustled around breathlessly, yet believed they were the ones moving 
“without touching the ground” -  this was the image Dai Zhen had of those who 
chose to confine their work and thought to the discipline of textual exegesis.279 
However, Dai did not consciously identify himself with either the footman or the 
person in the sedan chair, although he did say:
278 Duan Yucai, preface to the 1792, 3rd edition of the Dai’s Literary Writings. Quanji, v.7, p202.
279 Annping Chin, Freeman M. 1990. p.31.
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“To take my research in the Six Canons and nine branches of 
mathematics as my highest achievement is the same as to mistake the 
footman for the person in the sedan chair."280
He never considered doing philosophy in any way other than through 
philological work on the Canons. At the same time, he thought of this philological 
work on the Canons also as a philosophical activity. It is suggested that Dai 
Zhen’s originality and profoundness in Confucian philosophy lie precisely in the 
fact that he never separated philosophy and philology. He saw his quest to 
discern the teachings of the sages as a task of ‘finding’, not ‘making’.281 For him, 
providing an account of why one does what one does is a task one can approach 
only after one has mastered the Canons. It is only through such a course of study 
that one can become the kind of person who will make the right moral choices; 
this in turn provides one with the understanding necessary for discerning the 
reasons behind one’s actions 282
280 Duan Yucai.lbid. Quanji, v.7. p.203.
281 Analects, 7.1, “transmits rather than creates.”
282 Philip J. Ivanhoe. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, pp.96-97.
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IV. The Moral Philosophy of Dai Zhen
The moral philosophy of Dai Zhen can be summarised as “fulfil desires and 
express feelings”. Because he believed that life is the most cherished thing for all 
humans and living things, he maintains that, "whatever issues from desire is 
always for the sake of life and nurture”. He also claimed that, “caring for oneself, 
and extending this care to those close to oneself, are both aspects of 
humanity”.283 He established a strong monastic moral philosophy based on 
individual human desire and feeling.
Dai Zhen was fascinated with how Confucius had been able to construct a 
moral philosophy based on his knowledge of the past and his study of human 
conduct. As such it was Confucius’ discourse on human nature above all else 
that he wished to elucidate. Yet the discourse only seems to exist in the 
Analects.284 Dai Zhen realised this; he called most interpretations “forced and 
far-fetched” 285 trusting only that of Mencius. Mencius gave Confucius’ discourse 
on human nature a continuity, clarity and logic that, in Dai Zhen’s view, is entirely
283 Shuzheng, Article 21.
284 Analects 15:2^
285 Dai Zhen, Yumoushu, Quanji, vol. 6, p. 498.
134
persuasive. In the Shuzheng, Dai was determined to build a philosophy of human 
beings based on Mencius’ vision.286
Since Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi believed that natures, being principle, are all the 
same, by some means they had to account for the differences between 
themselves and Confucius. Consequently, they claimed that Confucius was 
“referring only to man’s physical endowment” , or physical nature, which was to 
be distinguished from the nature construed in Mencius’ theory that “human nature 
is good” . Zhu Xi, quoting Cheng Yi, explains why Confucius said that “Human 
natures are nearly together’’287: “The nature referred to here is the physical 
nature, not the original nature. When one speaks of the original nature, that 
nature is the principle. Principle is always good -  this is what Mencius meant by 
‘human nature is good.’ Why then should nature be only alike?”288
Dai Zhen wholly disagrees with what the Neo-Confucians’ argument 
suggests. In Dai Zhen’s view, Confucius and Mencius were talking about the 
same nature, because according to the words of the Analects and Mencius, the 
idea that man has two natures -  a physical nature and an original nature -  simply
286 Dai Zhen thought there to be no difference between the philosophies of the Six Canons, 
Confucius and Mencius. However, Mencius' situation was different from that of Confucius. During 
Mencius’ lifetime there were heresies like Yang and Mo, against which he had to make more 
detailed explanations than Confucius was compelled to. Dai Zhen declares that the one who 
disclosed and clarified the Way of Confucius was Mencius; there is no fundamental difference in 
their philosophies. Shuzheng, Article 24.
287 Analects, 17A2.
288Shuzheng, Article 21
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does not make sense. Dai Zhen claims that Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi must have 
invented the term “physical nature”289 to refer to what Confucius called “nature” . 
A number of assertions seem to support the Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi understanding. 
However, Dai Zhen feels that there is a misunderstanding behind the verification 
that Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi present, and that there are inconsistencies in their 
reasoning, which together constitute solid grounds for disbelieving Cheng Yi and 
Zhu Xi. Thus Dai Zhen sets out to disprove Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi.290
Dai Zhen thought that their theory of two natures was just Cheng Yi’s 
justification, and that Zhu X i’s evaluation was self-serving. Their theory that 
nature is principle and that principle is always good is certainly well served by the 
assertion that human nature is good, but they try to avoid essential subjects 
whenever the text does not fit their analysis. According to their dualism theory, a 
human cannot be a moral agent by his subject, as maintained by the ancient 
Canons always maintained. Consequently, Dai Zhen applied the Kaozheng 
method and produced his own account of the morality of human nature. His 
reading, he claims, clarifies rather than distorts the version Mencius intended to
291convey.
289 Ibid.
290 Articles, 22-23.
291 See the Preface of Shuzheng.
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1. Dai Zhen’s Philosophy of the Human being
According to Dai Zhen, the physical body is an important concept because 
all the characteristics of human nature are based on the physical body, and the 
ultimate virtue of life and things is hold onto life. Thus Dai Zhen claimed that it is 
because this bodily self exists that there are desires, feelings and the possibility 
of intellect; therefore, conversely, desires, feelings and intellect are all part of an 
individual’s physical body. Furthermore, his morality is also a part of himself, 
rather than being a transcendental abstract, as was believed by the Neo- 
Confucians.
Because this bodily self exists, there are desires of sound, colour, smell, 
and taste; because this bodily self exists and the relations of ruler and 
minister, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger, and 
friend and friends are present, there are feelings of pleasure, anger, 
grief, and joy.292 Drink and food become the protective part and 
management part of a body, skin and marrow. The whole body is to be 
a unity together. A substance raises a body, [other things] a material 
force raises a material force [of human body], and vital force, creating 
greater mental ability, grows up naturally. If the body were shattered 
then it would return to the Heaven and the Earth, if it is gathered then it 
is a man and things. One who gets through Heaven and the Earth, is 
alive, if disconnected from the Heaven and the Earth one is dead. It is 
analogised with a plant. Leaves get through the Heavenly force to
292 Shuzheng, Chapter 30.
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collect the wind, the sunshine, the rain, and the dew. Roots get through 
the Earthly force to connect with the soil, manure and moisture.293
That things and man become what they are is due to further differentiations 
of the yin and yang into the so-called five elements. According to Dai Zhen, Dao 
has the functions of creative activity and ordering, and furthermore Dao has a 
type of power distinguishable by its function of “making the nature” of things, that 
is, by making things what they are, which is defined as “goodness”.294
The Book of Odes denotes that “Great! The virtue of Heaven and Earth is in 
giving birth” and “Benevolence is the virtue of producing and sustaining. The 
common people are contented. For daily they have their drink and food”.295 For 
Dai Zhen, the idea of goodness clearly means the function of making the nature 
of Dao and the producing and sustaining of man. Therefore human desires and 
feelings that sustain and nourish life are also defined as goodness.
Human Nature
Dai Zhen’s definition of nature (xing) is “allotments from yin and yang and 
the five elemental forces”.296 Each thing, animate or inanimate, follows its own 
allotment to assume a particular form, and each completes its own nature. The
293 Ibid.
294 Dai Zhen, Fa Xing Lun (On Law and Phenomena), Quanji, vol. 6, p. 343.
295 Book of Odes, p. 166, Waley trans., p. 176.
296 Shuzheng, Article 16.
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Elder Dai’s Record of Rites implies that an allotment is “as allotted from the Way 
it is 'decreed’, and formed as one thing of which it is ‘the nature’” 297 The words 
of the Elder Dai’s Record of Rites explain the differences in the natures of things 
and the unevenness among things of the same kind. Confucius says that,
“Human natures are nearly alike”298
"That which emanates from the Heaven is called the decree" in The Book of Rites 
of the Elder Dai. Dao is the transformation of the material force of yin and yang, 
therefore it can be said that to be an emanation. There is nothing but emanation 
and formed natures are not the same. Therefore, The Book of Changes says, 
"The successive movement of yin and yang is the Way”. The Doctrine of the 
Mean says: "What Heaven has conferred is the very nature" and Mencius 
distinguished between "nature of dog”, "nature of cow" and "nature of Human".299
Dai Zhen clearly displays the development and component parts of the human 
being. According to Dai Zhen it is only because there are Heaven and Earth that 
there are man and thing. There being man and thing, we can thus distinguish 
their attributes, termed ‘nature’. Both man and thing have desires; and desire falls 
within the realm of nature. Both man and thing have consciousness; and 
consciousness lies within the function of nature.300
297 Dadai Liji (The Elder Dai’s Record of Rites), ben ming pian, p. 13. Wenyuange siku quanshu 
edn, vol. 128, p. 531. See also Shuzheng, Article 16.
298 Confucius, Analects, 17:2.
299 Dai Zhen, Letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, vol. 6.
300 Ibid.
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Dai notes that the nature of the myriad of creatures is made up of their 
physical components, ability, and capacity. According to Dai Zhen, ‘Nature’ 
means what is passed on to a thing in the course of its transformation in Heaven 
and on earth. The size to which a thing is limited in the process of transformation 
is determined by a decree (ming), whilst it is nature that shapes its form.
Thus Dai Zhen made interesting analogy;
When The Book of Odes and The Book of Documents talk of the decree 
of Heaven, most of them use the phrase "The king has received the 
decree from Heaven". [...] It is compared to the relationship between a 
king and a wise minister. After the king orders once, [he waits for the 
executionof his order] carefully, attentive and ceaselessly. One should 
praise the capability of a king to appoint a superior man [as a minister].
How can one not admire the king’s profound and high virtue? One who 
is able to quote this, can say, "It is the reason that a king can be a king". 
Generally speaking, to be commanded is the same as when the king 
orders the east; the minister cannot do the west. All commands have 
specified limitations; consequently, one who receives an order cannot 
pass over it. With simulating order of king, it is said that even if the 
position of a less wise minister is higher than that of a wiser one, each 
position is placed by the order of the king. This 'specified order1 can be 
named and called the 'order of the king'. The king notifies the minister 
that they have rules of conduct and the king makes them courteous in 
their public business. This 'instructed order' can be named and is called 
the 'order of the king'. The command of the 'specified order' has its 
limitation from the beginning of receiving of the decree, eventually both 
the honorable and the low are governed too. In the command of 
'instructed order', their accomplishments show their abilities, which 
therefore makes for maximum efficiency. Even if it just maximises their 
duties, 'to command' and 'to specify' are in the same category. When 
the king commands the best at public duties, they dare not do it. Just as,
140
when the king commands the east they dare not go to the east. It is said 
that the 'command' is a 'definitive noun' when there are disputes over 
destinies and principle and meaning.301
Dai Zhen analyses the usage of ancient words in order to distinguish 
between 'specified order' and 'instructed order' so as to make the meaning of the 
decree clear. The 'specified order’ is same as the 'definitive noun' to determine 
the shape of the form.
Accordinf to the decree of Dao, a thing develops into a concrete form and 
shape according to its prescribed nature, termed as its ‘capacity’ (cai). Dai Zhen 
explains it in terms of flowers from within, manifested in its appearance, colour, 
and sound.302
Heaven and the Earth can be analogised with a big tree, its flowers, 
fruits and leaves are not the same but flowers, fruits and leaves all 
emanate from the tree. It's thick or thin trunk, lightness or darkness of 
color and smell, savoury or poor taste, and flower and flower, fruit and 
fruit, leaves and leaves are not the same at ail. In a word, it is an 
emanation. Each of the parts of the tree has been defined by its own 
emanation. It is the same as what humans have from Heaven, though 
humans have been defined from their own emanation too. Everyone is 
able to complete their innate natural gift. It can be compared to a human 
body. It has a heart, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, legs and arms, beard, 
eyebrows, skin hair and hair, but only the Heart governs all of them. As 
for the rest of it, each part has its own capacity. Hence according to the 
saying of The Book of Rites, "the man is the heart of the Heaven and 
Earth”. To the blind man, the heart cannot see in place of the eyes; as to
301 ibid.
302 Yuan Shan, Chapter 2.
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the deaf, the heart cannot listen in place the of ears. This means that 
the heart also defines what has been emanated.303
By the decree of Dao, everything has its capacity. Everything has its 
individuality from others, even if they come from the same root and the same 
species. This process of transformation is called the individualising power of Dao.
Thus Dai Zhen says:
Someone ladles water out from a brook, fills large earthenware jug, a 
small bottle and a piece of pottery with water. When it becomes ice, the 
size of the ice will be the same as the large earthenware jug, the small 
bottle or the picec of pottery. If it were not filled, then each depth would 
be different. Although the water was ladled from the same brook, it 
differs according to the time and region. There are differences in taste 
and purity as well. Even if they came from the same brook, each of them 
has been defined by their own emanation.304
After the physical body has been transformed and characterised by 
capacity, desire (yu), feeling (qing) and consciousness (yi) accompanied it. Since 
a person has desires and feelings, a person also develops cunningness and 
intellect within him; and, since a person’s nature is manifested in cunningness 
and intellect, he develops a liking for and a repugnance to beauty and ugliness, 
right and wrong respectively:305
303 Dai Zhen, Letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, vol. 6.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
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From birth onwards men have desires, have feelings, and make 
cognitive distinctions. These three [capacities] are the spontaneity of 
blood and breath and of conscious knowing. What are given in desires 
are sounds, colours, smells, and tastes, and accordingly there is liking 
and disliking; what are manifested in feelings are pleasure, anger, grief, 
and joy, and accordingly there is misery and happiness; what are 
distinguished in cognition are the beautiful, the ugly, the true, and the 
false, and accordingly there is approving and rejecting. Desire of sound, 
colour, smell, and taste are what supply and nourish one’s life; feelings 
of pleasure, anger, grief, and joy are responses to contact with [other] 
beings; when cognitive distinctions of beautiful and ugly and true and 
false reach their furthest extent they penetrate the operations of heaven 
and earth.306
After one has acquired desire, feelings, cunningness and intellect within 
him, then requires the natural development of moral virtues.
The way of living lies in desire and in one’s feelings. The two [desire and 
feeling] are in the nature of naturalness so that everything under 
Heaven can be accomplished. Cunningness is the source by means of 
which beauty and ugliness are developed to the full, and from which the 
power of control is derived. Intellect is the source by means of which 
one’s sense of right and wrong is developed to the full, and from which 
the worthy and the sage’s virtue are developed. And these two aspects 
are also in the nature of naturalness; when these two are cultivated to 
such finesse that they become a moral necessity, and then all the 
abilities under Heaven can be made full use of.307
It is said that nature is due to Dao or the Dao of Heaven, and that the 
individual natures of things and men are describable in terms of their vital forces
305 Shuzheng, Article 30.
307 Ibid.
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(qi) and their refined existence, of which the mind and intelligence are the 
fundamental aspects. This is the definition of nature that Dai Zhen proposes. Dai 
Zhen considers the yin and yang and the five agencies as the essence of Dao. 
Using this framework, he regards these vital forces and refined existence as the 
substance of individual nature. The essence of individual nature is the power of 
the individualising distribution of Dao.308 In order to be able to combine this 
individualising function of Dao with its creative and ordering functions, the sense 
in which Dai Zhen spoke of goodness should be noted:
With regard to Heaven and Earth, “transformation" is their 
productiveness and “spirit" their governing [aspect], and these cannot be 
separated and distinguished; thus it is said that transformation 
encompasses spirit and that spirit also encompasses transformation. It 
is from transformation one knows spirit, and from transformation and 
spirit that one knows virtue, which is the central correctness of Heaven 
and Earth. With regard to man, whose possession of blood and breath 
implies conscious knowing, even though from the sages on down there 
are individual differences with regard to ignorance and clarity, all who 
have [this capacity for] conscious knowing are able to learn, and thereby 
enlighten their ignorance and advance toward clarity.309
According to Dai Zhen, at any time since the ancient times at which people 
have talked about the nature of things, they are actually referring to the 
“characteristics of their vital energy [g/]” , which are distinguished by their 
intelligence and sense. But all living things “made up of blood and qi cherish life
308 Chungying Cheng (1971), p. 33.
309 Shuzheng, Article 15.
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and fear death” , and they “seek what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful” .310 
In this regard, birds and other animals are not different from man. And if they 
know only their mothers, not their fathers, it is because they are limited in their 
perception and sensation (their capacity to feel). However, they all love their 
offspring; in loving them, “in the love between male and female, and in not 
devouring their own kind or biting those they are associated with, they have 
advanced well beyond cherishing life and fearing death” . They have extended 
their care and concern to those who are close to them and in the process have 
exhibited the virtue of benevolence:311
“Man is different from the birds and beasts in that he has an 
understanding of ritual, principles and righteousness; in fact, his 
perception and sensation are more acute than those of other animals 
[...] This explains why Mencius said that man’s nature is good” .312
Dai Zhen claimed that human nature is good, and also that the natures of 
dogs, oxen, and human beings all differ. Dai Zhen explains what Mencius' words 
means.
With regard to nature, Mencius fundamentally holds that it is good. In 
the phrase “may become good” he says, “may” because natures have 
differences, but asserts [the nature’s] goodness because there are none 
who cannot [become good]. The following phrase, “this is what 
goodness means” , is in response to [Gongduzi’s] preceding remark,
“now you say that the nature is good” , [and thus refers to the nature.]
310 Shuzheng, Article 21.
311 Ibid. Article 21.
312 Ibid. Article 27.
145
And when he goes on to say: “If one becomes not good, it is not the 
fault of one’s capacities” ,313 [it means] in sum that those who become 
not good are those who “ensnare and drown their hearts"314 and "let go 
of their true hearts”315 to the point of becoming completely "fettered and 
losf316 anc| “not far removed from the birds and beast”317. When one 
speaks of capacities, nature is seen, and when one speaks of nature, 
the capacities are seen; the reason is that the capacities add nothing to 
nature and take nothing from it. Since man's nature is good, his 
capacities are also fine. If they are sometimes not fine, it is always the 
result of "ensnaring and drowning one’s heart” . That is why [Mencius] 
says, “It is not that the capacities bestowed by Heaven are thus 
different".318
If nature is principle, as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi insisted, then nature must 
always be good, whether it is the nature of an animal or of a human being. 
According to the original text that is untouched by the Song commentators,319 the 
two statements do not, however, contradict one another. Dai Zhen explained this 
as follows:320
That the capacities may at first be fine and later not fine is from 
capacities losing their capacities, but one cannot say that nature is at 
first good and later not good: one speaks of "nature” with regard to the
313 Mencius, 6A6.
314 Ibid, 6A7.
315 Ibid. 6A8.
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid 6A7. Shuzheng, Article 30.
319 There is Canonical difference between Zhu Xi and Dai Zhen. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi support
the New text of the Canon whilst Dai Zhen and early and mid-Qing Evidential scholars support
the Old text. The political attitudes expressed in the Old and the New texts are different.
320 Shuzheng, Article 20.
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root and origin, and of "capacity” with regard to the physical makeup. If 
when the physical makeup is popped and ruined it is not the fault of the 
physical makeup, how much less can it be blamed on the root and 
origin? If one considers such Song Confucian articulations as: The 
nature is principle and: After men are born, when this principle has 
already fallen in the midst of [physical] form and material force, [their 
being is not entirely [identical with] the original substance of this nature.
In the light of Mencius’ articulation that even after the nature has been 
“ensnared and drowned” and “fettered and lost" and “others see one’s 
wickedness” it is still “not the fault of the capacities” , [it is clear that] with 
regard to “the capacities that Heaven bestows” the Song Confucians do 
“blame the capacities” .
Dai Zhen noted that clearly “goodness is the great thing shared in common 
by all things in the world and activity of Heaven and earth; Dao. Dao gives rise to 
everything; Dao individualises everything as everything; and, finally, Dao orders 
and harmonises everything with everything else -  all these are connoted in the 
use of the term “goodness” .321
321 Dai Zhen, Duyi xici lunxing (Reading the Great Appendixes on Nature in the Book of 
Changes), Quanji, vol. 6, p. 348.
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2. The Metaphysics of the Way
Dai Zhen is not attempting to destroy the credibility of metaphysics in 
general, only a particular metaphysical system, namely the Neo-Confucian brand 
of metaphysics called the metaphysics of //'. But Dai Zhen also attempts to build a 
concept of the metaphysics of the human being based on Dao and qi. He rejects 
the Neo-Confucian notion of li and affirms his notion of li as the order of things. 
And he extends this meaning to universal agreement of feelings of man. As a 
principle of reality and benevolence, according to Dai Zhen, li should be rectified 
to assume the true Confucian sense.322
Yamanoi Yu, in his illuminating essay on Dai Zhen’s philosophy of qi, 
distinguishes Dai Zhen’s categories from Zhu X i’s as follows:
[In Dai Zhen’s philosophical categories] there exists the realm of qi, 
which is related to objects and forms, but not the realm of principle, 
which transcends forms and objects and is the most essential part of 
Zhu X i's  teaching. This does not mean, however, that the notion of 
principle is absent in Dai Zhen’s thought. Principle had a special 
significance for Dai. It is just that the idea of principle as "reason” and 
“something above shape" is missing.323
322 Shuzheng, Article 16-19.
323 Yamanoi Yu, ‘Tai Shin no shiso ni okeru “ki"’ (the idea of qi in Dai Zhen’s philosophy) in Ki no 
shiso (The philosophy of qi) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1978), p. 478.
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Using his reading of the early sources, Dai Zhen tries to reconstruct a 
metaphysical system of human nature and morality based on the Dao of the Six 
Canons.324 Dai only trusts and relies on the Six Canons and he is proud of what 
he has gained from an entire lifetime’s philological and philosophical research.
He derives his sense of metaphysics from the Book of Changes, the Record of 
Rites (particularly the chapter “Record of Music”), the Doctrine of the Mean, the 
glosses in the Shuowen jiezi, and, of course, the Book of Mencius.
Dai Zhen says:
1 sought to prove [my view by] philological study [of the Canons] and to 
check the ideas contained therein as they were expressed at the time.
Only when I arrived at a clear understanding of them could I test my 
mind.325
Thus, Dai Zhen claimed that the origins of human beings do not go beyond yin, 
yang, and the five elemental forces; and that the source of our morality lies in our 
blood and chi and in the knowing mind (xueqi zhixin). For Dai, it is not necessary 
to imagine the heart and mind as the storehouse of moral principles set out in the 
Six Canons. Morality requires an explanation but does not need to be put in a 
separate category or attributed to any source other than the Six Canons and the 
words of the ancients.326
324 Shuzheng, Article 1.
325 Yuanshan, Chapter 1.
326 Shuzheng, Article 17.
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a. Dai Zhen’s Criticism of Principle
According to the Song Confucians, // is the universal principle, form, and 
structure of things. It not only constitutes the guiding spirit in human nature but 
also represents the truth and reality of it; in effect, li is associated with the rational 
part of human nature. Man knows li because li is clearly present in man’s nature. 
The objectivity of li testifies to, and guarantees, the unity and uniformity of human 
nature. Li is therefore also the principle of virtue inherent in human nature. The 
rest that is found in human existence is non-//, which has nothing to do with virtue 
and is not to be tolerated.327
Thus for Dai Zhen, li is seen as being coextensive with human needs and 
feelings when they are properly satisfied and balanced in a social setting. Li is not 
separable either from human needs and feelings or from the whole of the society 
of man.328
The Neo-Confucians regard li as a form of ontological substance, but Dai 
Zhen disagrees with them and claims that li is the order of all things man’s 
intellect can perceive. As an ontological substance man can possess the //, but as 
an epistemological observable facts man both knows li and creates it.
327 See Zhuzi, Zhongyoung, SOCT, p. 732-3.
328 Shuzheng, Article 15.
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The Song Confucians, who also make li indistinguishable from Dao, Dai 
Zhen claimed, appropriated the idea of an immortal spirit. For instance, Shao 
Yong said, “For want of a better name we call the Dao and One ‘spirit’”. The 
human spirit, according to this view, is identical with the spirit of Heaven and 
Earth; it has “no spatial restrictions”, but when manifested in man as his nature, it 
has a material base; therefore, nature is “the form and body of the Way”.329 
These ideas, in Dai Zhen’s opinion, “showed the profound influence of Laozi and 
Zhuangzi”, as well as Buddhism. “What Shao Yong said about the spirit, that it 
constitutes the Dao and nature, Zhu Xi appropriated for his idea of principle”.330 
Dai explains:
The interest of Master Zheng and Master Zhu in Daoism and Buddhism 
was all for the sake of seeking the way. As long as they could see their 
way as true, they were unconcerned even if others regarded it as false.
Their initial [intent] was not to turn against the Six Canons, Confucius, 
and Mencius and put their trust in [Daoism and Buddhism]. Not having 
attained the explanation of [the Confucian way], and seeing that [the 
Daoist injunction to] “returning and observing within” were close to [the 
Confucian method of] “empathetically investigating what is near to the 
self” , they considered that these [Daoist and Buddhist practices] could 
also gradually clarify thoughts and worries, and hoped [by mastering 
them] to attain a basis from which to assess affairs and things. But [the 
problem with maxims such as] “illuminate the heart and see the nature 
” , or “return to the original substance of one’s spirit” , is their implication 
that as soon as the original substance is reached it is already without 
deficiency or lack, whereas in actuality as soon as one acts there are 
mistakes and errors. Lao, Zhuang, and the Buddhists are of course
3^ 9 Ibid. Article 15. Shao Yong in Huangjijing shishu (Supreme principles governing the world), 
SBBY edn, 8B:17.
330 Shuzheng, Article 15.
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unconcerned with such mistakes and errors, but Master Cheng and 
Master Zhu, determined as they were to seek the way, eventually 
realised that [such maxims] could not be relied on to weigh and assess 
affairs and things, and so said in the end that they were false.331
Like the Daoists and the Buddhists, Cheng and Zhu make the mistake of 
first believing in the existence of an entity distinct from qi and then exalting it as 
that which transcends the process of change. Cheng Yi accuse the Buddhists of 
separating qi from the mind, but in Dai Zhen’s view, Zheng commits a similar 
fallacy -  he creates a basis that he calls Heaven and says that the heart and 
mind belong to man and nature belongs to Heaven. The yearning for an other­
worldly entity was as powerful among the Song Confucians as among the Daoists 
and Buddhists; for their part, the Song thinkers call their idea the “principle of 
necessity” and claim that they have taken it from the teaching of Confucius and 
Mencius:332
In the Six Canons and books written by Confucius and Mencius, I have 
never heard of the dichotomy between li and qi, but the Song 
Confucians were trailblazers in making such a discourse. Moreover, 
when they identified Dao as li, that was, after all, an erroneous definition 
for the term.333
In the Shuzheng, Dai Zhen tries to make sense of the logic underlying Song 
metaphysics. Principle is Heavenly principle but is bestowed on all things. Zhu Xi
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid.
333 Dai Zhen, Xuyan, Article 1.
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says, “Wherever material force condenses and takes shape, principle is present 
in it”, and conversely, “Were it not for material force, although there would still be 
this principle, there would be nothing to which it could attach itself’.334 Principle 
lodges in the heart and mind:
What Dai Zhen calls principle is not what Zhu Xi calls principle, because 
their elemental sense of the world was different. Dai Zhen claims that all major 
Song metaphysicians thought alike, with the exception of Zhang Zai:
Only the theories of Master Zhang can be separately recorded. For 
example when he says: from the transformations of material force “the 
Way” is derived, and: transformation is Heaven’s way, and: when they 
interact and have effects it is transformation; when they are united and 
unfathomable it is spirit, if a sage were to arise again there would be 
nothing to change in these various remarks. Master Zhang saw that 
necessity is what is meant by principle, and so he did not simply say 
"spirit” , but said, “when spirit is constant” . Genuinely to speak like this is 
not to take principle as separate, like a thing, and is close to the Six 
Classics, Confucius, and Mencius.335
It is of course clear from Dai Zhen’s testimony on li that his sense of what 
principle is derives from the Six Canons. In these tests, li is often paired with tiao 
and fen to mean the "internal texture” of things or the “order and arrangement” 
that can be distinguished among things and affairs.
334 Yulei, 1:3, 5:3a; Shao Yong, Huangjijing shishu, 8B:17.
335 Shuzheng, Article 15. Zhang Zai, Zhangzi Quanshu, SBBY edn, 2:36.
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"Principle” (//) designates the subtle incipiencies that must be 
distinguished according to kind when [something] is examined; thus it is 
called “pattern” (fenli). With regard to the physical substance of things 
one speaks of “skin texture” (////'), of "capillary passages” (couli), and 
"structural pattern” (wenli). [When something is] in its proper place, well 
ordered and not confused, it is called “orderly” (frao//).336
“Principle” always refers to a pattern “that gives the whole its distinctive 
property or characteristic”. After an etymological survey of the word, Dai Zhen 
ends the first article of the Shuzheng with an unsettling statement: “What the 
ancients called principle was never the same thing as what latter-day scholars 
call principle”.337
As long as one is tranquil and not yet affected by things, one’s blood 
and breath and heart’s discernments are calm and without loss; thus 
[the text] says “Heaven’s nature” . When one moves in response to 
things then desires spring forth from nature, and one man’s desires are 
what all men similarly desire. Thus it says “the nature’s desires” . When, 
with one’s likings and disliking already formed, one follows one’s own 
likings and disliking to the neglect of those of others, often one cripples 
others in the indulgence of one’s own desires. To return to oneself is to 
consider how one would feel in response if another were indulging his 
desires. When feelings reach their proper level, this is the regulation of 
one’s likings and dislikings, and this is what it is to accord with heaven’s 
principle. What the ancients meant by "heaven’s principle” was never 
anything like what latter-day Confucians call “heaven’s principle” .338
336 Ibid. Article 1.
337 ibid.
338 ibid. Article 2.
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To explain this more precisely, Dai Zhen displays the difference between 
decree and principle. According to Dai Zhen, when the Neo-Confucians talked 
about //, it was equivalent to the ancients’ idea of decree (ming). Decree and li are 
inexorable limitations imposed on things and human affairs. The capacity to know 
such a limitation is dependent on a person’s learning and wisdom. Thus, he says:
The ancients often talked about decree, whereas men of later ages 
often talked about li, both of which are different terms for the same 
actuality. The desires craved for by the ear, eye, and by various organs 
of the body are caused by his nature. If one understands that such 
desires are necessarily so, he is in accord with the normality of Heaven 
and earth, and therefore he imposes self-restraint on his desires and 
dares not trespass against Heaven and Earth’s normality. This is what is 
called decree. Therefore decree is nothing other than the necessary 
limitation one finds in the naturalness of [human] nature after careful 
investigation and through understanding of it. Thus it [decree] is the 
ultimate law inherent in the naturalness, if we allow a thing to run its 
course naturally but fall into error in the process, it loses its naturalness 
and is not naturalness per se. Hence, [the discovery of] what is morally 
necessary is actually the completion of what is natural... Also, it is by 
means of the desires of the ear, eye, and many other organs that living 
creatures are nourished. However, if a person permits his desire to run 
wild and does not control himself, he is bent to drive himself on towards 
death.339
Decree and principle are different terms for the same actuality. According to 
Dai Zhen, decree is nothing other than the necessary limitation one finds in the 
naturalness of nature, and it can be found after careful investigation and through 
a proper understanding of it. However, the two concepts differ with respect to
339 Xuyan, Article 3.
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nature. Decree is given order in Dai Zhen’s term; it is a ‘definitive noun’, and, on 
the other hand, principle is the inner coherence of readily shaped things. Dai 
Zhen discerned “what is antecedent to form” (xingershang) and “what is 
subsequent to form” (xingerxia),340 which Zhu Xi interprets as “what is within form 
“and “what is above form”. 341
By order of decree, capacity is adhered to in moulding humans and 
creatures into form and substance, each according to its nature. Capacity is also 
the naturalness of human nature as physical embodiments. Physical capacities 
are the manifestations of natures; without physical capacities, there can be no 
human activity at all.342
Concerning li, li is not a kind of natural cause or sense organ but is the 
product of human observation, rather than a physical endowment or cause of 
shape or form. Even though it is not the first product of nature, principle is also a 
part of the nature of humans as an inner coherence of its endowments. Dai Zhen 
claimed that it is this that enables the expansion (or extension) of nature and 
human morality.
Because the desires are rooted in the blood and breath they are spoken of as 
“the nature”; but there are limits (pertaining to them) which may not be exceeded 
of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, (which) is not the same in all
340 YiXici, 1.12; cf. Leggetrans.
341 Shuzheng, Article 16.
342 Shuzheng, Article 29.
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men and is limited by the initial (conditions of one’s) life, is described as 
“decreed”; but that all may broaden and fulfil (this excellence) is man’s nature.343
Dai Zhen’s concept of li can be further explained in three ways:
Li is the pattern of things and is therefore not apart from things: the order of 
things.
Li is the overall understanding of human desires and feelings: order of 
desire and feeling.
Li is therefore the function of intellect that enables man to recognise 
both these points -  the first and the second -  which is the discerning 
and guiding ability of the mind to achieve comprehensive goodness in 
oneself, society, and the universe as a whole:344 the order of human 
understanding.
Conceiving li as the order of things, Dai Zhen proposes a concept of li that 
is highly individualistic and highly empirical, as discussed in the following. Li 
dwells in things and varies with things. It is open to man’s observation, and its 
understanding and discovery depend on man’s discernment and distinction. In 
other words, Dai Zhen considers li as the name for what we can discern in things 
and distinguish in their minute details, which is why li is also called the principle of 
discernment as well as the patterning and the shaping of things. If we know how
343 Ibid.
344 Chungying Cheng (1971), pp. 19-20. Dai Zhen also defines principle as a desire of the 
intellect.
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things differ from one another, we should know the distinguishing traits of these 
things, these being called the //'of structuring.345
Li is the inner coherence of qi, and it does not exist prior to the latter, nor is 
it a separate entity that controls the qi. Li is just a necessary, unchanging law 
within things and human affairs themselves. What is known as a necessary, 
unchanging law within things and human affairs is the natural order within 
them:346
Pointing out perpetual production and reproduction is to verify the 
existence of a natural order [within a thing]; on the other hand, he knows 
the meaning of //'.347
Although every person is complete, the propensities of their physical 
existence prevent most people from achieving understanding. As mentioned 
above, in Dai Zhen’s view, the Song Confucians distinguish “principle and qi as 
having two separate origins and then put the blame on the physical form”. 
Certainly, they try to mix and knead principle and qi into a single lump, but “this 
did not prevent these two things from being each a separate entity”. Principle is 
always described in “the most glowing manner”, characterised as “pure and
345 Shuzheng, Article 1.
346 Ibid., see Article 2-5.
347 Xuyan, Article 1.
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expansive” and placed in a category above the transforming force of the yin and
When Masters Cheng and Zhu honour principle and regard it as 
something conferred on the self by Heaven, it is like Xunzi honouring 
propriety and righteousness and regarding them as something 
conferred on the self by the sages. When they say that principle has 
been corrupted by physical form and materiality, so that for all who are 
not sages physical form and materiality are in all respects greatly 
deformed, this is Xunzi’s theory that nature is evil. And yet when they 
say that principle is a separate thing that is anchored and attached [to 
physical form and materiality], it is like Lao, Zhuang, and the Buddhists 
saying that the True Governor or True Emptiness is anchored and 
attached to the physical body. If principle is complete and self-sufficient 
it becomes difficult to say that one must study in order to illuminate 
principle, and therefore they could not but distinguish “principle” from 
"material force” as "two roots” , and lay the blame [for the difficulty of 
apprehending principle] on physical form and materiality. Their theory is 
put together from a variety of mixed elements, and leads scholars into 
confusion and doubt. Although the formulations of the Six Canons, 
Confucius, and Mencius are all there, [the learner] merely becomes 
accustomed to them instead of grasping their truth, and no longer seeks 
to comprehend them. Alas! How could I dare be silent and rest?349
Dai Zhen points out that li originates in desire. Putting these two points 
together, it follows that li is man’s feelings and that li originates in man’s desire, 
because if there is no desire, there is no action. He states that:
348 Shuzheng, Articles 13 and 14.
349 Ibid. Article, 14.
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Li exists in desire, in one’s dealing with affairs, he is motivated by 
desire; if there is no desire, there is no action. Since there is desire, 
there is action, and actions that are appropriate [i.e. action neither in 
excess nor deficient in what is required] are known as li. How could 
there be li if there is no desire or action?350
Dai Zhen further considers li to be a result of the investigation of things by 
analysis after synthesis and by synthesis after analysis.351 Of course, li in this 
sense is not devoid of metaphysical basis. What Dai Zhen is objecting to is Zhu 
Xi's assertion that li originates in Heaven and resides in the mind. For Dai, li 
always dwells within things themselves; and what he seeks is the understanding 
of things. All things follow the natural principles of their existence. But these 
natural principles of existence (ziran) have to be understood as necessary 
principle (b/ra/7).352 Therefore, Dai Zhen says:
The li of things and affairs can be obtained only in an analysis and 
dissection of the minutiae of things. [...] The ancients take 
understanding as a matter of analysing the patterning and lining of 
things. [...] The li is to be found in the unchangeable rule in all things as 
well as in human affairs. [...] The li will clearly reveal itself when we seek 
the unchangeable law in all things and in human affairs that are by 
themselves necessary. And to say that li and qi are mixed together and 
yet separate entities is to make a learner seek in vain such entities even 
though his head has turned white.353
350 Ibid. Article 10.
351 Dai Zhen, Letter to Duan Yucai, See also the Nianpu (Biographical Chronology of Dai 
Dungyuan), Quanji, vol. 6.
352 Shuzheng, Article 14-15.
353 Xuyan, Article 3.
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To summarize this chapter, Dai Zhen compieteiy rejected the abstract and 
metaphysical concept of li in Neo-Confucian philosophy as being not in accord 
with the benevolence and reality of human desire and feeling.
The sage is also a man, and everyone praises an exhaustive grasp of 
human principles as sagely wisdom. But an exhaustive grasp of human 
principles is nothing else but an exhaustive grasp of what is necessary 
in the activities of daily life. To push out to the limit with regard to what 
cannot change is [what is meant by] the necessary, and this is to speak 
of the perfection [of the matter at hand], not to penetrate to its root. The 
later Confucians searched too far, taking ideas and arguments meant 
only in reference to the perfection [of things] as if they were substantial 
entities, and saying that these achieved completion when “merged" with 
materia] force. Those who heard [these theories] became accustomed 
to them and did not examine them, and did not know their difference 
from the words of the Six Cannons, Confucius, and Mencius.354
b. Dai Zhen’s Metaphysics of The Way
Dai Zhen uses the same words when referring to the five agencies and 
describing Dao. He states that the yin and yang connote the five agencies just as 
the five agencies connote the yin and yang. The five agencies and yin and yang 
determine that things become what they are. It is they that are the cause of the
354 Ibid. Article 13.
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various forms of distribution. Things have their individual natures, which in turn 
have their own unity. Conversely, these individual natures are derived from Dao, 
the yin and yang, and the five agencies that are the elemental differentiations of 
yin and yang. Dao's power to individualize things can be seen as one of its chief 
characteristics. Given such an understanding, it is easy to see why there are 
individual things and individual men: individual things and individual men are 
different from each other because they have different distributions of Dao.355
The Yi says: “one yinlone yang is what is meant by the Way; what continues 
it is goodness, and what form it are natures”.356 Dai maintains the ethereal 
transformation of the twin forces of yin and yang in his cosmology. He writes:
Dao means unceasing transformation [...] Perpetual production is the 
origin of transformation, and perpetual production in an orderly manner 
is the proper course of transformation.357
Generally speaking, the perpetual ethereal transformation in the universe is 
known as Dao; and in human affairs, Dao is the normal course in human relations 
in daily life, which is similar to unceasing ethereal transformation:
As Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi perceived that the ethereal transformation of 
yin and yang is untraceable, they therefore regarded all concrete 
matters as coarse and sought the formless [//] as something sublime...
355 Shuzheng, Quanji, Article 8.
356 Yi, Xici, 1.5.
357 Yuanshan, chapter 1.
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According to them, they were suddenly enlightened to the fact that 
herein lies the distinction between li and g/.358
For his analysis of word Dao, Dai Zhen gives a semantic analysis in the 
context of the Book of Changes to confirm the meaning of the metaphysical term.
There is a difference in the usage of the ancients between the 
expressions “is what is meant by" (zhi wei) and "is called” (wei zhi). “Is 
what is meant by” always takes what comes before it as the meaning of 
what comes after it. The Yi’s One yin and one yang is what is meant by 
the Way gives an account of the Way of Heaven, and is like saying that 
“the Way” means one yin and one yang. [But] "Is called" always uses 
the term that follows it to make a distinction with regard to the actuality 
that precedes it.359
Dai Zhen clearly demonstrates the word usage of The Book of Changes (Yi), 
according to Dai’s definition.360 Thus he says:
What is antecedent to form is called the Way; what is subsequent to 
form is called a vessel. The Way or of vessels, but merely uses “the 
Way" and “a vessel” to distinguish between “antecedent to form" and 
“subsequent to form” . “Form” refers to what has already achieved 
physical form. “Antecedent to form” is like saying “before form” , and 
"subsequent to form” is like “after form” . When yin and yang have not 
yet achieved physical form, this is what is meant by “antecedent to 
form"; it is clear that they are not "subsequent to form” . “Vessel” refers 
to what does not change once it is completed; “the Way” refers to what 
“substantiates things and cannot be left out” . Not only are yin and 
yang not "subsequent to form”: when the five modes [appear as] water,
358 Xu Yan, Article 2.
359 Shuzheng, Article 16.
360 Nowadays this usage of the Chinese phrase for “is called” is widely accepted by Chinese 
Classicists. This distinction between the usages of the words was discovered by Dai Zhen.
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fire, wood, metal, and earth they have physical matter, can be seen, and 
are certainly “subsequent to form” and “vessels” , but their material 
force, which men and things all receive and embody, is “antecedent to 
form".361
When we examine the theories regarding “what is antecedent to form” 
(xingershang) and “what is subsequent to form” (.xingerxia),362 we find that what 
Dai Zhen says about “what is antecedent to form” and certainly what he says 
about “what is subsequent to form” both fit into Zhu X i’s category of “what is 
within form”. Zhu X i’s notion of “what is above form”, in other words, the realm of 
“principle”, simply does not exist in Dai Zhen’s thought.363 When we examine the 
theories regarding the “successive movement of yin and yang”, we again find that 
the realm of “principle” - that is to say what Zhu Xi considers to be the “reason” 
(suoli) underlying “the successive movement of yin and yang” - also does not 
exist in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen defines his own categories for “what is 
antecedent to form" and “what is subsequent to form”: “form is the designation for 
things that have definite shapes and characteristics. To say something is 
antecedent or above form is like saying ‘before there is any form’; to say 
something is subsequent to or below (or within) form is like saying ‘after there is 
form’; there exists the realm of qi, which is related to objects and forms, but not 
the realm of principle; it is merely the case that the idea of principle as “reason” 
and “something above shape” is missing:364
361 Suizheng, Article 17.
362 Yi, Xici, 1.12; cf. Legge trans.
363 Shuzheng, Article 17.
364 Yamanoi Yu (1978), p. 478.
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Tracing back the origins of men and things, it ends with this. In the Six 
Canons and in the writings of Confucius and Mencius I have not heard 
of a distinction of principle from material force, but the later Confucians 
invented and articulated one, and thus assigned yin and yang to what is 
"subsequent to form” .365
It is clear that before the yin and yang assume shape and characteristics, 
they should be referred to as being antecedent to form, not subsequent to it. 
‘Concrete things’ (qi) means those things that have assumed specific forms and 
no longer undergo change’’.366
The [ethereal forces] of yin and yang flow naturally; and, to say it 
idealistically when the flow of yin and yang reaches a state of perfection, 
it then becomes the li. Li is nothing other than that which is necessarily 
so (biran), and may be likened to the way in which the flow of the yin 
and yang forces is expected to be perfect; it may also be likened to the 
way in which a person’s actions are expected to be faultless, when we 
talk about the necessity of the perfect and the faultless, we talk about 
the matter after the actions, from the point of view of after the -  fact, not 
before; and, moreover, [we can only concretely] make judgment on 
something in every individual case. How could we use empty words as 
the criterion by which judgment on a thing [or a person’s action] is to be 
made, and furthermore, regard [the criterion as the principle which] is 
mixed together with the corporeal ether, thus becoming the controlling 
mechanism of a thing?367
Dai remarks that a thing’s nature (xing) is derived from the ethereal forces 
of yin and yang, in other words physical constituents, ability, and capacity. Nature
365 Shuzheng, Article 17.
366 Ibid. Articles on the Heavenly Way, 16-19.
367 Xuyan, Article 3.
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means something that is derived from naturalness (ziran), whereas benevolence 
(re/?) and intellect (zhi) are rules resulting from something that is morally 
necessary (biran). Dai continues (as partially quoted above):
The desires of the ordinary man, when loosed to the point of perversity 
and meanness, lead to wrangling, strife, and disorder; the desires of the 
sage are all excellent virtue. The desires are the same, but with regard 
to moral excellence the difference is as great as this. Desires are the 
spontaneity of blood and breath, and liking this excellent virtue is the 
spontaneity of conscious knowing: this is the basis on which Mencius 
says that the nature is good. The spontaneity of conscious knowing 
always delights in principle and righteousness, but has just been able 
exhaustively to attain principle and righteousness. When one thoroughly 
examines [what issues] from the spontaneity of blood and breath in 
order thereby to know its necessity, this is what is meant by principle 
and righteousness. Spontaneity in relation to necessity is not two things.
When according to the spontaneity [of an action] one thoroughly 
understands it and there is not the slightest incipient flaw in it, this is its 
necessity; and if thereupon one is without regret and at peace, this is 
then spontaneity’s ultimate norm. If in giving free rein to one’s 
spontaneity one flows into error, this is to shift and lose one’s 
spontaneity and is not spontaneity. Therefore to return to necessity is to 
fulfil one’s spontaneity.368
Thus, metaphysical arguments on Dao and nature lead to the desire and 
consciousness of man’s morality. For Dai Zhen, his main concern and the goal of 
his metaphysical arguments were the human being and ethics rather than 
metaphysics itself as a separate entity.
368 Shuzheng, Article 15.
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3. The Ethical Human Being
Both men and things have physical bodies and their endowments are made 
different by the individualising power of Dao. The goodness of Dao is defined as 
the eternal activity of producing life and things, therefore it is human life that, as a 
direct production of Dao, is good and every action of sustaining life is good 
because bodily self exists. It is at this point that the moral philosophy of Dai Zhen 
begins. Principle is defined as the order of man’s desire and feelings and the 
order of the organization of human society; through the li man can improve his 
given endowments.
a. Principle and Ethics
With regard to the understanding of li, Dai Zhen’s criticism of Neo-Confucian 
ethics is clear and relevant. According to Dai Zhen, the Neo-Confucians locate 
the //'of virtue and human nature in a place other than in feelings and desire. 
Thus, after they denounce feeling and desires as being totally devoid of li, 
according to Dai Zhen, Neo-Confucians have no basis for justifying ethical 
principles other than their arbitrary opinions, which, only serve to diminish an 
individual’s life.369 For Dai Zhen, //was nothing but the appropriateness of human 
feelings and desire and the harmony of all men in the developments of their 
feelings and desires. Thus he proclaimed:
369 Ibid. Article 15.
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It is “principle” when [appropriate] feelings do not fail. There is never a 
case of not attaining the [appropriate] feeling and yet still attaining the 
principle. In all one’s actions towards others one should reflect and 
silently think: if another were to act towards me in this way, would I be 
able to accept it? Whenever one demands something of another one 
should reflect and silently think: if another were to demand this of me, 
would I be able to fulfil it? If one measures one’s stance toward others 
by oneself, the principle will be clear. “Heaven’s principle” refers to 
spontaneous patterning. Spontaneous patterning is precisely a matter of 
using my feelings to assess the feelings of others so that all reach their 
proper level.370
According to Dai Zhen, since li is on a metaphysical level nothing other than 
patterns and organisations inherent in concrete things and revealed by cognitive 
capacities, //should consequently be found in human feelings and needs, in that 
these represent concrete facts in life. Dai Zhen thought that without desires and 
feelings, no ethical values and activities could be fulfilled and expressed, and so 
without desires and feelings nothing has any order.
It must be recognised, affirms Dai Zhen, that the reality of human nature is 
its desires and feelings, which are universal human traits. They are universally 
human because the use of Neo Confucian notion of principle without the 
recognition of the value of these traits will lead only to monstrosities to which man 
will react immediately with aversion. Human needs and feelings that define
370 Shuzheng, Article 2.
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benevolence have a metaphysical justification: they are derived from universal 
life, material in the world that is intrinsically good:371
Mencius says: even nowadays, if men suddenly see a child about to fall 
into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and 
distress. But this “distress” -  and "benevolence" [which fulfils it] -  is not 
something separately stored away in the heart, apart from [the ordinary 
operations of] conscious knowing. It is because one knows in oneself 
the love of life and fear of death that one is alarmed at the child’s 
danger, and feels distress at the child's [impending] death. If one did not 
have these feelings of love for life and fear of death, wherein could one 
feel alarm and distress?372
Let us consider the question of the distinction between li and desire. 
According to the Neo-Confucians, either li or desire must motivate a person’s 
action. When they talk about li, it seems to them that this is an object that derives 
its existence from Heaven and that it dwells within the mind. Hence all the Neo- 
Confucians regard opinion as the //. As to their response to affairs, if, luckily, they 
happen to be correct, it is not that from subtle comprehension of the situation they 
seek to stabilise it in this way. If, unluckily, having not understood the situation, 
they hold to their opinion, believing only that they are acting according to 
Heavenly principle and not out of human desire - so that at the very least one 
man suffers under the calamity of it, and possibly states and families and all 
under Heaven suffer under the calamity of it - as long as they believe that it has 
not issued from desire there is no way they can be awakened. Whenever one
371 Yuanshan, Chapter 3.
372 Shuzheng, Article 21.
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holds that principle resides in the heart, and that whatever does not issue from 
desire must issue from principle, one always takes one’s opinions to be principle 
and brings calamity on all under Heaven:373
Since it is only a matter of using feeling to assess feeling, with regard to 
one’s affairs it is not that the heart puts forth an opinion to deal with 
them. Were one to discard feeling and search for principle, this so-called 
principle would be nothing but an opinion. One cannot give free rein to 
one’s opinions without bringing disaster upon the people.374
Dai Zhen states unambiguously that li is the order of man’s feelings:
To understand people’s feeling in the world, to fulfil people’s desire in 
the world, and to evaluate their feeling and desire without being amiss is 
//.375
Interpreting li in terms of the order of man’s feelings and desire represents 
the major change in thinking found in the Shuzheng; when Dai Zhen wrote his Xu 
yan, he had not yet arrived at this view. On the basis of qi, he makes a distinction 
between the interpretation of li among men in ancient times and in the present in 
the following way:
When the ancients spoke of principle, they sought it according to human 
feelings and desires, and took causing them to be without flaw as 
principle. When moderns speak of principle, they seek it apart from
373 Qian Mu, Dai dongyuan, Quanji, vol. 7, pp. 506-507. See also Shuzheng, Article 43.
374 Ibid. Article 5.
375 Ibid. Article 43.
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human feelings and desires, and take causing them to be repressed 
and uncaring as principle. This distinction of principle and desire is 
suited to turning all men under Heaven into swindlers and frauds. How 
can words express its injuriousness?376
Dai Zhen noted that principle must base on the one’s concrete individual 
feeling and desire.377
As long as one is tranquil and not yet affected by things, one’s blood 
and breath and heart’s discernments are calm and without loss; thus 
(the text) says “heaven’s nature” . When one moves in response to 
things then desires spring forth from the nature, and one man’s desires 
are what all men similarly desire: thus it says “the nature’s desires” .
When, with one’s likings and dislikings already formed, one follows 
one’s own likings and dislikings to the neglect of those of others, often 
one cripples others in the indulgence of one’s own desires. To return to 
oneself is to consider how one would feel in response if another were 
indulging his desires. When feelings reach their proper level, this is the 
regulation of one’s likings and dislikings, and this is what it is to accord 
with heaven’s principle.
Moreover, since everything has its natural principle of existence, there 
should be no a priori imposition made on things -  an imposition that is our mind’s 
arbitrary interpretation of things. This, says Dai Zhen, is the reason why we need 
an open mind in order to understand the variety of li in a variety of things. Once 
we know the variety of li in a variety of things, we can obtain insights into the
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
171
nature of things of various kinds; and, on that basis, we can then make 
predictions and universal generalisations.378
The mind is capable of understanding moral principle. In Heaven’s ethereal 
transformation, production and reproduction are its natural order. Man and thing 
distinguish themselves in the process of ethereal transformation, during which 
each entity obtains its own nature (xing). Since man is given a pure nature that is 
enlightened, he is therefore able to comprehend a thing’s nature and Heaven; 
and if he practises what he knows to the extent of being faultless, he [may be 
said to] act in accordance with Heaven and Earth’s virtues.379
That the mind (xin) knows li naturally is one possibility; that the mind comes 
independently to know li through an investigation of things is another; the 
important point here is that both lead to the position of li. However, the Song 
Confucians put the subjective imposition of one’s opinions onto li. It is precisely 
this point that Dai Zhen was referring to when he said that the difficulty with the 
notion of li is that it cannot be conceived of in such an a priori and abstract way 
for settling disagreements concerning //, for the settlement of opinions concerning 
li will often rest with those who have the authority of prestige or power. Any 
argument on the basis of li will eventually lead to an argument by those in
378 Yuanshan, chapter 2.
379 Xu Yen, Article 2.
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authority, as is often seen in the case of Dai Zhen’s Neo-Confucian opponents 
those who justify their own vicious and intemperate acts in the name of //.380
Mencius says: What hearts affirm in common is principle and righteousness;381 
the sages only apprehended before me what my heart affirms in common [with 
others]. Pursuing his critique of [Gaozi’s] theory that righteousness is external, he 
says that principle and righteousness are the nature, not that the nature is 
principle and righteousness. The nature is that wherein blood, breath, and 
conscious knowing, rooted in yin, yang, and five modes, are in all cases 
discriminated and distinguished in humans and creatures. Principle and 
righteousness man’s conscious knowing penetrating when it thinks, and his 
capacity to be undeluded in what he does. When Mencius took the goodness of 
the nature as his Way, and in his articulations always cited Yao and Shun.382
Dai Zhen anticipates a possible objection to his view in light of the following 
statement by Mencius: “What the mind shares in common is called li and yi 
(principle and righteousness); it is the sage who acquires the knowledge of what 
the mind shares in common with every man”.383 The objection is to the idea that 
li can be localised in the mind. Although Dai Zhen agrees with this statement of 
Mencius’, he sees no reason to draw from it the conclusion that the mind is li or
380 Ibid. Chapter 2.
381 Mencius, 6A7.
382 Shuzheng, Article 21.
383 Mencius, 6A7.
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that li is the mind, as the Neo-Confucians of the Lu Xiangshan and Wang 
Yangming School appear to have done:384
From antiquity to the present, what may be said generally of the natures 
of humans and creatures is that they each differ in physical kind. 
Speaking specifically of [those possessed of\ blood and breath, they not 
only each differ in physical kind, but their consciousness is also 
different. Those humans differ from the birds and beasts by virtue of 
their possession of propriety and righteousness -  which is so because 
in truth human consciousness is very far from [that of other living] things 
-  [that] is what Mencius calls the goodness of the nature. But Xunzi, 
seeing propriety and righteousness as something that the knowing of 
the ordinary man cannot reach, ascribed it separately to the sage.385
Concerning the objectivity of l i  in concrete things and the rationality of the 
mind as being capable of knowing li, Dai Zhen believes that the mind is not 
separated from the life materials of which we are made. The mind and 
intelligence are only the subtle and refined parts of our natural existence. The 
activity of the mind -  thinking -  is the subtle and refined part of the mind. In all 
living things, according to Dai Zhen, there exist refined and subtle parts, refined 
and subtle to different degrees and on different levels. Even within the order of 
man there exists the difference between the intelligent and the obtuse. But this 
fact does not affect the objectivity of li. The mind knows l i  only in the light of 
learning and discerning. The more learning and investigation a mind receives, the 
more li it will discern in things. But to say so is not to confuse l i with the mind or 
with the nature of human beings, as the Neo-Confucians do. It is in this sense
384 Shuzheng, Article 21. In this article, Dai Zhen criticises the Neo-Confucians.
385 Ibid., Article 27.
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that Dai Zhen declares that desire and virtue come from the same root: the 
nature.386
In the Shuzheng, Dai Zhen compares moral growth to physical growth: just 
as blood and qi desire food and drink as nourishment for growth, the knowing 
mind desires learning to enlarge itself. When the body develops, it begins by 
being immature and small, but ends in wisdom. Growth is an extension and an 
expansion, but according to Dai Zhen, the Song thinkers had a different view of 
moral development.387
Cheng Hao says that “When sages and worthies discussed Heavenly virtue, 
they thought that each person is naturally complete and self sufficient”.388 
Although complete and self sufficient, when nature is actualised (or, as Zhu Xi put 
it, “when nature is implanted in g/1’389), it can become fettered and even 
destroyed. Cheng Yi calls this “turning one’s nature into feelings”.390 Thus, both 
Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi advocate learning -  learning purifies nature of its “sauce 
and salt”.391
386 Yuanshan, chapter 3.
387 Ibid. Article 14. See also Dai Zhen’s Letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, vol. 6.
388 Cheng Yi, Yishu, 1:1.
389 Zhuzi quanshu (Complete Writings of Master Zhu), 1714 edn, 43:3b.
390 Ercheng wenji {Collected literary writings of Cheng Yi), in ErCheng Quanshu, 4:1a.
391 Zhu Xi distinguished original nature from physical nature as follows: “Original nature is like 
water; physical nature is as though you have sprinkled some sauce and salt in it, and it then 
acquired a peculiar flavour. ” See Zhu-zi Quan-shu, 43:4a (trans. Wing-tsit Chan), A Source
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From Dai Zhen’s point of view, the Song Confucians had to distinguish 
principle and qi as two separate origins and then put the blame on physical form. 
Otherwise, it would be illogical to advocate learning. This is the same as saying 
that having received the Heavenly principle is no different from having none at all. 
The principle bestowed in the heart and mind is like the four thousand pecks of 
grain that a wealthy man has in his storehouse. He labours each day to obtain a 
peck of grain and then says, “What I’ve earned with effort, I already possess in 
my storehouse”.392
Dai Zhen’s theory of understanding follows from his concept of principle. Principle 
is that which has endured the test of time despite differences in historical 
circumstance and individual experience; it does not contradict Nature’s mode of 
operation and “can be laid before the spiritual beings without misgivings or fear”. 
What is necessary, therefore, refers to the principle “that cannot be altered no 
matter how far it reaches”. Dai Zhen says that when he speaks of principle, he 
has in mind “its extension” and he is not interested in knowing “its origin”.393
Dai Zhen believes that // is the balanced manifestation of individual life in 
both its rational and emotive dimensions in a society and a community. In this
Book in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 624.
392 Shuzheng, Article 14. For example, when Master Cheng Yi says, "be reverent to cure it and 
restore it as it was", he does not mention learning, and Master Zhu, in his discussion of 
Zhongyong’s (1.5) “extend the inner and harmonious,” seems to regard it as a matter of 
“cautious apprehension" and “inner watchfulness" see Zhu Xi, Zhong yong zhangju.
393 Shuzheng. Article 13. The first quotation comes from the Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 29.
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sense, li is derived from the vital nature of man: it is the disciplined and well- 
regulated expression of the feelings and needs of man. Li should not, and cannot, 
be separated from its function as the embodiment of universal needs and feelings 
if harmony and proper satisfaction of feelings and needs are to be obtained. Li 
must therefore be conceived as being consistent and coherent with its 
reasonable application. But the phrase “reasonable application of IF’ implies that li 
is to be found only in concrete life forms and activities, such as needs and 
feelings.394 In fact, li is the internal ordering and balancing of feelings and desires 
that contribute to or lead to the being of an individual in all his relationships with 
other individuals. As such, feelings and desires need to pass the test of universal 
agreement and universal application in order to be justified:395
The “common tendency" is something like the tendency to the perfection 
of humaneness and the fulfilment of righteousness, and “diverse paths” 
are something like individual distinctions of circumstance; the “single 
attainment” is something like the understanding of the heart’s 
discernment being fulfilled in sagely wisdom, and the "hundred 
considerations" are something like according with things to understand 
their norms.396
The test of universal agreement and universal application was criticised by Hu 
Shi as being misleading on the grounds that the individual who thinks of others’ 
feelings in terms of his own may project his own feelings into others.397 This is a
394 Yuanshan, Chapter 1.
395 Ibid. Article 39.
396 Shuzheng, Article 41.
397 Hu Shi, Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan, Quanji, p. 402.
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plausible criticism only when one fails to see the open texture of this test. Nothing 
can guarantee the absolute desirability of a certain feeling and action. But the 
continuous and consistent use of the test of universal agreement and universal 
application should gradually bring goodness to full realisation, because, over a 
period of time, one’s intelligence becomes refined and one’s understanding and 
experience increase. It is only in this context of learning, of a type that contains a 
vision of comprehensive goodness, that the test of universal agreement and of 
universal application can be seen to be the most rewarding and most appropriate 
method of establishing value-claims and, for that matter, the genuine value of 
morality or virtues.398
b. Decree and Capacity
Every creature is different and every man is also different according to his 
decree and capacity. Consequently, each creature has its own desires and 
feelings to fulfil and to express as part and parcel of its life. As such, Dai Zhen 
claimed that whatever issues from desire is always for the sake of life and 
nurture.399 It is according to decree and capacity that man has his physical body 
and all the senses, desires and feelings that make his life possible. It is through 
the individualising power of Dao that man can do his moral activities as a subject.
398 Ibid. p. 410. See also Yuanshan, Chapters 2 and 3, and Shuzheng, Articles 41-42.
399 Shuzheng, Article 10.
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To say the above, according to Dai Zhen, is not to ignore the distinction 
between men and things. Things have small endowments from Dao and remain 
things, whereas man takes great endowments from Dao and becomes a man as 
a result.400 All things in the world, including men, are created, individualised, and 
ordered by Dao, and, different as they are, they still possess something in 
common. As desires (yu) and perceptive abilities (jue) constitute parts of the 
nature of things, animal beings and men share the same desires and perceptive 
abilities:401
“Capacities” are what Mencius speaks of as “the capacities that Heaven 
bestows”:402 humans and the hundred creatures each according to its 
nature becoming form and substance, so that perception may thus 
discriminate and distinguish them. When the transformations of material 
force bring forth humans and creatures, in their limitation to what has 
been allotted they are spoken of as “decreed”; as to their becoming the 
original fundament of humans and creatures they are spoken of as 
"natures”; as physical embodiments they are spoken of as “capacities” . 
Because each nature is different, physical capacities also differ. 
Physical capacities are the manifestations of natures; without physical 
capacities, how could what are called “natures” be observed? If a man 
or thing is compared with an implement, his capacities are the 
implement’s material. Formed by allotment from yin and yang and the 
five modes, natures each differ, and material capacities thus differ 
accordingly. It is like smelting gold or tin: if one smelts gold to make an
400 Ibid. Chapter 2.
401 Ibid. Chapter 3.
402 Mencius, 6A7.
179
alloy, the implement is golden, and if one smelts tin to make the 
implement it is tin. Differences among particular things are like this.403
Dai Zhen analogises the endowments that different metals have as different 
natural qualities, and applies them to the class of things called men. Men have 
the same kinds of natural endowments from Dao, which forms their nature. 
Analytically speaking, man has nature, natural inclinations, and necessity, all 
three referring to the same reality:
When this nature is completed, it has these capacities. Speaking of it in 
its separate [aspects] it is “decreed” , it is “the nature” , and it is 
“capacities”; speaking of it as one, it is the nature [endowed by] Heaven 
[...] Thus Mencius says: form and appearance are the nature [endowed 
by] Heaven, but only a sage can fulfil the form.404 The natures of 
humans and creatures are not the same, and therefore the form and 
appearance of each is different. Although the organs and functions of 
the human form far surpass those of creatures, if with regard to the way 
of man one it is unable to be without fault, one does not fulfil this form, 
just as when one articulates something in words that one’s actions do 
not reach, one does not fulfil these words. “Fulfilling the form”, means 
the same as “realising the nature” or “realising one’s capacities” .405
Decree has two manners of describing the actual and the ideal -  the factual 
and the potential or the ethical and metaphysical -  aspects of man and Heaven. 
Dai Zhen distinguishes between the natural and the necessary. The mind, 
intelligence, capacities and performing virtues are what are naturally inherent in
403 Shuzheng, Article 29.
404 Mencius, 7A38.
405 Ibid.
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man. Further, it is natural that man should have his individual human qualities.
But whether man fulfils his capacities to the utmost is a matter of individual 
development and cultivation.406 If man is to conform to the metaphysical virtues 
of Dao, it is necessary that he develop his nature and capacities to the utmost; 
and if man develops his nature and capacities without omission, he is said to 
realise the virtue of Heaven and Earth, which is also the virtue of man. Dai Zhen 
calls this the virtue of man -  a result of the development of human nature in 
conformity with the activities of Heaven and Earth -  //. In this sense, li is again not 
an abstraction, a principle, to be grasped, as is the case in the Neo-Confucian 
practice of eliminating one’s desire 407
The individualising power of Dao can therefore be called the power that 
gives both nature and decree to things and, hence, the power that lays down the 
natural qualities of things for the things themselves and for their relationship with 
other things:408
Because the desires are rooted in the blood and breath they are spoken 
of as “the nature”; but there are limits [pertaining to them] which may not 
be exceeded by benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom,
[which] is not the same in all men and is limited by the initial [conditions 
of one's] life, and is described as "decreed”; but that all may broaden 
and fulfil [this excellence] is man’s nature.409
406 Chungying Cheng, 1971, pp. 40-41.
407 See, Shuzheng, Article, 16-28.
408 Shuzheng, Article 20.
409 Ibid. Article 28.
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It is suggested that what broadens and fulfils this excellence is man’s nature. 
As we seen above, principle is the extension of human nature and moral virtue is 
the fulfilling of it. And thus:
The gentleman does not make an excuse of the nature to indulge his 
desires, and does not make an excuse of the limitations of what has 
been decreed and so not fulfil his capacities. The later Confucians did 
not carefully examine the literal meaning, and missed the point of the 
articulation that Mencius established. “Does not say ‘[It is] nature”’
(buwei xing) is not the same as "does not regard it as the nature” (buwei 
zhi xing)\ “does not say [it is] decreed” (buwei ming) is not the same as 
“does not regard it as decreed" (buweizhi ming). Articulating it from this, 
when Mencius speaks of "the nature” it is precisely “the mouth’s [desire 
for] tastes, the eye’s [desire for] colours, the nose's [desire for] odours, 
and the four limbs’ [desire for] ease and rest” that are the nature; when 
he says “there are no men who lack a tendency to goodness” it is 
precisely their ability to know the limits [of these desires] and not exceed 
them that is good, and it is the ability of the blood and breath and 
conscious knowing to be grounded in what is without fault that is good; 
and when he speaks of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and 
wisdom it is precisely to designate that blood and breath and conscious 
knowing, which originate in Heaven and Earth’s virtues.410
Further more, Dai Zhen raised an interesting point in his discussion of 
human nature. He observed that, “in common speech, from ancient times to the 
present, when we want to condemn someone who is stupid, we do so by saying 
emphatically that ‘he does not have human nature (renx/ngf),411 ’ but in the case of 
a person who still has some evidence of goodness, we say that ‘he still has some
410 ibid.
411 The two classical phrases with which the colloquial expressions on "having” or “lacking” 
human nature are paired are both taken from Mencius' “Ox Mountain parable" Mencius 6A8.
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human nature.’ Human nature, therefore, has been equated with goodness”.412 
His remarks imply that Mencius acquired his ideas regarding human nature from 
this common figure of speech. A person devoid of goodness, in Mencius' words, 
"is one who, in the eyes of others, resembles an animal” 413 According to Dai 
Zhen, goodness is merely the characteristic of being a natural human; it is not a 
holy entity or perfect principle that is something supernal and beyond human 
reach414
There are different degrees of goodness, which explains Confucius' remark 
that “by nature men are nearly alike” 415 Dai Zhen likes to describe the gradation 
as shades, measuring goodness in terms of light and darkness. Confucius uses 
the words “wisdom” and “stupidity” to indicate that the differences in the human 
nature of different people are a matter of degree; “wisdom” and “stupidity” do not 
suggest an antithetical relationship in the way that “goodness” and “badness” do. 
When Confucius says that human natures are alike416 he means that they are 
alike in being good but differ in the degree of their goodness. All human beings 
are capable of the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and 
compliance, and a sense of right and wrong. These feelings did not originate from 
an external source; Heaven did not confer goodness on man. Human beings are 
good because they are living beings of blood and qi, and their knowing minds
412 Ibid. Article 23.
413 Mencius, 6A: 8.
414 Shuzheng, Article 23.
415 Confucius, Analects, 17A.2.
416 Ibid.
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have the potential to develop their native endowments to the full. Goodness is not 
the same in everyone because it cannot be ascribed to an unchanging, universal 
principle; as a function of the particular, its expression is idiosyncratic.417
Dai Zhen wrote:
What constitutes a man is his entire composition. If we leave out of this 
composition his physical endowment and physical body, what does he 
have left to be called a man? When Mencius said, "man by nature is 
good” , he had in mind his entire composition, whereas Cheng Yi and 
Zhu Xi talked about nature in abstract terms, as an entity whose original 
substance is distinct from what is human 418
c. Nature and necessity
Dai Zhen regards goodness and nature as overlapping, although nature 
refers to concrete things, developments and goodness, to the balanced and 
perfect development of natural things. When a thing is called good, that thing 
must be in accord with the nature of Heaven and Earth. Different things may have 
different natures, but their goodness is always one not two. In light of these 
explanations, the significance of Dai Zhen’s assertion in the following should 
stand out immediately:
417 Shuzheng, Article 27.
418 Ibid.
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Goodness is what [something] must be, and [its] nature is what it 
spontaneously is. In merging with what it must be it completes what it 
spontaneously is; thus spontaneity’s furthest reach, and the Ways of 
Heaven and Earth and of humans and creatures are fulfilled in it. With 
regard to Heaven and earth, [spontaneity and necessity] are not 
articulated separately, but with regard to humans and creatures their 
separate articulation becomes clear.419
It is common sense that the facts cannot produce the value; however, Dai 
Zhen claimed that these two aspects of “what something must be” it and “what it 
is” must be merging. He explains how to extract moral values from the facts.
Dai’s proposition is based on the human nature that is a direct emanation of the 
Dao and, it is claimed, the heart of the Dao. It is said that one of the aims of Dai’s 
strong monistic philosophy is to unify the fact with value. Within this point is an 
attack on Neo-Confucianism, since the Neo-Confucians, when explaining 
material fact and metaphysical moral value, divide nature into two.420
Thus the extension of human nature from nature to necessity denotes the 
development from physical fact to moral value; and in Dai Zhen’s moral 
philosophy, the extension of human nature leads to the way to become a sage. 
However, as G.E. Moore indicated, this may be merely another naturalistic fallacy 
that is to be avoided 421 Nevertheless, it is suggested that there as a certain 
degree of validity and worth in Dai’s premise and definitions of nature as 
goodness, because it denotes a creative and active form of “what it is” itself is
419 Shuzheng, Article 32.
420 Ibid.
421 For G.E. Moor, see Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1989).
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“what should do”. Because Dai Zhen thought all creatures emanate from Dao, 
and it is through the individualising power of Dao that every creature has its 
capacity and its own desires and feelings.422
Thus Dai Zhen says:
Something that develops naturally is known as in accord (shun)\ 
something that develops from moral necessity is known as constant 
{chang); something that develops intrinsically is known as virtue (de). All 
the Dao under Heaven are ultimately in accord; all the teachings under 
Heaven unify in [undeviating] constancy; and, under Heaven everyone’s 
nature is similar in virtue. [...] A being, which has blood, breath, and 
consciousness, has desires. Since a person’s nature is manifested in 
desires, he would therefore exhibit a love for and an aversion to certain 
sounds, colours, and odours; and, since he has desires he therefore has 
feelings. Since a person’s nature is manifested in his feelings, he 
therefore exhibits joy, anger, sorrow, and jubilation, all of which are 
divided into the two aspects of Capacity and natural expression (shu) 
among these feelings.423
Like water seeking low ground 424 human nature has inclinations. All eyes 
prefer beautiful colours, all ears pleasant sounds, and all mouths tasty food. 
Inclinations are desires, and they are not limited to our physical senses. We are
422 Shuzheng. Chapter 1.
423 Yuanshan Chapter 2.
424 Memcius, 1A6.
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born also with an appreciation of righteousness and principle -  we have an 
inborn moral sense that takes man from nature to necessity.425
According to Dai Zhen, the five human relationships are referred to in the 
Doctrine of the Mean as the Way of Man (rendao), because man cannot act 
outside the context of these relationships. These five human relationships, on the 
one hand, depend for their existence on the nature of man and the nature of Dao; 
on the other hand, they must prescribe how human beings should act and live in 
the context of these relationships. It is in terms of these prescriptions that the 
nature of man is defined; and it is by following these prescriptions that the nature 
of man will be developed 420
According to Mencius, these prescriptions are as follows: between father 
and son, there must be affection (qin); between ruler and subject, there must be 
righteousness (yi); between husband and wife, there must be differentiation (bie); 
between the elder and younger brothers, there must be orderliness (xu); between 
friend and friend, there must be truthfulness (xin). Affection, righteousness, 
distinction, orderliness, and truthfulness are all the virtues that man is capable of 
attaining.427 They are natural to humans, but that man should develop and
425 Shuzheng Article 29-32.
426 Shuzheng, Article 33.
427 Mencius, 3A 4.
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cherish these virtues is a moral requirement and necessity that is rooted in the 
nature of man and in the nature of Dao:428
Man’s blood and breath and conscious knowing originate in the 
transformations of Heaven and Earth. Once there is blood and breath, 
what supplies and nourishes one’s blood and breath are sounds, 
colours, odours, and tastes. Once there is conscious knowing, one 
knows [the relationship between] father and son. [The relationship 
between] elder and younger brother, [the relationship between] husband 
and wife, and not stopping with the intimacy of a single household one 
also knows [the relationship between] ruler and subject and [the 
relationship between] friend and friend. When these five relationships 
mutually sustain and regulate each other, one responds appropriately to 
each stimulus with pleasure, anger, sorrow, or delight. When the desires 
of sound, sound, sight, odour and taste are united with the feelings of 
pleasure, anger, sorrow, and delight, the Way of man is complete.429
Dai Zhen formulated Classical Confucian ethics in terms of his doctrine of 
nature, which is natural, and goodness, which is necessary or obligatory. All the 
precepts that should govern the five basic human relationships are the bases for 
the cardinal virtues430 -  benevolence, propriety and righteousness -  which are
428 Ibid. Article 36.
429 Ibid. Article 28.
430 Ibid. Dai Zhen explains the cardinal value to be genuineness: Dai Zhen said that
when one is entirely wise, humane, and courageous, and one’s practice of these virtues in the 
daily functioning of human relationships is such that all under heaven see the benevolence and 
see the propriety and righteousness of these relationships, and there is nothing to add in the 
way of excellence, this is to understand through genuineness. When one learns in order to 
explain and clarify the daily functioning of human relationships, and seeks to fulfil benevolence 
and to fulfil propriety and righteousness, and the extent of one’s wisdom, benevolence, and 
courage thus daily increases until it reaches the abundance of a sage’s virtue, this is to become
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described above and which represent the development and fulfilment of human 
nature and the nature of Dao in perfect and balanced form.
If one penetrates to the furthest refined incipiencies of the daily 
functioning of human relationships, it is spoken of as “benevolence” , as 
“righteousness” , and as “propriety” , and if one unites these three to 
judge the affairs of the world, it is like a weighted steelyard in relation to 
the heavy and the light, if with regard to benevolence; in Heaven what 
makes for orderliness in the successive transformations of material 
force, and in man what makes for the unconfused penetration of this 
orderliness by his heart’s knowing, is the virtue of wisdom.
Dai Zhen claimed that all the value of virtue comes from the activity of Dao 
and the moral virtue of accordance with it Virtue is therefore a product of man’s 
“producing and sustaining”, in other words a product of desire and feeling.
Only virtue of orderliness is producing and sustaining [the myriad 
creatures], and if the orderliness is lost the Way of producing and 
sustaining is cut off. Paired bi-names such as “benevolence and 
righteousness’’ and “wisdom and benevolence” all link producing and 
sustaining with orderliness and articulate them jointly.431
Virtues all pertain to the preservation of human society and the 
development of individual natures in their social context. That is why benevolence 
is the virtue of preserving life among men and of developing individual natures in 
the context of man, and also why benevolence is considered the most basic
genuine through understanding.
431 Ibid. Article 36.
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virtue. Every imperfection regarding the practice of other virtues can be traced to 
an imperfection in the practice of benevolence. Propriety and righteousness are 
the most conspicuous and concrete results of practising benevolence. They are 
all based on the patterning and ordering activities of Dao, just as benevolence is 
based on the creative activity of Dao. Since the patterning and ordering activities 
of Dao are at the same time the creative activity of Dao, a man of true 
benevolence is at the same time a man of propriety and righteousness. Dai Zhen 
thus sees an organic interrelationship among all the fundamental virtues in the 
Analects of Confucius:432
Dai Zhen explained it augments benevolence and righteousness with 
propriety, as that by which benevolence is perfected and righteousness is fulfilled. 
One speaks of the flourishing of virtue as complete in wisdom and benevolence 
alone, but when the Zhongyong denoted; wisdom, benevolence, and courage -  
these three are the world’s universal virtue 433 It augments wisdom and 
benevolence with courage, as that by which virtue is realized 434
From blood, breath, and conscious knowing one speaks of wisdom, 
benevolence, and courage: it is not that apart from blood, breath, and 
conscious knowing there is a separate “wisdom”, “benevolence”, or 
“courage” to be conferred on them. With regard to the daily functioning 
of human relationships one speaks of benevolence and of propriety and 
righteousness: were it not for the daily functioning of human
432 Ibid.
433 Zhongyong, 20.8.
434 Shuzheng, Article 36.
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relationships there would be no “benevolence", no “righteousness” , and 
no "propriety” .435
Thus he said:
Articulated with regard to its fulfilment, the Way has nothing greater than 
benevolence, together with righteousness and together with propriety; 
articulated with regard to what is able to fulfil it, the Way is nothing 
greater than wisdom, together with benevolence and together with 
courage. In the three [attributes of] benevolence, righteousness, and 
propriety, goodness is complete; and although the excellences of the 
virtuous nature cannot be numbered, in the three [attributes of] wisdom, 
benevolence, and courage, virtue is complete. It is the full actuality of 
goodness and virtue that is meant by genuineness436
Dai Zhen, consistent with his reconstruction of Classical Confucianism, 
holds that not only are virtues a natural basic element in man but that they also 
are part of daily human relationships; for it is in the context of daily life and human 
relationships that man discovers virtues such as benevolence, propriety and 
righteousness. Since any given basic human relationship presupposes, and gives 
rise to, all other human relationships, it can be shown that each of the basic 
virtues also presupposes and gives rise to other virtues. There is another reason 
for the interrelation of virtues. Dai Zhen claimed that all virtues are nothing but the 
Way of man in his creative activity, which he defined as goodness.
435 Ibid. Article 38.
436 Ibid.
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Benevolence is the virtue of producing and sustaining. The common 
people are contented. For daily they have their drink and food: it is in 
just this that the way of man is produced and sustained. When one man 
fulfils his life, and extends this so that he fulfils it in common with the 
entire world, it is benevolence. The articulation of benevolence may 
encompass righteousness: if one’s cherishing and love [of intimates], 
recognition [of elders], and nourishing [of the young] do not accord with 
correct and magnanimous sentiment, then righteousness is [in that 
measure] not fulfilled, and benevolence also is [in that measure] not 
perfected. The articulation of benevolence may encompass propriety: if 
there are no distinctions of close and distant or of above and below, 
then propriety is lost and benevolence is also not attained. The Yi says: 
establish the Way of man as benevolence and righteousness.437
d. The Ethics of the Way
Dao is described as having a metaphysical value and an ethical value, 
because the creative activities of Dao are none other than the ethical value of 
human nature, which is equated with goodness. The foremost metaphysical 
value of Dao is benevolence, but there are two more cardinal values to be 
followed according to the function of Dao, namely propriety and righteousness. 
Only human intellect can fully understand of the virtues of Dao. According to 
Dai’s definition of nature and moral value, there is value in unifying natural fact 
and moral value, and the completion of this process of the goodness of Dao is in 
fact man’s task. The man who completes this task is a sage.
437 Ibid. Article 36.
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According to Dai Zhen, the Neo-Confucians often identify Dao with //', calling 
it Heavenly principle (tianli), and contrast this with qizhi, and as both are related 
to Dao, there should be no more disparaging of the natural functions of desires 
and feelings in man. What should really concern man is how to fulfil his desires 
without trespassing against the mean and the balance of the universal creative 
activities of Dao:438
Later Confucian accounts of the Way are largely derived from this. Master Zhu 
says: yin and yang are material force and “subsequent to form”; that by which it is 
“one yin/one yang" is principle and “antecedent to form” . Principle is what is 
meant by the Way 439 Master Cheng and Mater Zhu saw that that it would not do 
for the ordinary man to give free rein to the spontaneity of his blood and breath 
and conscious knowing, but that [he could] advance by means of the necessity of 
Principle. The spontaneity of blood and breath and conscious knowing they called 
the physical temperament, and the necessity of Principle they called the nature. 
They also united blood and breath with conscious knowing as one root, and then 
added another root.440
There are two observations to be made here concerning Dai Zhen’s view of 
the relationship between man and Dao 441
438 Shuzheng, Articles 16-19.
439 Ibid. Article 17.
440 Ibid. Article 15.
441 Chungying Cheng (1971), pp. 35-37.
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Firstly, Dai Zhen opposes the separation of the natural inclinations of man 
from his nature. Man, besides having desires and feelings, has intelligence and 
the capacity to know things. But intelligence and desires and feelings are all 
natural inclinations.
Whatever has life is not separated from Heaven and Earth’s 
transformations of material force. The ceaseless movements of yin and 
yang and the five modes are Heaven and Earth’s transformations of 
material force, and the life [...] of humans and creatures [is] rooted in 
this. [But] because of inequalities of allotment, completed natures are 
each different.442
In pointing out that nature is not separate from natural inclinations and that 
human nature is not separate from human inclinations, Dai Zhen recognises that 
the inclinations of man differ from those of things in having a special natural 
inclination towards the principle of reason and righteousness (liyi), just as the 
ears have a special natural inclination towards pleasant sounds, and eyes 
towards luxuriant colours.
That human beings have a mind and intelligence in their natural inclinations 
differentiates man from things. That in the mind and intelligence man has a 
natural inclination towards the principles of reason and righteousness indicates 
man’s capacity for developing into a sage, because the mind and intelligence are 
faculties that enable him to comprehend principles or reason and righteousness, 
to see what is appropriate for action in a situation. They are therefore most subtle
442 Ibid. Article 21.
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and sensitive. When they are fully developed, they are capable of a moral 
deliberation that makes man free and capable of participating in the activities of 
Dao. In fact, both the mind and intelligence and their natural inclinations toward 
the principles of reason and righteousness are natural endowments of man. This 
is the reason why man can be said to be naturally good. Goodness in human 
nature is not something abstract, but is formed from these natural endowments of 
man:443
Those who from birth are incorrigibly stupid, and who are difficult to 
speak with about principle and righteousness, do not change because 
they cut themselves off from learning. But if [such a one] fears authority 
or cherishes favours, it often happens that on suddenly encountering 
one whom he fears or cherishes his heart is opened and he awakens 
from his stupor. If he then repents and follows the good he is no [longer] 
incorrigibly stupid, and if he applies himself to learning he will daily 
advance towards wisdom. When one decides that [someone’s] not 
changing is incorrigible stupidity, often it is on account of his knowing 
the good and not doing it, or knowing what is not good and doing it; thus 
it is said that [such people] “do not change” , not that they “cannot 
change” . Although from antiquity to the present the incorrigibly stupid 
have not been lacking and their germinal intelligence is almost the same 
as an animal’s, their irreducible difference from animals is that there Is 
none who cannot change.444
Secondly, in his On Goodness, Dai Zhen strongly emphasises that the 
mind, intelligence and the perceptive capacities are comprehended in natural 
inclinations. All our perceptual and emotional activities, to the extent that they
443 See Yuanshan, Chapters 1, 2.
444 Shuzheng, Article 22.
195
follow their natural bent without trespassing against universal harmony, are the 
Way of Heaven. There is no reason, therefore, to discriminate against them, 
because there is no basis on which to make an absolute dichotomy of the mind 
on the one hand and intelligence on the other, in terms of their source or origin:
To speak [of someone’s action] from the viewpoint of the Heavenly Way, 
that leaves nothing regrettable, is known as Heavenly virtue; to speak 
[of someone’s action] from the viewpoint of his nature’s desires, in which 
no failing can be detected, is known as nature’s virtue. The desires of 
[man’s] nature come from naturalness. Nature’s virtue is to be cultivated 
eventually to the extent of being morally necessary and thus fulfils the 
proper development of what is natural [in man]. And this is known as the 
full development of the natural. If one knows what is natural, he 
understands Heaven and Earth’s transformation; and if one knows what 
is morally necessary, he understands Heaven and Earth’s virtue.445
Dai Zhen argues that Dao determines nature, and that the individual natures 
of things and men are describable in terms of their vital forces and their refined 
existence ~ the mind and intelligence. He regarded these vital forces and refined 
existence as the substance of individual nature, whereas he regarded the yin and 
yang and the five agencies as the substance of Dao, even though it should be 
noted that the substance of individual nature is no more than the individualising 
distribution of the substance of Dao. In order to combine this individualising 
function of Dao with its creative and ordering functions, the sense in which Dai 
Zhen spoke of goodness should be noted:
445 ibid.
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Goodness is the great thing shared in common by all things in the world.
Dao gives rise to everything; Dao individualises everything as 
everything; and, finally, Dao orders and harmonises everything with 
everything else -  all these are connoted in the use of the term 
“goodness” . [...] Goodness is used to mean what is inherent in man 
[and things]. That which man has and acts upon is due to his nature and 
in turn forms their basis. The so-called goodness Is nothing other than 
the formation and transformation of Heaven and Earth and the function 
and capacities of nature. To know these should enable us to know 
goodness.446
The creative activity of Dao is said by Dai Zhen to be a virtue of 
benevolence. But since the creative activity of Dao is also an ordering activity, the 
ordering of things by Dao also reveals the fundamental virtues of Dao. Thus, Dai 
Zhen said:
The very order of things produced by the ordering activity of Dao is a 
virtue of propriety; and the very distinction drawn by Dao in its ordering 
activity is ultimately a virtue of righteousness.447
In this metaphysical usage, benevolence, propriety and righteousness are 
taken to be metaphysical characteristics of Dao; and they denote respectively 
those natural powers of being creative, order, giving, and individuation of the Dao. 
The reason why Dai Zhen used ethical terms to describe the activities of Dao is 
that he believed that it is within the function and structure of universal principle 
that man acts and things operate.
446 Dai Zhen, Du Yixi cilunxing, Quanji, vol. 6, p. 348. See the opening sentence of the 
Yuanshan. Quanji, vol. 6, p. 2.
447 Yuanshan, Chapter 1.
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Dai Zhen’s argument may be explained as follows: if man participates in 
Dao and is not separated from it, the realisation of ethical virtues can certainly be 
regarded as the realisation of the virtues of Dao. Therefore, by implication, the 
ethical virtues certainly belong to the true nature of Dao. In fact, Confucius and 
Mencius said that only man could realise, make explicit, and expand the Dao. Dai 
Zhen elaborated this doctrine by formulating the regularity of Heaven and Earth in 
terms of the three metaphysical virtues: benevolence, propriety and 
righteousness:448
“Nature” and “Way” are terms which refer to the substance and actuality 
[of something]; “benevolence” , “propriety” , and “righteousness” are 
terms which praise its purity and correctness. The human Way is rooted 
in natures, and natures originate in the Way of Heaven449
According to Dai Zhen, the three metaphysical virtues constitute the basis of 
the goodness of Dao of Heaven and Earth -  metaphysical virtues that are not 
separated from the ethical virtues, just as Heaven and Earth are not separated 
from man. In man are seen the activities and potential of Heaven and Earth; 
because human is the heart of Heaven and Earth, the true virtues and powers of 
Heaven and Earth lie in ethical virtue. At the same time, the metaphysical virtues 
of Heaven and Earth are the root of human value and virtue; hence, man should 
realise and conform to human nature through realisation of and compliance with 
the metaphysical virtues of Heaven and Earth 450 The Book of Changes
448 Ibid.
449 Shuzheng, Article 32.
450 Ibid. Article 24.
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maintains that "Heaven and Earth are completed by the anticipation of human 
moral activities”, (or, in other words, “man can be the third part of Heaven and 
Earth” ). Therefore there is only one nature, but it has two aspects, the 
metaphysical and the ethical.
That [Confucius] mentions only wisdom and not benevolence or 
propriety and righteousness [is due to the fact that] wisdom, with regard 
to heaven and earth, men and things, and affairs and actions, is entirely 
sufficient to know their unchanging norms; if benevolence were not 
perfected and propriety and righteousness not fully realised, could one 
speak of unchanging norms? The one who disclosed and clarified the 
Way of Confucius was Mencius. There is no difference.451
One aspect of the nature of man is his intellect, by which he can 
comprehend the complete capacities of Heaven and Earth. That is, as Dai Zhen 
saw it in the genuine spirit of Confucianism based on the Six Canons, man in his 
complete nature partakes of every power and quality of Dao and is therefore not 
separated from Dao. Man is rather a plenum of Dao, though only in potential 
form. Nothing is deficient in him, though it is true that individual men may differ in 
their nature in terms of degrees of crudeness and refinedness or, as Dai 
described it in terms of the gradation as shades, in degrees of light and darkness. 
However, human beings are good because they are living beings of blood and 
breath that emanate from Dao that is defined as “goodness”, and their knowing 
minds having the potential to develop their native endowments to the full. 
Goodness is not the same in everyone because, of necessity,452 it cannot be
451 ibid.
452 Shuzheng, Articles 32-35.
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ascribed to an unchanging, universal principle.453 Man is capable of 
comprehending the metaphysical and ethical value of Dao because he has a 
mind and intelligence that are determined by Dao, and because he is the heart of 
Dao. Therefore he is capable of realising all the virtue of Dao because the 
realising and procession of Dao is merely a fulfilment of his own nature:454
In general, if a man can make sure that what issues from himself is 
always loyal, treats others with consideration, and conducts his affairs 
like this, even though he may have faults and errors they will be few.
Anyone who has not yet become a sage cannot yet be spoken of as 
humane or be without regret with regard to propriety and righteousness; 
but if what one’s character has attained and what one’s heart’s 
discernment has understood can be called loyal and considerate, it is 
almost the same. The sage is humane and wise, what is manifest in his 
conduct of affairs is entirely humane and entirely proper and righteous, 
and loyalty and consideration are inadequate to define him; yet the 
ultimate perfection of loyalty and consideration is nothing other than 
this.455
For Dai Zhen, the important point of Mencius’ statement lies in the phrase 
“to share in common". The mind is not denied the function or ability to discern li, 
because the mind can be mistaken in its discernment and universal application. If 
what the mind finds li not to be universally applicable or agreeable, then that so- 
called // is merely opinion. We should not justify the objectivity of li simply in terms 
of the functioning of the mind, i.e. its activities of judging and discerning. The
453 Shuzheng, Article 27.
454 Yuanshan, Chapter 2.
455 Shuzheng, Article 41.
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mind can know //, and it can judge the rightness or wrongness of a representation 
of li. But only when the true knowledge of li is ascertained can li be considered as 
yi:
What the yi, the Analects, and Mencius say of the nature is all said 
according to its allotment from yin and yang and the five modes to 
become the nature; once [the nature] is formed then humans and 
hundreds of creatures each differ, being limited to their allotment as 
partial or complete, thick or thin, clear or turbid, muddled or intelligent.
To speak of it only as “life" is to assimilate humans with dogs and oxen 
and not see their differences.456
Yi and li can therefore be known only by a conscious mind; thus it is 
important that we should keep unhampered the mind’s faculties of distinguishing 
and judging. Only then will there be no beclouding of our conception of things and 
no ambiguities or prejudices in our understanding of things:
Dai Zhen says:
Those with the highest understanding are sages. [...] The sages acquire 
complete and exhaustive understanding of things and their knowledge 
knows no limit. [...] In order to seek the enlightenment of the mind, one 
must pursue learning.457
The sage is a man of compassion and insight. He bases his actions on 
feelings but weighs all things impartially so that what he grasps is "what all
456 Ibid. Article 21.
457 Xuyan, Article 1.
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human minds agree upon”. In Dai Zhen’s view, Mencius’ employment of the two 
words “principle” and “righteousness”458 should be understood precisely as 
referring to the making of distinctions and the making of judgments. And when 
Mencius described Confucius' teaching as complete and correct, he meant that 
Confucius was able to initiate an “order” (tiaoli) of things and to carry it to 
completion 459 Dai Zhen says:
What is grasped as constant is a “norm”; what is entirely in accord with its 
articulations is “principle”; what is actualised in speech and conduct is “excellent 
virtue”. A “thing” is an affair (or undertaking), meaning something that does not 
depart from the eating and drinking of daily life. If one casts this aside to speak of 
principle, it is not what the ancient worthies and sages meant by principle460
On the other hand, what all hearts and minds possess is “an appreciation of 
moral principles”, but not the principles themselves. For Dai Zhen there is an 
important distinction here: a person can act out of good intent and still fail 
miserably in what he tries to do because he is not born with a set of moral 
principles to guide him - the heart and mind know spontaneously what is good 
and desires it without thought, but without fine discernment and accurate 
assessment there cannot be correct action 461
458 Mencius, 6A7.
459 Shuzheng, Article 4 and Article 1.
460 Ibid. Article 15.
461 Ibid. Article 6-8.
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“Mencius used what was known to prove what was not known. He 
attributed the desire to hear, see, smell, and taste to the ear, eye, nose, 
and mouth, and the appreciation of moral principles to the heart and 
mind. All these desires and preferences are within the bounds [of one's 
natural tendencies] and are not outside them".462
What is natural is complex but has discernible order; its internal texture is 
subtle, but the human mind has the power to comprehend it. For Dai Zhen it is 
necessary to exercise this power to the full, because when proper differentiation 
is made, there will be order without confusion.463
The mind and intelligence are the capacities for comprehending these 
virtues. Moreover, as the mind itself contains the very virtue of benevolence, it is 
extremely sensitive, empathically energetic, and highly creative. Thus, when the 
mind is rightly exposed, it will develop what is inherent in it and regulate every 
desire and feeling and act of man, from its natural state of tranquillity to its natural 
state of harmony. All the desires of the body are benevolence (ren) when fulfilled 
in accordance with the regulations of the mind, and are therefore creative and 
beneficial. The ultimate goal of man is to attain the supreme goodness that is 
described in terms of the three virtues of benevolence, propriety and 
righteousness. To attain this is to understand the virtues and to practise them:464
This is what Zhongyong articulates as: to cultivate the Way is 
instruction. ... Heaven -and earth’s transformations of material force
462 Ibid. Article 7.
463 Ibid. Article 1-3.
464 Yuanshan, Chapter 3.
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flow forth without end, ceaselessly bringing forth. ...The great virtue of 
Heaven and Earth is to bring forth. Thus, when one speaks of the Way 
with regard to Heaven and earth, one need only refer to its substance 
and actuality, and the Way appears of itself: ... man’s conscious 
knowing may be clear on dim; when it is clear there is no loss, but when 
it is dim there is confusion and error. Thus, when one speaks of the Way 
with regard to man, the daily functioning of human relationships is all the 
actuality of the Way: what accords with natures is the Way, and 
cultivates one’s person with the Way, and the world’s far-extending Way 
is five-fold [if all have] this [meaning]. [But] what is thus designated as 
the Way cannot but be cultivated: cultivating the Way with benevolence 
and the Sage’s cultivation of it as instruction [both signify] this.. Its purity 
and correctness are what is meant by establishing the Way of man as 
benevolence and righteousness, and by taking the “regular” as [the 
world’s] "far-extending Way” , when the “regular” is taken as a “far- 
extending Way” , purity and correctness are extended as a standard for 
the world.465
The question arises of how the three virtues of benevolence, propriety and 
righteousness can actually be understood and practised by man. To answer this, 
Dai Zhen introduces the Confucian virtues as being the consequence of the effort 
to understand and practise the metaphysical virtues or the goodness of Dao:
“Goodness” is the term that praises the purity and correctness [of 
something]; "nature” is a term that refers to its substance and actuality.
When something is good it is united with heaven; although formed 
natures differ, their goodness is one. Goodness is what [something] 
must be, and [its] nature is what it spontaneously is. In merging with 
what it must be it completes what it spontaneously is; this spontaneity’s 
furthest reach, and the Ways of Heaven and earth and of humans and 
creatures are fulfilled in it. With regard to Heaven and earth [spontaneity
465 Shuzheng, Article 32.
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and necessity] are not articulated separately, but with regard to humans 
and creatures their separate articulation becomes clear. The Yi also 
says:466 when the humane see it they call it benevolence, and when the 
wise see it they call it wisdom; the common people practise it daily but 
do not know. Thus the Way of the superior man is rare.467
He pointed out that one may approximate benevolence by understanding 
and practising faithfulness or trusthfulness to oneself (zhong); that one may 
approximate propriety by understanding and practising integrity or truthfulness to 
others (xin)\ that one may approximate righteousness by understanding and 
practising empathy and compassion or reciprocity (s/?tv):468 These three moral 
values are different expression of benevolence by situations man faced.
“What you don’t want” and “what you hate” are no more than the 
ordinary feelings of men; they do not speak of principle, yet principle is 
fully realised in this. Since it is only a matter of using feeling to assess 
feeling, with regard to one’s affairs it is not that the heart puts forth an 
opinion to deal with them. Were one to discard feeling and search for 
principle, this so-called principle would be nothing but an opinion. One 
cannot give free rein to one’s opinions without bringing disaster upon 
the people.469
466 Yi, Xici, 1.5.
467 Shuzheng, Article 32.
468 Translated by Graham as “Likening to oneself: A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (Illinois: 
La Salle, 1989), pp. 20-21.
469 Shuzheng, Article 5.
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He further defined these approximate virtues: to fulfil one’s capabilities is 
truthfulness to oneself; to fulfil one’s understanding is truthfulness to others; to be 
fair in one’s giving is compassion:
Now let us suppose that the man who gives free rein to his opinions will 
err, but that the man who seeks out his own feelings will find them.
When Zi Gong asked: “Is there a single doctrine that may serve as a 
rule of practice for all one’s life?” The Master said: “Wouldn’t it be 
reciprocity? What you don’t want for yourself, don’t inflict on another”.470 
The Great Learning, in explaining [how to] govern the state [and so] 
bring tranquillity to the empire, says only: do not use what you hate in 
those above in your treatment of those below, or what you hate in those 
below in your service of those above, to explain [the principles 
governing] high and low position; do not use what you hate in those 
before in your precedence of those behind, or what you hate in those 
behind in your following of those before; to explain [the principles 
governing] elders and juniors; do not use what you hate in those on the 
right in your relations with those on the left, or what you hate in those on 
the left in your relations with those on the right, to explain [the principles 
governing] relations of equal rank 471
The remaining two virtues, sincerity (cheng) and moral deliberation or 
assessment (quan), though not appearing prominently in the Analects, receive
470 Analects, 15.24. See also 15.3, in which Confucius asks Zi Gong: “So, do you think I am one 
who learns much and remembers it?” He replied, “Yes, is it not so?" The master said “No, for 
me there is a unity that threads it together” . Zi Gong also remarks, in 5.13, that this is what 
Confucius says of the nature and the Way of Heaven that one cannot hear, (see Dai’s Preface 
of Shuzheng).
471 Shuzheng, Article 5. The quotation is from the Great Learning, X.2, where the three 
injunctions are summarised as "the way of the measuring square".
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special consideration from Dai Zhen. He explains sincerity as being what is real 
(s/?/) and truthful. It is the same as goodness. Dai Zhen says:
Since it is speaking in terms of qian and kun [= Heaven and Earth] it 
does not say “humaneness and wisdom” , but says “the Easy and the 
Simple” . When one “knows through the Easy” , one’s knowing is 
identical with humaneness and reciprocity; if one is “able through the 
Simple” ,472 one’s ability is identical with “doing what gives one no 
trouble” 473
Dai Zhen continues:
The sages accorded with the desires of their blood and spirits and so 
made the way of mutual nourishment: thus, to regard another as like 
oneself is loyalty; to rely on one’s own [feelings] and extend them is 
reciprocity; to be concerned about and rejoice with others is 
benevolence; what issues from the correct and not from the deviant is 
righteousness; to be respectful and reverent and not insulting and 
negligent is propriety; to be free from the flaws of mistake and error is 
wisdom. What else are loyalty and reciprocity, or benevolence, 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom?474
This is the completion of the development of virtues such as benevolence 
(re/?), wisdom (zhi), and courage (yong) in conformity with benevolence, propriety 
and righteousness. Hence, it is rooted in the reality of daily life and human 
relationships and starts with the vital intelligent activities of individual men; it then 
leads to the reality of moral enlightenment of zhi, ren, and yong. But it may also
472 Yi, Xici, 1.i. 6.
473 Ibid. Article. 40.
474 Ibid. Article, 15.
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start with learning and moral enlightenment, and then proceed to a state of 
perfection in daily life. The former is referred to in the Doctrine of the Mean as a 
process that starts with sincerity and moves on to enlightenment; the latter, as a 
process that starts with enlightenment and moves on to sincerity:475
Wisdom, benevolence, and courage -  these are the universal virtues.
And that it does not speak of righteousness and propriety is not because 
it is leaving out righteousness or leaving out propriety: wisdom is that by 
which righteousness and propriety are known. In “benevolence, 
righteousness, and propriety” the Way is fulfilled, and “wisdom, 
benevolence, and courage” are that by which it is fulfilled. Therefore 
benevolence, righteousness, and propriety are without gradations; but 
wisdom, benevolence, and courage dwell in the person, and so there 
are differences between “knowing from birth and practising with ease” , 
of “knowing through study and practising to gain advantage” , and of 
"knowing through adversity and being forced to practise” .476
The virtue of moral deliberation is the ability of a person to weigh values 
given in all human situations and to make the right decisions for the purposes of 
action and self-cultivation. Every human situation and relationship must have its 
own regularity or a principle that is its internal patterning and ordering. 
Assessment (quan) is the ability to discern the regularity of principle therein and 
is therefore essential to the development of the human virtues. But a human 
situation may vary on different occasions. What is most valuable on one occasion 
may become less valuable on another. Assessment is the ability of a man to 
discern changes in situation; it is therefore the intrinsic appropriateness of an
475 Ibid. Articles 29-33.
476 Ibid. Article 33.
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action. Thus quan is in effect the utmost development of wisdom (zhi) or the 
understanding of things. But the utmost development of zhi does not involve the 
abolition of desires and feelings; rather, it depends upon the satisfaction of 
feelings in the right places and the understanding of proper values of feelings and 
desires. To have this understanding is to have assessment:477
The daily functioning of human relationships is that by which the sages 
communicate the feelings and fulfil the desires of all under Heaven; 
when through assessment its component elements are not lost, this is 
principle. But because the Song Confucians speak of being “be-clouded 
by human desire”, as long as [their actions] do not proceed from desire 
they are confident that they are not beclouded. From antiquity to the 
present there has been no lack of stern and upright men,'hating evil like 
an enemy, who affirm what should be affirmed and reject what should 
be rejected, grasping [distinctions of] heavy and light that are obvious 
and seen by all but not knowing that there are times when assessment 
[shows that] the heavy here becomes light and the light here becomes 
heavy: as soon as their affirmations and rejections and their 
[assessments of] heavy and light are mistaken, all under Heaven 
receive the calamity of it and cannot be rescued.478
Since the Neo-Confucians do not recognise the proper value or significance 
of a moral life in terms of a universal comprehension of feelings and universal 
satisfaction of vital desires, they lack the understanding of the virtue of 
assessment. Because of this, Dai Zhen implicitly suggests that their minds, in a 
sense, were beclouded:
477 Ibid. Article 40-43.
478 Ibid. Article 40.
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Among the afflictions of men is ‘selfishness’ and ‘beclouding’. 
‘Selfishness’ arises from feelings and desires, through which one 
becomes humane, or by getting rid of the heart's discernment, through 
which one becomes wise. Thus the way of the sages and worthies is to 
be without selfishness but not without desires, while that of Lao,
Zhuang, and the Buddha is to be without desires but not without 
selfishness. It is by means of desirelessness that the latter complete 
their selfishness, whereas it is by means of unselfishness that the 
former communicate the feelings and fulfil the desires of all under 
Heaven.479
Dai Zhen emphasises that it is through the most intimate experience of 
man’s desire and feelings, by doing what is proper and appropriate in each 
different situation in life, and by following what is upright and orderly, that man will 
approximate benevolence, propriety and righteousness; and that a man truthful to 
himself and others will be unselfish, sincere, and straightforward. When all these 
virtues are fulfilled, man will possess the virtue of wisdom (zhi), because only 
then will he truly comprehend the goodness in Dao and the virtue of courage 
(yong), a result of his serious and consistent practice of virtues carried out so as 
to attain the supreme good. A man who develops these virtues and concentrates 
on the performance of these virtues is called a “superior man” (junzi); a man who 
is able to develop and accomplish these virtues from his nature is called a “sage” 
(sheng). In this way, what is nature in man is finally completed in what is 
necessary and essential in Dao. Thus Dai Zhen says:
What desire is, when it arises, we want to achieve that, it prepares us 
for the best condition. What the emotion is, there is intimacy and
479 ibid.
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distance, elder and younger, the high and the low, it is feeling and 
stirring naturally. What the principle is, it defines the boundary of the 
delicateness of emotions and desires. It lets the emotion and the desire 
be [...] apportioned to all people, even if only a little, that is the very 
principle. Desire, do not worry about lack of desire, the only worry is a 
glut of it. A glut of desire is a bad habit which is selfish and careless of 
others. The heart is drowned in it, and behaviour is wicked. Therefore, 
Mencius said "To nourish the heart there is nothing better than to make 
desires few". This is proper for emotion. Worrying about the lack of 
desire and not allowing a glut of them is not proper for the emotions yet.
Do not worry about the glut, just try to help oneself away from mistakes 
through the examination; but if desires are not moved to egoism, this is 
benevolence. If it is not drowned and wicked it is righteousness. If the 
emotions were stirred, to be in the state of Equilibrium is the state of 
Harmony. This is the very principle of Heaven. When the emotions and 
the desires do not move, and one is calm and makes no mistakes, this 
is called the innate disposition. The innate disposition is not contained in 
themselves, the emotion and the desires are not contained in 
themselves, but only the heavenly principle is just heavenly principle.480
The ethical virtues of man obtain not only a sanction but also confirmation in 
the metaphysical nature of Dao or Heaven and Earth. The metaphysical theory of 
Dao, as discussed here, can then be said to provide a sanction and justification 
for moral virtues, whereas moral virtues provide a confirmation for the 
metaphysical nature of man. The ethical theory in Confucian philosophy is always 
embedded in, and consistent with, a theory of reality and a theory of human
4ao Dai Zhen, Letter to Peng Yunchu, Quanji, vol. 6.
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nature, and this is nowhere as evident, as explicit, and as clear as we find in Dai 
Zhen’s concept of goodness:481
How are [such men] "beclouded by human desires”? The principle of 
[their] self-confidence is not principle. But where Mencius speaks of 
holding to the middle without assessment, the later Confucians have 
added a "holding to principle without assessment".482
e. Selfishness and Becloudedness
In explaining Dao and individual things in terms of goodness, Dai Zhen 
inevitably left unsolved the problem of evil and misconduct. If man has intrinsic 
goodness in his nature and is naturally capable of cultivating himself into a sage, 
then the question arises of how the presence of evil and misconduct in life should 
be accounted for. That man has notions of evil and misconduct is empirically 
obvious. It is further true that man can distinguish between what ought to be 
desired and what ought not to be desired.
Desire that is not fallen into selfishness is benevolence; consciousness 
that is not deluded is wisdom. Benevolence and wisdom are not
481 Shuzheng. Article 40-43.
482 Ibid. Article 40.
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something added to the ability of a thing or a man, since these are 
inherent in its very nature.483
We are aware that performing what ought to be desired in a situation may 
entail personal unhappiness and that performing what ought not to be desired 
may sometimes entail persona! happiness. But we usually consider our acts to be 
wrong if we perform what we ought not to do merely on the basis of avoiding 
personal unhappiness or pursuing personal happiness. We need an explanation 
and justification for what we would in general call evil and misconduct. The 
question here is whether such a justification and such an explanation are 
possible and intelligible in Dai Zhen’s philosophy of goodness:484
If a man is born dull, even if he is without desire he will still be dull. 
Whatever issues from desire is always for the sake of life and nurture.
The defect of desire is selfishness, not beclouding. It is the one who 
believes he has attained the principle, when what he holds to is actually 
in error, who is beclouded and does not understand. The two great 
afflictions of all men at all times, selfishness and becloudedness, are 
simply the product of two roots: selfishness arises from faults in desiring, 
and becloudedness from faults in knowing. Desire arises from the blood 
and spirits, and knowing from the heart. On account of selfishness one 
blames desire, and on account of desire one blames the blood and 
spirits: on account of becloudedness one blames knowing, and on 
account of knowing one blames the heart485
483 Ibid.
484 Yuanshan, Chapter 3.
485 Shuzheng, Article, 10.
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The Neo-Confucians were the first to attribute evil or misconduct to the
inherent and natural qualities (material nature) of man. In this point the Neo- 
Confucian’s theory is comparable with Xunzi’s belief that “human nature is evil”. 
However, Xunzi and the Song Confucians differ in their view of human nature. 
The Song Confucians divide human nature into two - material nature and original 
nature - and then designate material nature as evil and original nature as good. 
But Xunzi regards nature as one, not two, and his theory of nature is almost the 
same as that of Mencius. The most critical difference between Xunzi and 
Mencius is that Xunzi’s views place great emphasis on learning, because his 
articulations come from honouring the sages, from emphasising learning, and 
from exalting propriety and righteousness; Xunzi considered men to be capable 
of becoming sages. In articulating that human nature is evil, he says:
"It is possible for an ordinary man to become a Yu... Ordinary men all 
can know the righteousness that should rule between father and son at 
home, and the rectitude that should rule between sovereign and minister 
abroad... The capacity to know them and the ability to put them into 
practice belong to the ordinary man... it is clear that it is possible for him 
to become a Yu. Let an ordinary man addict himself to learning with ail 
his heart and the entire bent of his will, thinking, searching, and closely 
examining; -- let him do this day after day, through a long space of time, 
ceaselessly accumulating what is good, and be a third with heaven and 
earth. Thus sagehood is something reached by accumulation... but if 
sagehood can be reach by accumulation, how is it that all cannot 
accumulate?486
486 Xunzi 23, xinge, SPPY 17, 6a4-7a1; translation based on Legge, in The Works of Mencius, 
Prolegomena, Chapter II, Apendix I, pp. 85-86.
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Xunzi’s view that human nature is evil is simply that the ordinary man is not 
as much of a genius a sage. As mentioned above, humans’ natural endowments 
vary and according to endowment there are wise and stupid men, sometimes 
referred to in the terms ‘he does not have human nature’. Confucius uses the 
words “wisdom” and “stupidity”487 to indicate that the differences in the human 
nature of different people are a matter of degree. In other word, evil in Xunzi’s 
first definition is close to “stupidity” and “selfishness and becloudedness” rather 
than to the ordinary usage denoting immorality488
Xunzi saw that the sages’ inborn godlike understanding could not be 
generally ascribed to all humans, and that all others who are not sages become 
good only after learning, whereas by following their spontaneity they fall into evil. 
When he therefore describes the nature as evil, it seems that his discussion is 
one-sided and corresponds only to the idea that “some are by nature not good” . 
But when he says that propriety and righteousness are the mind of the sage, this 
amounts to saying that the sage’s nature alone is good. Therefore The Neo- 
Confucians were the first apart from Xunzi to attribute evil or misconduct to the 
inherent and natural qualities (material nature) of man 489
Nowadays the nature of man is such that from birth he has a fondness 
for profit; if this is indulged, wrangling and strife arise and modesty and 
complaisance are lost. From birth he has (feelings of) envy and hate; if 
these are indulged, violence and crime arise and loyalty and good faith 
are lost. From birth he has desires of the ear and eye and a fondness
487 Analects, 17,3.
488 Shuzheng. Articles 25-26.
489 Ibid.
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for (pleasing) sounds and sight; it these are indulged, license and 
wantonness arise and propriety, righteousness, and elegant form are 
lost. Thus, if man’s nature is followed and his feelings are indulged, 
inevitably there will be wrangling and strife, violation of allotments and 
confusion of forms, and anarchy. That is why there must first be 
transformation by teachers and laws and guidance by propriety and 
righteousness; only then can there be modesty and complaisance, 
elegant form, and good order. Observing it from this, it is clear that 
man’s nature is evil.490
With regard to the distinction between qizhi and yili -  or between the 
emotions and the conscience - the Neo-Confucians claim that desires and 
feelings can be equated with evil or misconduct as parts of human material 
nature, and consequently condemned human desires and feelings as being 
completely devoid of original nature, //, or conscience. Indeed, the Neo- 
Confucians might have accepted the idea that man can achieve complete 
goodness in a physical life; but, even if they had, their distinction between the 
good and the evil in human nature would not have permitted a complete removal 
of evil in human nature because human nature does embody natural qualities 
such as feelings and desires, which the Neo-Confucian believed to be devoid of 
goodness:
Today, since principle and desire are sharply distinguished as two, and 
since in governing oneself one regards what does not issue from desire 
as principle and in governing others one also necessarily regards what 
does not issue from desire as principle, whatever the people experience 
of hunger and cold, gloom and resentment, pleasure in food and drink,
490 Xunzi 23, xinge, SPPY 17: 1a7-1b1.a1; translation based on Legge, in The Works of 
Mencius, Prolegomena, p. 79.
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sexual attraction, and the responses of ordinary sentiment and inner 
feeling is all seen as the extreme triviality of human desire. “I treat what 
is trivial as trivial, and hence what I give due weight to is heavenly 
principle and public righteousness”: the formulation is exquisite, but 
when one uses it to govern others one injures them, and when it comes 
to those below responding to those above with deceit and falsehood 
one speaks of it as "the evil in others” .491
For Dai Zhen, evil misconduct does not originate in and is not inherent in 
human nature, since human nature is a continuum of intelligence, feelings, and 
desires, all derived from, and also manifesting, the nature of Dao. Thus any evil 
or misconduct must be due to contingencies in the empirical developments of 
human capacities. In fact, according to Dai Zhen, evil or misconduct is 
considered as the specific failure of individual men in achieving such virtues as 
benevolence, propriety and righteousness:492
These injuries of partiality and selfishness cannot be blamed on the 
capacities, and especially cannot be articulated as [pertaining to] the 
nature. Mencius took the goodness of the nature as his Way:493 When 
this nature is constituted it has these capacities, and since the nature is 
good its capacities are also excellent. But it is not absence of partiality 
or selfishness that makes [the nature] good and [the capacities] 
excellent. When a person is first born, if he does not eat he will die; 
when a person is naive and immature, if he does not learn he will be 
stupid. One eats in order to nourish one’s life, the fulfilment of which is 
to become an adult; one learns in order to nourish one's instincts, the 
fulfilment of which is to become a worthy or a sage. The reasons are the 
same. Although the capacities are good, they may be compared with a
491 Ibid. Article 43.
492 Yuanshan, Chapter 2.
493 Mencius, 3A1.
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piece of fine jade: if one forms it into an implement and treasures it, its 
lustre becomes daily more refined, and after a time it comes to gleam 
and its value is greater than before; bit if one gouges and erodes it and 
carelessly throws it away, after a time it becomes damaged, poor, and 
colourless, and its value is less than before.494
Dai Zhen shows that evil or misconduct, as found in specific cases, is due to 
the lack of fulfilment of the natural inclinations of man; therefore, that special evil 
or misconduct stems from individual imperfection. He argues that the 
development and perfection of human nature consist in satisfying and respecting 
the desires and feelings of men without inappropriateness or disharmony. Thus, it 
is only natural for Dai Zhen to hold that, in the final analysis, evil or misconduct 
result from the satisfaction of one’s own desires and the respecting of one’s own 
feelings without satisfying the desire or perhaps hindering the satisfaction of the 
desires of other men, and without respecting the feelings of other men. Evil can 
be further identified with the failure of the mind and intelligence to attain a 
comprehension of virtue and to secure guidance in reason for one’s desires and 
feelings:495
All that pertains to oneself in relation to others is called ‘feeling.’ When 
feeling is without excess and without deficiency it is principle 496 Lao, 
Zhuang, and Buddhists give first importance to being without desire and 
without action, and so do not speak of principle; what matters to the 
sage is that desires and actions should all reach principle. That is why 
the gentleman also is only without selfishness, and does not value being
494 Shuzheng, Article 31.
495 Yuanshan, Chapter 3.
496 Shuzheng, Article 3.
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without desire. Although the gentleman makes sure that his desires 
issue from the correct and not from the deviant, he is not necessarily 
without hunger and cold, gloom and resentment, pleasure in food and 
drink, sexual attraction, or responses of ordinary sentiment and inner 
feeling. Thus, when slanders and false accusations return to provoke 
biting discussion and condemnation, this distinction of principle and 
desire leaves the gentleman with no way to perfect his conduct. Such is 
its injuriousness! [...] What they call "desire” is what emperors and kings 
devote their hearts to with regard to the people; what they call “principle” 
is not what the ancient sages and worthies called principle. They have 
mixed in the formulations of Lao and the Buddha in making their [own] 
formulations, and thus the corruption inevitably comes to this.497
If a person has not developed his capacities to the full, it is due to two 
possible causes: selfishness and delusion. Dai Zhen calls selfishness (si) the 
failure to have a universal regard for other men’s desires in one’s attempt to 
satisfy one’s own desires. He also describes it as “doing harm to benevolence", 
which is the creative harmony of things in the world. Similarly, Dai Zhen refers to 
the failure to have universal regard for the feelings of other men in judging other 
men as partiality (p/an); and in light of this understanding, he refers to the failure 
to recognise the true nature of man and the patterning of things, and the failure to 
guide the development of one’s nature toward virtue and perfection, as 
beclouding (ib/):498
“Wisdom” is articulated with regard to one’s not being beclouded. 
"Benevolence” is articulated with regard to one’s not being selfish, and 
"courage” is articulated with regard to one’s own strength. If one is not
497 Ibid. Article 43.
498 Shuzheng, Articles 30-39.
219
un-beclouded and unselfish and strong in oneself, wisdom, 
benevolence, and courage cannot be spoken of; but as soon as one 
acts with wisdom, benevolence, and courage one is genuine. If one’s 
wisdom, benevolence, and courage were not genuine, one would be 
neither wise nor humane nor courageous - and again how could one 
speak of wisdom, benevolence, and courage?499
The problem with the development of man’s nature is not that man has 
feelings and desires, but that his desires are selfish, the feelings of the human 
being unsympathetic, and his mind and intelligence beclouded. As Dai Zhen saw 
it, all desires and feelings are intrinsically good because they are not separated 
from Dao or from Heaven and earth. But in order to realise their intrinsic 
goodness in actual behaviour, desires and feelings must be free from selfishness 
and partiality, and the mind and intelligence must be cleansed of beclouding. 
Hence, Dai Zhen says:
The defect of desire is selfishness, and from selfishness greed and 
depravity follow; the defect of feeling is partiality, and from partiality 
obstinate perversity follows; the defect of cognition is blindness, and 
from blindness mistakes and errors follow. If one is not selfish, one’s 
desires are all humane, and all proper and righteous; if one is not 
partial, one’s feelings are easygoing and fair; if one is not blinded, one 
knows what is called intelligence and sagely wisdom.500
The best way to get rid of selfishness is to adopt selflessness, whereas the 
best way to set oneself free from being beclouded is to engage in learning. A
489 Ibid. Article 39.
500 Ibid. Article 30.
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person who has the qualities of benevolence and intellect is neither selfish nor 
beclouded; a person who attains an understanding of the unceasing production 
and reproduction of things in the universe is a man of benevolence; and a person 
who gains an understanding of the orderly principle of things is a man of intellect:
An ordinary person obtains [D ao ’s] aspect on desire, but a [Confucian] 
superior man obtains its aspect on benevolence. If a person also thinks 
about the fulfilment of other people’s desire when he is satisfying his 
own desire, then he possesses boundless benevolence within him. If, 
however, he forgets other people’s desire while satisfying his own 
desire, then he is a selfish person lacking benevolence... The quality of 
wisdom is to enable a person to know [the Dao], whereas the quality of 
benevolence is to enable him to practise it.501
Dai Zhen clearly assumes that man, in the process of developing his nature, 
might be subject to any of these failures; he may, therefore, incur all specific evils 
or misconducts in personal behaviour, in social relationships, and in government.
501 Yuanshan, Chapter 2.
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4. Learning, Morality and the Canons
Dai Zhen strongly believed that man could become a sage if he fully 
understood the truth, the goodness of Dao. As mentioned, Dai Zhen claimed that 
the truth dwells in the Canons. At the same time, the method of excavating the 
truth is significant; therefore, the theory of truth and method of Dai Zhen is 
obviously different from that of Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi suggested that when man fully 
realises that the meaning of wisdom is hidden and stored, the “investigation of 
things" becomes essential for the extension of knowledge.502 However, Dai Zhen 
claimed that the truth was to be found in the Canons, and that there was no 
hidden or stored meaning, but that attaining wisdom was merely a matter of 
producing the proper meaning from the words that had come to have different 
connotations from those they bore when written. Zhu Xi induced the principle 
from the investigation of things, whereas Dai Zhen took what he believed to be 
the truth from the Canons and then proved it in reality. It seems he applied a 
deductive rather than an inductive method. Dai Zhen was certainly not empiric 
and, in this sense, the comparison with D. Hume is not an appropriate one. Dai 
Zhen’s attitude is unquestionably more similar to that of a Biblicist than that of a 
scientist or a philosopher like Zhu Xi.
502 Wingtsit Chan, SOCT, 729.
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Dai Zhen’s theory of truth is comparable to Plato’s theory of Knowledge. 
Plato, in his workTha503etetos, created a dichotomy between opinion (doxa) and 
truth (logos), using an analogy of the Wax Tablet and the Aviary. Dai Zhen’s 
theory of knowledge is similar to Plato’s analogy of the Aviary, that denoted a 
collection of knowledge and the possibility of error, in that Dai Zhen emphasises 
the importance of exact knowledge and the skill of taking language from the texts. 
Another comparable aspect is that Dai Zhen also created a dichotomy between 
opinion and principle. Dai criticised the Neo-Confucians’ concept of principle for 
being merely an opinion (doxa), because to attempt to find a correspondence 
between Zhu Xi’s definitions of words and the words in the Canons themselves, 
was to discover that there was no such meaning as Zhu Xi’s containted in the 
Canons (logos).
Michel Foucault made an interesting assertion that philosophy is the 
playground of game of truth, and that the whole game of truth has to be carried 
out in this ground. It is notable that Chinese texts are very rich in culture, politics 
and moral philosophy, but it is also obviously that the metaphysical aspect is 
relatively lacking. This is possibly one of the reasons that the Song Confucians 
looked for metaphysics outside the Confucian Canons; Dai Zhen, however, saw 
the Neo-Confucians’ importing of the concept of principle as a breach of the rules 
of the game.
503 Plato, Thaetetos, Conford edn, pp. 130-190.
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Dai Zhen’s moral philosophy strongly emphasises the role of the intellect in 
realising the Way -  both in the sense of recognising what is right and directing 
the self to follow what is right. These two aspects of moral philosophy appear to 
occur simultaneously in his view of things:
Heretical theories always give first importance to unselfishness, and do 
not seek to be un-beclouded; they emphasise practice, but do not first 
emphasise discernment. Others observe their earnest practice, and 
since they are without desire all respect and trust them. The learning of 
the sages and worthies grounds earnest practice in broad learning, 
close inquiry, careful thought, and clear distinctions; one’s practice is 
thus the un-beclouded practice of the daily functioning of human 
relationships, and not, like theirs, a discarding of the daily functioning of 
human relationships in the belief that absence of desire is a capacity for 
earnest practice.504
First of all, the answers on how to remove selfishness and therefore 
partiality, as has been shown, are clearly given in On Goodness; there is no 
better method than to strengthen one’s virtue of compassion (shu), that is to say 
the universal regard for the desires and feelings of other men:
If a man who has desires understands everyone else’s desires, he is a 
man of benevolence; if a man who has consciousness also 
comprehends everyone else’s consciousness, he is a man of wisdom.505
504 Shuzheng, Article 40.
505 Ibid.
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If one wishes to remove beclouding from one’s mind and consciousness, 
there is no better method than to concentrate on the learning (xue) of the 
Canons. The most important factor in seif-improvement, however, should be a 
recognition of one’s selfishness, partiality, and beclouding, and the consequent 
discontent that results. Once a man is always on the alert for evil and misconduct 
in his dealings with men, with the management of things, and with the 
comportment of himself, he will prevent himself from deviating into the track of 
misconduct, and he will feel the urge to develop his nature into the virtues of 
goodness, benevolence, propriety and righteousness:
Let us take man’s physical form and his moral nature and discuss them 
comparatively. Physical form is initially young and immature, but 
becomes full-grown; the moral nature is initially wrapped in childish 
ignorance, but becomes sagely and wise. The maturation of the physical 
form depends on the nourishment of food and drink, and is a matter of 
daily growth, not of restoring its initial condition; and when the moral 
nature, nourished by learning, advances to sageness and wisdom, it is 
clear that this [also] is not a matter of restoring its initial condition... 
Humans and animals differ in kind, and since the allotment of material 
force which humans receive is clear and bright, they differ from birds 
and beasts that cannot be enlightened. But when humans are compared 
with each other, their differences of natural talent are all slight. The 
ancient worthies and sages knew that humans differed in natural talent, 
and on this account emphasised learning and valued expansion and 
fulfilment.506
Man can either avoid or eliminate evil and wrongfulness if he sets his mind 
toward the prescribed virtues and practises them constantly. Man should follow
506 Shuzheng, Article 23.
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the good impulses in his nature by becoming aware of the supreme goodness in 
his nature and in Heaven and Earth as a goal of his conscientious efforts towards 
perfection. Dai Zhen, in the third part of his On Goodness, gives ample illustration 
and explanation of what he means by following the virtues of benevolence, 
propriety and righteousness as a means of avoiding and eliminating evil and 
misconduct. In these senses, Dai Zhen is typically Confucian in believing that all 
specific evil and misconduct can be removed, and that every man can then 
become a sage. Dai Zhen refers to Mencius’ statement that:
Form and colour are the same as Heavenly nature; but only sages can
exhaust all that is inherent in form and colour.507
Dai Zhen, however, devotes little attention to how learning can be used as a 
method to counter the beclouding in one’s mind and intelligence. Objecting to the 
Neo-Confucian belief that man will be free of beclouding if he simply rids himself 
of ail his desires, Dai Zhen proposes learning, as used in the Classical Confucian 
sense, as a means to remove beclouding. Learning involves wide learning, close 
inquiry, deliberate thinking and clear discernment; learning is the inquiry into and 
the practice of things, i.e. by seeing reason in the nature of things. In light of Dai 
Zhen’s critique of the Neo-Confucian notion of li and in light of the Neo-Confucian 
method of investigating //, it may perhaps be suggested that beclouding of one’s 
mind and intelligence is reflected in subjective opinions, which the Neo-
507 Mencius, 7 A 38.
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Confucians call “principle” (//); and hence, that beclouding leads one to abstract 
speculation. Thus:
To remove beclouding by learning is to remove one’s private opinions 
by opening one’s mind to actualities and forming accurate notions of 
them.508
Dai Zhen offers a simple explanation when asked why we must learn. If 
humans accept that they are human, then learning naturally ensues. And who are 
the humans? Humans, like all animals, are born with desires and have a 
tendency to become indulgent and thereby lose moral balance. Humans will 
never be able to rid themselves of their likes and dislikes and should never try to 
do so, for their likes and dislikes are the sources of their human benevolence. 
They are the reason that humans are able to empathise with the circumstances 
of others. Thus Dai Zhen says:
Mencius says: “The Way is like a wide road; how could it be difficult to 
find”509... Articulating it roughly, one speaks of the “far-extending Way” 
and of the “universal virtues" [by which it is enacted]: articulating it 
strictly, the fulfilment of the Way of the ruler, of the minister, of the 
father, and of the son with complete wisdom, benevolence, and 
courage, and with each affair performed without fault, is called the Way. 
Through the ultimate articulation of the greatness of the Way like this, 
how does it depart from the daily functioning of human relationships?
And when the perfected Way is ascribed to the man of perfected virtue, 
how is this easy for ordinary learners to fathom?
508 Yuanshan, Chapter 2.
509 Mencius, 6B2.
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The ability to empathise is what Confucius called “the method of 
benevolence”, and what Mencius meant by “the innate ability to do good” 
(liangneng). This virtue is not particular to humans, because all sentient animals 
are capable of projecting beyond their own situation, but only human beings are 
able to broaden their knowing mind until it arrives at perfect understanding:510
Nowadays, if those who would learn from the sages are assessed in 
view of the words and deeds that are proper to a sage, it is like students 
of Yi Qiu not being able to fathom his skill in Weiqi:511 none is able to 
reach them quickly. Zhongyong spells out the steps as: extensive study 
accurate inquiry careful reflections [...] clear discernment [...] [and] 
earnest practice512!...] And concludes by saying: “Let a man proceed in 
this way, and, though dull, he will surely understand: though weak, he 
will surely become strong.513 To proceed in this way to reach the Way 
of the sage is actually to proceed thus to a daily increase in one’s 
wisdom, in one’s benevolence, and in one’s courage, so that one’s 
wisdom, benevolence, and courage may become equal to a sage’s. But 
this daily increase may be difficult or easy. It is like learning a craft or 
skill: at first there is change from day to day and from month to month, 
but after a while others do not see one’s progress, and later still one 
feels oneself that one can make no further advance; yet though others 
may admire one as “the best... in the whole country”,514 one knows it is 
still not perfected.515
510 Shuzheng, Article 24.
511 This analogy is a reference to the story of Yi Qiu in Mencius 6A6.
512 Zhongyong, pp. 20,19.
513 Ibid. pp. 20, 21.
514 This analogy is a reference to Mencius 6A9.
515 Shuzheng, Article 35.
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Spiritual brilliance (shenming) is like a flame imbued with the power to 
illuminate every last corner of a room perfectly. What the person sees in the light 
is moral principles -  “the distinct order and pattern of events and affairs”; and 
when the mind has grasped the principle, “there is understanding whenever there 
is thought, and one can be free from doubts in the course of his action” . The 
person also “invariably feels at ease and contented”. Dai writes: “When Mencius 
stated that ‘moral principles are agreeable to the mouth,’ he was not merely 
making an analogy” .516 The mind takes pleasure in acquiring moral principles; it 
gains an emotional satisfaction from them:
Flavours, sounds, and appearances reside in things and not in me, but 
when they are received by my blood and breath [these faculties) can 
distinguish and delight in them, and what they delight in must be what 
they find especially fine; order and rightness reside in the order and 
distinctions of the inherent tendencies of affairs, but when these are 
received by my heart’s discernment it can distinguish and delight in 
them, and what it delights in must be what it finds most affirmable.
Zengzi explains: the refined material force of yang is called spirit, and 
the refined material force of yin is called receptivity. Spirit and receptivity 
are the root of particular things.517 For in general the ear’s ability to 
hear, the eye’s ability to see, the nose’s ability to smell, and the mouth’s 
ability to taste pertain to the bodily form (po); they are called “receptivity”
{ling), and yin governs their receiving. The heart’s incipient luminosity 
(jingshuang), such that if it thinks it will penetrate, pertains to hun and is 
called “spiritual” (shen), and yang governs its putting forth. What 
governs putting forth makes determinations; what governs receiving 
complies. Thus Mencius said: the organs of hearing and seeing are 
unable to think.... [but] the organ of the heart can think518. Thus thinking
516 Ibid. Articles 6, 21 and 8.
517 Dadai Liji, zengzi tianyuanpian.
518 Mencius, 6A15.
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is the ability of the heart. There are times when its incipient luminosity is 
beclouded and blocked off and cannot penetrate, but when it is not 
beclouded or blocked off and there is nothing it does not penetrate, it is 
designated as “spiritual brilliance” (shenming),519
What Dai Zhen understood by learning may even be discerned in his own 
practice of academic inquiry and in his methodology for pursuing the truth. 
According to Duan Yucai, Dai Zhen, as a great master of textual criticism and 
clear thinking, once remarked:
We should always understand what Mencius means by specific patterning and 
ordering. We should obtain the specific patterning and ordering of things. Then, 
from synthesis to analysis {fen) or from analysis to synthesis {ho), there is nothing 
that cannot be done.520
Learning the Canons, then, can be said to consist in finding the specific 
patterning and ordering of things by the “synthesis" and “analysis” of specific 
objects. This is directly opposed to the speculative methods of Neo- 
Confucianism. In applying his method of investigation to the study of Classical 
Confucian doctrine, Dai Zhen naturally found it necessary to look into the 
meanings of words, as well as institutional histories, so as to discover and
519 Shuzheng, Article 6. For A.C. Graham’s translation of this term as “psychicity" see his Two 
Chinese Philosophers, p. 112. This word would appear to be Dai Zhen’s paraphrase and 
expansion of the Zhou Xuan explanation of the relationship between shenming and jingshuang. 
Jingshuang is thus shenming in its germinal or potential form.
520 Ibid. Article 3.
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understand the truth of Dao. Thus, when Dai Zhen speaks of the “investigation of 
things for the extension of knowledge” , he said:
Investigation means to know a thing’s nature correctly without any fault 
and to think thoroughly about it without leaving out the point. Only then 
can a person’s mind not be deluded and when he exercises authority in 
the empire, his action will not make him have regrets later. This, then, is 
known as “the extension of knowledge” .521
It might be said that Dai Zhen oriented his studies in phonological and 
historical research towards his search for the truth of Dao.
He wrote to Duan Yucai:
Since I was seventeen years old, I have had the desire to learn Dao and 
have told myself that Dao can be found only in the Six Canons and the 
works of Confucius and Mencius. [But if we are to achieve this purpose], 
unless we are clear about the meanings of the words, and the 
institutional background and history, we will not even understand the 
language of these works.522
Dai Zhen’s motivation for his critique of Neo-Confucianism is his belief that 
the Confucian scholars of the Song period did not really understand the language 
and meanings of the words of the ancient sages, but only claimed to have 
understood whilst in fact merely projecting their own opinions onto the doctrines 
of the sages. He believes that this was why the Neo-Confucians were misled
521 Yuanshan, Chapter, 2.
522 Dai Zhen, Letter to Duan Yucai, Quanji, vol. 6.
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themselves, and why they were further misleading others. This was also the 
reason why Dai Zhen thought so highly of his Shuzheng, in which he applied his 
method of “synthesis” and “analysis”.523
This being so, it is permissible to say that “if it does not issue from the 
correct then it issues from the deviant, and if it does not issue from the 
deviant then it issues from the correct” , but not permissible to say that "if 
it does not issue from principle then it issues from desire, and if it does 
not issue from desire then it issues from principle” . Desire is the “thing” 
and principle is its “norm” , and what does not “issue from the deviant” 
and what “issues from the correct" still often has the bias of opinion and 
has been unable to attain the principle.524 [...] Alas! The harm of mixing 
in Daoist and Buddhist explanations when formulating doctrine is thus 
worse than [the harm from] Shen (Buhai) and Han (Fe/'z/)! Where in the 
writings of the Six Canons, Confucius, and Mencius is there any taking 
of principle as a kind of thing, external to the expressions of man’s 
nature in feelings and desires and rigorously controlling them?525
Dai Zhen relies upon rather straightforward philological arguments 
supported by extensive classical references. He argues convincingly and 
decisively, that the Canons of Confucianism can be understood through careful 
examination and study.526 This understanding is not within us already; it is 
something we come to realise through acquiring certain kinds of knowledge and 
augmenting this with systematic application. Dai Zhen began with faith in the
523 Ibid. Yumoushu, Quanji, vol. 6.
524 Book of Odes 260, as quoted in Mencius 6A6 and discussed by Dai Zhen in Shuzheng, 
Article 3.
525 Shuzheng, Article 10.
526 Ibid.
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Canons and the sages, and his careful, objective study of the language and 
history of these convinced him that the true meaning of the Canons had been 
lost. He believed that he had arrived at their truth by relying on careful research 
and reasoning, and this in turn convinced him that the truth of the Canons must 
itself be an unchanging standard, something that is necessary. But if the 
Confucian Canons themselves are simply a manifestation of this unchanging 
standard, and one can arrive at this standard through the careful application of 
the Canons, it would seem as if one should be able to realise the standard simply 
by appeals to the Canons and the Confucian golden rule:527
The final goal of the learning of the Canons is [the attainment of the 
understanding of] Dao. To clarify Dao, we need words (z/). But words are formed 
on the basis of the study of meaning and language. From the study of language, 
we may then understand the true meanings of words [used in the past]. From the 
understanding of the true meanings of words [in the Canons], we may then 
comprehend the mind and will of the ancient sages.528
Dai Zhen considered doing philosophy in no way other than through the 
Canons. In this he remained true to some of the oldest principles of the 
Confucian tradition, His quest was to discern the teachings of the sages as a task 
of ‘finding’ not ‘making’,529 more a matter of ‘study’ than ‘reflecting.’ For him,
527 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, p. 95.
528 Dai Zhen, Letter to Duan Yicai, Quanji, vol. 6.
529 Analects, 7.1, "transmit rather than create” .
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providing an account of why one does what one does is a task one can approach 
only after one has mastered the Canons. It is only through such a course of study 
that one can become the kind of person that will make the right choices; this in 
turn provides one with the understanding necessary to discern the patterns 
behind one’s actions.530
According to this picture of Dai’s moral philosophy, morality is seen as being 
satisfying in the same way that good food and pleasant sights and sounds are 
satisfying. For him, a moral act is marked as morality by a special kind of joy. This 
joy also makes morality possible, by providing positive reinforcement for the good 
actions one performs. Dai clearly endorses the idea that any moral action one 
does produces a feeling of joy, if only one reflects upon it:
When Mencius said, “Principle and righteousness please my mind just 
as the flesh of grass- and grain-fed animals pleases my palate” ,531 this 
was not an analogy. Whenever one does something that accords with 
principle and righteousness, one’s heart and spirit will always be joyful 
and contented.532
However, as we have seen, Dai Zhen believes that in order to recognise 
something as a case of principle or righteousness, one must already have 
passed it through the golden rule’s universal possibility test. It would seem that 
one could experience the joy of moral action only after one has discovered what
530 Philip J. lvanhoe, pp. 96-97.
531 Mencius, 6A7.
532 Shuzheng, Article 8.
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is necessary and understood the unchanging standard in the Canons and the 
words of the sages.
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VI. Conclusion
Dai Zhen’s philosophy has had a great impact on me because his 
philosophy seems simply to emerge from the old Canons and answer all the 
questions relating to ancient Chinese civilisation in a unified and coherent 
philosophical structure. Reading Dai Zhen, the words of the Chinese Canons 
seem to have their original meanings and to act as an organ clarifying the 
relations between other things.
Before Dai Zhen, nobody had attacked the Song Confucians so fiercely and 
effectively using logic and solid evidence; some of the Ming Yangming School 
had tried, but their attempts were not as successful as those of Dai Zhen. Without 
doubt, his philosophy transgressed the norms of Chinese history, certainly 
appears to be politically radical, and even contains elements of modern thinking.
However, as we have examined, his life was neither radical nor 
revolutionary but that of a philological scholar and library compiler. It is clear from 
the fact he attempted the Metropolitan exam for over two decades that he 
genuinely wanted to be an official in the Qing government and to have a secure 
job, though this was something he never achieved. He was never involved in any 
political purges, and never joined any political resistance organization. Instead, 
he was faithful to the Qing, and Emperor Qianlong praised his skill by appointing
236
him compiler of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries despite the fact he 
did not have the right qualifications.533
What was it that drove him to create such a dramatically radical philosophy? 
Was the reason, as Zhang Binglin observed, that Dai came from the working 
classes and was thereby intimately familiar with the common people’s hardship? 
Contrary to the claims of some materialists, Dai’s philosophy is certainly not 
reflective of proletarian class interests, as we have observed. So was the reason, 
as Qian Mu noted, that his heart was in fact cold and that he was arrogant?
First of all, it is clear that Dai Zhen directed his attention towards the 
language and civilization of ancient Zhou. His primary viewpoint was that of the 
ancients, although, of course, his stance was undoubtedly rooted in the Qing 
period and he certainly did comprehend the reality of his surroundings very 
well.534 Dai Zhen felt a certain duty as a philological scholar and tried to apply 
strict evidential scholarship to Neo-Confucianism so as to correct its erroneous 
use of language. He felt it his historical task to re-invent the Way so as to free it 
from contamination.535
So, Dai Zhen constructed a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Way 
so as to correct erroneous language and meanings, and did so from the 
perspective of a master of the skills of ancient civilisation and language. His work
533 See Kent Guy, 1987. pp 79-87. also, see Chapter 1.
534See Shuzheng, Preface.
535See Ibid.
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was neither politically radical nor philosophically arrogant; few people read his 
work when it was published, and some of those who did criticised him for wasting 
his energy on something useless. Also, it must be noted that his works were 
published under the strong censorship of the Qing dynasty.
His works continued to be perceived as radical, until they were eventually 
deemed to represent the radicals. However, it was not Dai that changed but the 
world surrounding his work. The discourse of intellectual trends changed with the 
changing political situation, and similarly the perception of Dai’s work changed, 
from being seen as research on Mencius1 teaching and the correction of the 
erroneous words of Neo-Confucianism, to being seen as an engagement with 
radical political issues.536
Dai Zhen’s Shuzheng and Inquiry into Goodness are not radical 
philosophical works but philological works in which Kaozheng methods were 
used to analyse key concepts of Confucian philosophy. The methodology Dai 
Zhen applied to his study of Mencius was essentially a linguistic approach used 
to determine the precise meanings of terms in the text. This appeal to etymology, 
Dai Zhen thought, would enable him to refute the later meanings that Zhu Xi and 
other Neo-Confucians had attached to these concepts.537
536 See chapter 2 ‘Modern Understanding of Dai Zhen’ and Zhang Binglin. Shidai (An 
interpretation of Dai Zhen), Quanji, p.339.
537 Elman,1984, p.19.
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It has been shown that Dai Zhen’s works in various fields covered every 
aspect of Zhou culture. His efforts are based around the idea that the Way is 
contained in ancient culture, Dai Zhen produced a large number of works: in 
addition to many books on mathematics, astronomy, philology, phonetics, and 
geography, Dai wrote three books on philosophy. They are On Goodness, 
Prolegomena, and Commentary on the Words and Meanings of Mencius, the 
latter being the most significant, as it embodies his final view on the subject. 538
The first ontological work, Inquiry into Goodness, appraises qi, the vital 
force, and Dao, the Way, instead of li, as being analogous to what is necessary 
(biran) in human nature. The Prolegomena is the first draft of Dai Zhen’s greatest 
philosophical work, the Mengzi ziyi shuzheng. After completing On Goodness in 
three chapters, Dai Zhen deemed that the Song Confucians’ discussions on 
human nature, principle, the Way, ability, sincerity, enlightenment, authority, 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and courage were not 
considering the true words of Confucius, Mencius, or within the Six Canons, 
which had become mixed with heterodox teachings. Dai Zhen therefore began to 
cite the words in Mencius so as to point out semantic errors. It is in this work that 
he lays out his first criticism of Neo-Confucianism.539
538 See chapter 1 philosophical works of Dai Zhen. And Qian Mu, Quanji. v.7. p. 483-96.
539 Ibid.
239
Scholars of the Qing dynasty including Dai Zhen made efforts to reconstruct 
the Canons and lost Classics, for both public motives and political reasons.540
According to Hu Shi, Dai Zhen was greatly influenced by the Ming 
Confucians, and in fact developed Yan Yuan’s thesis on human nature.541 Some 
Chinese contemporary scholars have suggested that Dai Zhen’s thought was 
derived from Yan Yuan and Li Gong’s system.542 Qian Mu insisted that Dai’s 
philosophy had its origins in Xunzi. According to Qian Mu, although Dai Zhen 
followed Mencius’ thesis of human nature being good, his statements often 
resembled those of Xunzi, who maintained that human nature is evil and placed 
great emphasis on man’s actions. However, as a strong ethical realist, Dai Zhen 
depended only on what he chose to concentrate on rather than on the Ming 
Confucians.543
At first, Dai Zhen devoted his passion for philosophy to Neo-Confucianism. 
He studied Neo-Confucian philosophy in a local academy under the supervision 
of strong supporters of the Cheng and Zhu orthodoxy. However, the later Dai 
Zhen could not accept the ideas of Zhu XL544
540 Elman, From Philosophy To Philology: 1990. pp. 17-18
541 Liu Zhaoren, Ruan Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan commercial press. 1979. pp.37.
542 Liang Qichao, 1939, pp22-24.
543 Hu Shi, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue {The Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan), Quanji,v7. pp. 384- 
386.
544 See chapter 1, the life of Dai Zhen.
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Hui Dong was the most influential figure in Dai Zhen’s philological and 
philosophical research. After encountering Hui, Dai Zhen was set firmly on his 
path and method, which was later to become the backbone of Qing evidential 
study. It was chiefly the differences and similarities between Dai Zhen and Hui 
that influenced Dai’s philology and philosophy. The differences between the two 
induced Dai to try to seek the truth of philosophy through philological research, 
whilst their similarities induced him to study so as to find ways to defeat the Neo- 
Confucians effectively.545
Dai Zhen established his school regardless of his lack of desire to create 
one. He preferred to have a “brother” or “companion” rather than a disciple. Dai 
Zhen’s Kaozheng School emphasised the importance of independence from the 
later authorities or exegetes.
Duan Yucai was the first figure in Dai Zhen’s school, but it must be said that 
other of his scholastic descendents such as Wang Niansun and his son Wang 
Yinzhi understood Dai better. Among the second generation of Dai Zhen’s
545 See the chapter 2. ‘Hui dong and Han Learning.’ Dai Zhen could not accept the idea of Hui 
Dong that there were two paths in the study of the Canons; ancient glosses and rational 
meaning, as inseparable, one being the method and the other its philosophical justification. 
In Dai Zhen’s term: “If the ancient glosses are not employed for the purpose of understanding 
the reason and meaning of things at the same time, then what is the point of pursuing that 
type of research?” The differences between them are obvious and very important in the 
Kaozhengxue. Later the Dai Zhen School distinguished itself from Hui Dong’s School. As a 
historiographer Wang Ming-sheng noted: “Master Hui studied the Canons in order to 
understand the ancients but Master Dai studied the Canons in order to understand the truth" 
Hsing-chuang p.8.
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School, Jiao Xun and Huang Sanshi attempted to extend Dai Zhen’s philosophy, 
and Ruan Yuan composed essays on Confucian philosophy modelled on Dai’s 
linguistic approach to philosophical terms. The most famous scholar of the Later 
Qing period, Gong Zizhen, referred to himself as a genuine inheritor of Dai 
Zhen’s philosophy.546
Dai Zhen influenced Zhang Xuecheng, an eminent Kaozheng historian of 
the mid-Qing period, despite their very different stances. The differences between 
Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng give a clear and distinctive view of character and 
limitations of Dai Zhen’s philosophy. As Zhang indicated, while Dai’s lack of 
historical perspective could be seen as a limitation, it is precisely this anti- 
historical character that is such a strongpoint in his philosophy.547
In the 20th century, Dai Zhen’s works were championed by Zhang Binglin 
(1868-1936) and subsequently also by Liang Qichao and Hu Shi. Feng Yulan, 
Qian Mu and Yu Yingshih also conducted research on Dai Zhen in the context of 
Chinese philosophy. Zhang Binglin honoured Dai by quoting him and praising 
many of his philosophical views.548
Liang Qichao and Hu Shi were eager to espouse anti-Song Neo-Confucian 
philosophy, the reason for this being that they felt it bore chief responsibility for 
China’s social injustice and material backwardness. Hu Shi was a profound
546 Kuhn, Philip. Havard University Press, 1970. p157.
547 See Chapter 2. Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng.
548 See Elman 1990. pp. 10-18
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scholar on Dai Zhen, and wrote The Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan. Hu praises Dai 
for knowing that philological study is merely the means to an end and not an end 
in itself. Dai did not, Hu argues, want merely to be a philologist but a philosopher. 
Dai’s cosmological theory is a form of naturalism that also contains elements of 
materialism .549 Liang and Hu’s promotion of Dai Zhen’s philosophy epitomises 
the restless intellectuals of the early republican era, whose faith in the orthodox 
doctrine and the Neo-Confucians had been shattered and who were searching 
for a new guiding philosophy.550
Feng Yulan, however, found Dai’s philosophy neither profound nor creative 
as compared with that of the Song Neo-Confucians whom Dai criticised. Qian 
Mu, on the other hand, a devoted Confucian scholar whose interpretation of the 
history of ideas followed the orthodox tradition, compared Dai with Xunzi. Later, 
Yu Yingshi compared Dai Zhen with Zhang Xuecheng.551
Ryden has recently compared Dai Zhen to the British empiricist D.Hume, a 
comparison that serves to prove the modernity of pre-modern philosophy. 
Additionally, my brief comparative research on Dai Zhen and the French post­
modern philosopher Foucault demonstrates their similarity in terms of tactics, 
attitudes and the aims of their philosophy.552
549 Hu Shi, Ibid, Quanji,v7. pp. 384-386. also see the chapter 2. Modern Understanding of Dai 
Zhen.
550 Liu Jinxian, 1977. pp.367-369.
551 Ibid. P.392.
552 Fifth Biennial Conference of the Chinese Studies Association of Australia held at Adelaide
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The titles and the approach of Dai Zhen’s philosophical writings make use 
of Kaozheng research on philosophical issues. The use of the technical term 
Shuzheng (verifications on the form of sub-commentary) in the title indicates that 
Dai Zhen saw his efforts as works of evidential research. The methodology Dai 
Zhen applied to his study of Mencius was essentially a linguistic approach used 
to determine the precise meaning of terms in the text. In addition, he thought this 
appeal to etymology would enable him to refute the later meanings Zhu Xi and 
other Neo-Confucians had attached to these concepts and would enable him to 
reproduce the proper meaning from the Canons.
Dai Zhen and most of the scholars of his school of "evidential study" 
(Kaozhengxue) evidential scholars made verification a central concern for the 
emerging empirical theory of knowledge they advocated, namely "to search for 
the truth from the facts" (shishi qiushi).553
Dai Zhen stressed the importance of exacting research, rigorous analysis, 
and of the collection of impartial evidence drawn from ancient artefacts and 
historical documents and texts. Evidential scholars made verification a central 
concern for the emerging empirical theory of knowledge they advocated, namely 
"to search for the truth in the facts". This scheme involved the placing of proof 
and verification at the centre of the organisation and analysis of the classical 
tradition in its complete, multidimensional proportions, including aspects of
University, 16-18 July, 1997. Brief comparison between Dai Zhen with M.Foucault by H. Lee.
553 See the chapter 3. ‘Method of Dai Zhen’.
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natural studies and mathematics. Fallacies and mistakes were the first enemy of 
the Qing evidential scholars, whose focus was on precise research.
Dai Zhen is famous for his criticism of Neo-Confucian philosophy and the 
Han exegesis as based on his method of evidential research. However, as well 
as writing negative criticism of them, he also wrote a positive philosophical 
perspective of the Canons. These two methods are closely related: in the 
Shuzheng, the method of negative criticism is used to correct the prevalent errors 
of understanding so as then to build a positive philosophical perspective of the 
Canon.
Dai’s critical method approach to the Canons is in keeping with his time and 
the issues confronting him. As mentioned, he believed Neo-Confucian philosophy 
to be a hybrid between Confucianism and heresies such as Daoism and 
Buddhism. Because of this hybrid, the Neo-Confucians made errors and distorted 
the words and meaning of the Canons. Dai Zhen claimed that the same limitation 
also applied to Han learning in the Qing period, as led by the Hui Dong School. 
The Han Confucians employed the xungu method to work on the exegesis of the 
Canons. Dai criticises the Han Confucians for providing the “definition of the word 
according to their own context”. Because the Han Confucians separated the 
words from the context of the Canons and only produced glosses and 
etymologies of words, according to Dai, Han Confucians could not understand 
the reason and the meaning of the Canons, since they were merely absorbed in 
the words and characters.
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Dai studied the Classics “in order to understand the truth in them, but 
ultimately he believed that without a knowledge of the ancient text, one would 
have no basis for establishing the truth.”554 Dai suggested two attitudes to 
approaching the Canons. The first attitude is to attain the Dao from the Canons 
directly. The next is to view the Dao as being laid within the ancient culture and 
the Canons. In this sense, the meaning must be excavated from the language of 
the old Canons.555
Dai Zhen’s methods are not only methods of viewing the ancient Canons, 
but also methods that lead to his Confucian moral philosophy. He emphasises 
the importance of the understanding of the minds of the ancient sages and 
worthies, and claims that this can only be achieved through a knowledge of 
words and language.
Through his search for truth of the Canons, Dai demonstrates a concept of 
human nature in the context of the Canons’ moral philosophy.556 Dai Zhen 
concentrated on the Canons and on seeking a systematic way of thinking about 
human nature and seeking the way to be a sage that was based on the ethical 
philosophy of the Canons. In his works, he intended to discard the idea of the 
Song Confucian notion of the human and the sage, since he believed it to be 
based on the fallacies and mistakes of Zhu Xi’s theory, and to build a solid base
554 Xing zhuang, Quanji, v.7. p8.
555 Ling Yicheng, p.85.
556 Chan, Wingtsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963. p.711.
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from which to promote the correct understanding of human nature and the 
concept of the sage.557
The moral philosophy of Dai Zhen can be summarised as “fulfil desires and 
express feelings”. Because he believed that life is the most cherished thing for all 
humans and living things, he maintains that “whatever issues from desire is 
always for the sake of life and nurture.” He also claimed that “caring for oneself, 
and extending this care to those close to oneself, are both aspects of 
humanity”.558 He set up a strong monastic moral philosophy based on individual 
human desire and feeling.
According to Dai Zhen, the physical body is an important concept because 
all the characteristics of human nature are based on the physical body, and the 
ultimate virtue of life and things is hold onto life. Thus Dai Zhen claimed that it is 
because this bodily self exists that there are desires, feelings and the possibility 
of intellect; therefore, conversely, desires, feelings and intellect are all part of an 
individual’s physical body. Furthermore, his morality is also a part of himself, 
rather than being a transcendental abstract, as was believed by the Neo- 
Confucians.
According to Dai Zhen, ‘Nature’ means what is passed on to a thing in the 
course of its transformation in Heaven and on Earth. The size to which a thing is 
limited in the process of transformation is determined by a decree (ming), whilst it
557 Dai Zhen, Xu Yan, Article 2, Quanji, v. 6.
658 Shuzheng, Article 21. Ewell Trans.
247
is nature that shapes its form. By the decree of Dao, a thing develops into a 
concrete form and shape according to its prescribed nature, termed ‘capacity’
(icai). Everything has its individuality from Dao, and this process of transformation 
is called the individualising power of Dao. After the physical body has been 
transformed and characterised according to capacity, the body is accompanied 
by desire (yu), feeling (qing) and consciousness (yi).
The goodness of Dao is defined as the eternal activity of the production of 
life and things. Human nature is good because humans are living beings of blood 
and qi that emanated from Dao, and their conscious minds having the potential to 
develop their native endowments to the full.
Dai Zhen was not attempting to destroy metaphysics in general, but rather a 
particular metaphysical system, namely the Neo-Confucian metaphysics, called 
the metaphysics of//. He also attempted to construct a metaphysics of the human 
being based on Dao and qi. He rejected the Neo-Confucian notion of li, and 
instead affirms li as being the universal needs and feelings of man. As a principle 
of reality and benevolence, according to Dai Zhen, the definition of li should be 
rectified to re-assume its true sense as intended by Confucius and Mencius.559
According to the Song Confucians, li is the universal principle, form, and 
structure of things. It not only constitutes the guiding spirit of human nature but 
also represents the truth and reality of it; in effect, li is associated with the rational
559 Shuzheng, Article 16-19 .
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part of human nature. Man knows li because li is clearly present in man’s nature. 
The objectivity of li testifies to, and guarantees, the unity and uniformity of human 
nature. Li is therefore also the principle of virtue inherent in human nature. 
Everything else found in human existence is non-//, which has no virtue and is not 
to be tolerated.560 However, Dai Zhen rejected the abstract and metaphysical 
concept of li in Neo-Confucian philosophy as being not in accord with 
benevolence and or the reality of human desire and feeling.
Dai Zhen’s testimony on li, that is to say his perception of what principle is, 
derives from the Six Canons. In these tests, li is often paired with tiao and fen to 
mean the “internal texture” of things or the “order and arrangement” that can be 
distinguished among things and affairs. Therefore, when Dai Zhen uses the term 
“principle”, he is always referring to a pattern “that gives the whole its distinctive 
property or characteristic”. Dai Zhen’s concept of li can be explained in three 
ways: 1. Li is the pattern of things and is therefore not separate from things: it is 
the order of things. 2. Li is the overall understanding of human needs and 
feelings: order of desire and feeling. 3. Li is therefore the function of the intellect 
that enables man to recognise both these points -  the first and the second -  and 
it is this that forms the discerning and guiding ability of the mind to achieve 
comprehensive goodness in oneself, society, and the universe as a whole:561 it is 
the order of human understanding.
560 ibid. Article 1.
561 Chungying Cheng, 1971, p19-20. Dai Zhen also defines that principle is desire of intellectual.
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Generally speaking, the perpetual ethereal transformation in the universe is 
known as Dao; and in human affairs, Dao is the normal course of human 
relations in daily life, which is similar to the unceasing ethereal transformation. 
Dao’s functions of creative activity and ordering are further distinguished by its 
function of “making the nature" of things, that is to say making things what they 
are. That things become what they are is due to the further differentiations of the 
yin and yang into the so-called five agencies -  water, fire, wood, metal, and 
earth.562
Dai Zhen provides an analysis of the metaphysical phrases in the Book of 
the Changes: “what is antecedent to form” (xingershang) and “what is 
subsequent to form” (.xingerxia),563 in which we find that what Dai Zhen says 
about “what is antecedent to form” and certainly what he says about “what is 
subsequent to form” both fit into Zhu X i’s category of “what is within form.” Zhu 
Xi’s notion of “what is above form”, in other words, the realm of “principle”, simply 
does not exist in Dai Zhen’s thought.564
Dai Zhen defines nature (xing) as “allotments from yin and yang and the five 
elemental forces.” Each thing, animate or inanimate, follows its own allotment to 
assume a particular form, and each completes its own nature. Man has desires 
and feelings, and he also develops cunningness and intellect within himself; and,
562 Dai Zhen, Fa Xing Lun (On Law and Phenomena), Quanji, v.6.p.476.
563 YiXici, 1.12; cf. Leggetrans.
564 Shuzheng, Article 17.
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since a person’s nature is manifested in cunningness and intellect, he develops a 
liking for and a repugnance to beauty, ugliness, right, and wrong.565 Dai remarks 
that a thing’s nature (xing) is derived from the ethereal forces of yin and yang. 
Thus, Dai Zhen claimed that the origins of humans and things do not go beyond 
yin, yang, and the five elemental forces; the source of our morality lies in our 
blood and qi and the knowing mind (xueqi zhixin).5m
That the mind (xin) knows // naturally is one possibility; that the mind comes 
independently to know //through an investigation of things is another.567 For Dai 
Zhen, the important point of Mencius’ statement lies in the phrase “to share in 
common is principle and righteousness.” Yi and //' can therefore be known only by 
a conscious mind; thus it is important that we should keep unhampered the 
mind’s faculties of distinguishing and judging. Dai Zhen believes that li is the 
internal ordering and balancing of feelings and desires that contribute to or lead 
to the being of an individual in all his relationships with other individuals. As such, 
feelings and desires need to pass the test of universal agreement and universal 
application in order to be justified:568
Every creature is different and every man is different according to their 
decree and capacity. Consequently, each creature has its own desires and 
feelings to fulfil and to express. It is according to decree and capacity that man
565 Ibid.
566 Ibid. Article 17.
567 Ibid. Chapter 2.
568 Ibid. Article 39.
251
has his physical body and all the senses, desires and feelings that make his life 
possible. And it is through the individualising power of Dao that man can perform 
moral activities as a subject.
The individualising power of Dao can therefore be called the power that 
gives both nature and decree to things, and hence the power that lays down the 
natural qualities of things for the things themselves and for their relationship with 
other things.569 It is suggested that to broaden and fulfil this excellence is the 
essence of man’s nature. As we have seen above, principle is the extension of 
human nature and moral virtue is the fulfilling of it.
Dai Zhen regards goodness and nature as overlapping: ‘nature’ refers to 
concrete things and their development, and goodness to the balanced and 
perfect development of natural things. For a thing to be called good, that thing 
must be in accord with the nature of Heaven and Earth. Different things may have 
different natures, but their goodness is always one.
According to Dai Zhen, the five human relationships are referred to as the 
Way of Man (rendao) in the Doctrine of the Mean, because man cannot act 
outside the context of these relationships. These five human relationships 
prescribe how human beings should act and live in the context of these 
relationships. It is by following these prescriptions that the nature of man will be 
developed. Virtues ail pertain to the preservation of human society and the
569 Shuzheng, Article 20.
development of individual natures in their social context. It is for this reason that 
benevolence is the virtue of preserving life among men and of developing 
individual natures in the context of man, and is considered the most basic virtue.
Dao is described as having a metaphysical value and an ethical value, 
because the creative activities of Dao are none other than the ethical value of 
human nature, which is equated with goodness. The foremost metaphysical 
value of Dao is benevolence, but there are two more cardinal values to be 
followed according to the function of Dao, namely propriety and righteousness. 
Only human intellect can fully understand of the virtues of Dao. The capacities 
necessary to comprehend these virtues are the mind and consciousness, as it is 
the mind itself that contains the very virtue of benevolence. All the desires of the 
body are benevolence (ren) when fulfilled in accordance with the regulation of the 
mind, and are therefore creative and beneficial.570
Dai Zhen pointed out that one may approximate benevolence by 
understanding and practising faithfulness or trusthfulness to oneself (zhong)\ that 
one may approximate propriety by understanding and practising integrity or 
truthfulness to others (x/n); and that one may approximate righteousness by 
understanding and practising empathy and compassion or reciprocity (sfrt/).571
570 Yuanshan, Chapter 3.
571 Translated by Graham as “Likening to oneself’
A. C. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao, La Salle, Illinois, 1989. pp. 20-21.
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These three moral values are different expressions of benevolence to be found in 
three different types of situation that a person has to face.
In explaining Dao and individual things in terms of goodness, Dai Zhen 
inevitably left unsolved the problem of evil and misconduct. For Dai Zhen, evil 
misconduct does not originate in and is not inherent in human nature, since 
human nature is a continuum of intelligence, feelings, and desires, all derived 
from, and also manifesting, the nature of Dao. Thus any evil or misconduct must 
be due to contingencies in the empirical developments of human capacities. In 
fact, according to Dai Zhen, evil or misconduct can be considered as the specific 
failure of individual men to achieve such virtues as benevolence, propriety and 
righteousness.572
If a person has not developed his capacities to the full, it is due to two 
possible causes: selfishness and delusion. Dai Zhen calls selfishness {si) the 
failure to have universal regard for other men’s desires in one’s attempt to satisfy 
one’s own desires, and the failure to have universal agreement for the feelings of 
other men in judging them as partiality (pian).573
The best way to rid oneself of selfishness is to adopt selflessness, whereas 
the best way to set oneself free from being beclouded is to engage in learning. A 
person who has the qualities of benevolence and intellect is neither selfish nor
572 Yuanshan, Chapter 2.
573 Shuzheng, Articles 30 -  39.
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beclouded; a person who attains an understanding of the unceasing production 
and reproduction of things in the universe is a man of benevolence; and a person 
who gains an understanding of the orderly principle of things is a man of intellect.
There is no better method than to strengthen one’s virtue of compassion 
(s/?u), that is to say the universal regard for the desires and feelings of other 
people. Furthermore, if one wants to remove beclouding from one’s mind and 
intelligence, there is no better method than to concentrate on the learning (xue) of 
the Canons.
Dai Zhen offers a simple explanation when asked why we must learn. If 
humans accept that they are human, then learning naturally ensues. Humans will 
never be able to rid themselves of their likes and dislikes, for their likes and 
dislikes are the sources of their human benevolence. They are the reason that 
humans are able to empathise with the circumstances of others.
Learning the Canons, then, can be said to consist of finding the specific 
patterning and ordering of things by the “synthesis” and “analysis” of specific 
objects. This is directly opposed to the speculative methods of Neo- 
Confucianism. In applying his method of investigation to the study of classical 
Confucian doctrine, Dai Zhen naturally found it necessary investigate the 
meanings of words, as well as institutional histories, so as to discover and 
understand the truth of Dao. Thus, when Dai Zhen speaks of the “investigation of 
things for the extension of knowledge.”
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